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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
RACE/ETHNICITY IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE 
The era following World War II which signaled the beginning of 
decolonialization has witnessed a renewed interest by sociologists in 
the question of race and ethnic relations. This renewed interest in 
research and theory building reflects, more than anything else, the 
persistance of ethnicity and the emergence of many ethnic conflicts 
within and between societies around the world. Aside from class, race 
and ethnicity are probably the most widely recognized lines along which 
cleavages within most of the world's societies occur. According to 
Glazer and Moynihan, until quite recently in the west "the 
preoccupation with property relations obscured ethnic ones", at least in 
Western societies, but now "it is property that begins to seem 
derivative, and ethnicity that seems to become a more fundamental source 
of stratification". 1 
The emergence of racial/ethnic conflicts, however, stands in direct 
contradiction to the assertions by early sociologists of the inevitable 
mitigation and even disappearance of race/ethnicity as a factor in intra 
and inter-societal relations. Weber, for example, argued that ethnicity 
1 Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, Ethnicity: Theory and 
Experience, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975, p. 17. 
1 
2 
or 'ethnic honour' is one more example of irrationality. According to 
him, communal consciousness and ethnic identity flourished only in the 
absence of 'rationally regulated action'. Hence, ethnic consciousness 
and identity could not be expected to survive within the confines of 
bureaucratic rationality which Weber saw as sweeping over the western 
world. Karl Marx, similarly, described what he called the "remains of 
nationalities" as "fanatic partisans of the counter-revolution" and 
foresaw their disappearance as an inevitable outcome of the 'great 
historical revolution' . 2 Tonnies' famous dichotomy of gemeinschaft and 
gesellschaft also reflected a process whereby irrational, kin-like or 
tribal bonds between people give way to affiliation based on mutual 
interest and need. Durkheim, similarly, talked about the process where 
organic solidarity would replace mechanical solidarity. The fact that 
ethnic relations were long ignored by sociologists is partly due to such 
assertions by the sociological giants. According to Rex, for a long 
time race was considered the domain of biology but, he adds, "even 
..... when the falseness of racist biology was systematically exposed, 
some sociologists were inclined to argue that the problem simply did not 
exist." 3 
The historical development of race and ethnic relations, however, 
proves that neither industrialization, modernization and urbanization, 
nor class solidarity have been powerful enough to do away with ethnicity 
2 Parkin, F., Marxism and Class Theory: ~Bourgeois Critique. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1979, p. 31. 
3 Rex, J., Race Relations and Sociological Theory, Schocken Books 
Inc. New York: N.Y. 1970, p. 1. 
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as a focal point of societal cleavages. The inadequacy of the earlier 
formulations is magnified not only by the persistence of racial and 
ethnic conflicts but also by the intensification of these conflicts. we 
need alternative explanations. 
Contemporary Racial and Ethnic Theorizing: 
The last two decades have witnessed a renewed interest by 
sociologists in the study of racial and ethnic problems. As research 
efforts intensified several theorizing patterns began to emerge. Among 
the areas of ethnic relations that have received the most attention have 
been: ethnic prejudice, consciousness and identity, and ethnic 
solidarity. The underlying assumption of most research in these areas 
seem to be the argument that, given the level of modernization and 
industrialization, and given the fact that ascriptive criteria are being 
replaced by achievement criteria, (for assigning roles, positions, 
rewards and privilages), then integration and assimilation will be 
forthcoming. The structural and political arrangements of western 
liberal democracies in particular were considered conducive to the 
promotion of a value consensus and therefore to integration and 
assimilation. It is also generally assumed in such arguments that the 
system is interested in promoting social harmony. Because one of the 
characteristics of the capitalist system is that it operates through 
economic rationality and, since social harmony and the absence of 
conflict are in line with such economic rationality, it seemed not 
unreasonable to attribute the lack of ethnic integration or its slow 
4 
process to factors other than structural or political. This is 
especially so when the public ideology speaks loudly of such goals. 
Thus, when studying ethnic groups, researchers have stressed cultural 
variables, miscegenation, or as Harris (1959) prefers it 'endogamy' vs. 
'exogamy', attitudes, prejudices, patterns of residential segregation 
and the like. All of these variables are said to result either in the 
emergence of 'collective identity' which hinders integration, or enhance 
integration and assimilation. While the study of these variables is 
important and at times can yield some explanations it does not in and of 
itself adequately explain either the persistence of ethnic conflicts or 
their inter and intra-societal variations. 
Because such approaches failed to account for the continued 
persistence of ethnic conflicts, another 'extreme' view, to use 
Bonacich' s term, 4 which argues for the primordialness of ethnicity 
emerged. This view argues that ethnicity, race, and nationality (in 
short, communalistic frames) are 'natural bonds' which link people 
together. Such a bond is strongest when shared ancestry is the common 
denominator. However, according to Bonacich there are at least three 
reasons for questioning the primordial nature of such communalistic 
ties. First, as a result of interbreeding, a mixed ancestry is 
continuously being generated which makes it problematic to define ethnic 
boundaries. 5 Second, intra-ethnic conflicts and class struggles have 
4 Bonacich, E., 'Class Approaches to Ethnicity and Class', The 
Insurgent Sociologist, vol. X, no. 2, Fall, 1980, p. 10. 
5 In his comparative analysis of four societies (Mexico, Brazile, the 
U.S. and South Africa), Van den Berghe (1967) argued that where these 
5 
persisted in spite of shared ancestry. Third, the fierceness of 
conflicts based on ethnicity, race, and nationality is not dependent 
upon shared ancestry. In other words, the fact that ethnic groups share 
common ancestry does not necessarily make the inter-ethnic conflicts 
milder and vice versa. 
Because of these reasons Bonacich concludes that "ethnic, national, 
and racial solidarity and antagonism are all socially created phenomena" 
which use "primordial sentiments". But these sentiments which are based 
on ances"try are "not just there", they must be "constructed" and 
"activated".' 
The model of primordial ethnicity theory accepts ethnic division as 
given and proceeds to comment on its consequences. These are seen as 
either negative in the form of discrimination against out-groups or 
positive in the form of support for the in-group members. Such analysis 
is typical of the psychologically rooted tradition which can best be 
characterized as ahistorical and politically naive. Criticism has been 
levelled against such approaches for their inadequacy to explain much. 
As Wolpe noted: 
In sum, a member from a racial group is treated unequally, it is 
asserted, because he is defined as a member of that group ..... This 
would seem to give rise to questions concerning the conditions in 
which definitions or attitudes of hostility arise but, in fact, 
sociologists who adopt this approach take this simply as given and, 
as a consequence, race relations are removed from both an economic 
and structural context and treated as an area sui generis. 7 
interbreeding or, miscegenation were accepted racism was lowest. 
6 Bonacich, E., 1980, p. 11. 
7 Wolpe, H., 'Industrialization and Race in South Africa'. In: 
6 
Van den Burghe accuses such research of trivializing race/ethnicity and 
characterizes sociologists who undertake such approaches as conservative 
and politically naive, He said: 
The stance of the liberal academic establishment on the issue of 
race was not only conservative and politically naive, it was also 
bad sociology, because it attacked mostly epiphenomena like 
attitudes, stereotypes, and discrimination rather than the 
underlying historical, economic, and political causes of racism. 
A~ trivial questions and you get trivial answers. And, at the 
policy level, trivial answers cannot solve fundamental problems ... • 
Schermerhorn complained that in recent years the trend has been to 
depend more on updating the results of scientific studies in the field 
than on "rethinking them". 9 
A decade later a similar criticism was levelled against the 
inadequacy of research on racial/ethnic relations. In the fall of 1980, 
for example, a special edition was published by The Insurgent 
Sociologist designed to further the development of sociology of race and 
ethnicity which placed them, according to the Binghamton Collective, 
" ... within the larger context of class, capitalist development, anti-
imperialist struggles and the transition to socialism. 1110 The editorial 
board argues that "Sociologists have followed the lead of journalists 
and politicians in focusing upon racial/ethnic tensions, while ignoring 
the class and colonial bases for conflicts which have arisen at various 
Zubaida, S. (ed.), Race and Racialism, London: Tanistock Publication, 
1970, p. 156. 
8 Van den Burghe, Intergroup Relations, Basic Books, New York, 1972, 
pp. 10-11. 
9 Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory 
and Research, New York: Random House, 1970, p. 9. 
10 The Insurgent Sociologist, vol. X, no. 2, Fall 1980, p. 3. 
7 
periods in time ..... These simplistic analyses contribute to the 
mystification process and tend to reinforce a conservative, status-quo 
line of political action." 11 
Despite such criticisms, or perhaps because of it, sociological 
inquiry into the field of race/ethnic relations has continued to yield 
sever•l theoretical formulations. The most recent of such theoretical 
formulation is the 'Split Labor Market Theory', which relates ethnic 
antagonism to conflicting economic interests between, basically, two 
classes: capitalists and high paid workers. 12 Its claim to validity 
lies in the fact that it avoids the pitfalls inherent in attributing 
ethnic discrimination to primordial human nature and the notion that 
ethnic solidarity, and hence ethnic discrimination, is a remnant of pre-
capitalist societies and expected to vanish with modernization. 
Consequently, in explaining group variations of ethnic antagonism, 
majority-minority relations are not treated as a simple dichotomy. 
Rather, majority groups are identified and their relations with and 
attitudes towards the minority are analyzed on the basis of their 
material interests. 
Such a treatment of the majority is befitting the Israeli case in 
which the status of the Arab minority has been sensitive to intra-Jewish 
cleavages. While on the surface it appears that differential attitudes 
11 Ibid. 
12 Bonacich, E., 
Market' . American 
547-59. 
'A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor 
Sociological Review, vol. 37, (October), pp. 
8 
toward the Arabs are split along ethnic lines (Oriental- Ashkenazi), 13 
in reality this split is rooted in the conflicting material interests of 
the two Jewish ethnic groups which are derived from their different 
locations within the occupational hierarchy. 
From this perspective there is a remarkable similarity between Israel 
and S~th Africa where the status of the nonwhites was shown to be 
influenced by conflicting material interests between business and white 
labor. 14 In her analysis Bonacich shows that there exists a definite 
relationship between the occupational location of members of the 
'majority' (white minority) and their attitude toward the nonwhites. 
She has shown that the status of the colored in South Africa has been 
contingent upon the results of a continuous struggle between two 'white' 
groups with conflicting material interests: capitalists and labor. 
Accordingly, Bonacich was able to map-out the attitudes of each group 
with regard to policies related to the coloreds and document the methods 
by which these attitudes have been institutionalized and are expressed. 
13 Among all the terms used to indicate the Jewish ethnic cleavages 
in Israel, Oriental-Ashkenazi seems the most adequate. 'Orientals' is 
used instead of 'Sephardim' because Sephardim includes European Jews 
from England, France, Italy, and Greece, who were dispersed from Spain 
following the Crusades in Europe and the Spanish Inquisition (see 
Schnall, D., Radical Dissent in Contemporary Israeli Politics, New York: 
Preager Publishers, 1979, f.n. p. 156). Similarly, while some writers 
prefer the use of the term 'Western' others prefer Ashkenazi. Although 
'Ashkenaz' means Germany, the term has gained a wide usage in Israeli 
society and has come to describe the privilaged non-Oriental Jewish 
population which includes Jews from Europe, America, and even Russia. 
Hence, throughout this thesis the terms Orientals and Ashkenazim will be 
used to identify two culturally distinct Jewish ethnic communities. 
14 See Bonacich, E., 'Capitalism and Race Relations in South Africa: 
A Split Labor Market Analysis'. In: Zeitlin, M. (ed.), Political Power 
and Social Theory, vol. 2, Greenwich: Connecticut, 1980, pp. 239-271. 
9 
In her analysis, labor is shown to be more hostile toward the colored 
and has continuously supported exclusionary policies whereas capitalists 
were shown to be more supportive of inclusionary policies. 
Since the split labor market theory will be used throughout this 
analysis an expanded presentation of its concepts and theoretical 
under~nnings is necessary. 
10 
THE SPLIT LABOR MARKET - THEORETICAL FORMULATION 
The theory of the split labor market has been undergoing modification 
and refinement ever since it was first formulated by Edna Bonacich in 
1972. The most recent modification was introduced in 1986 by Bosewell 
who elaborated and clarified some of its concepts, and introduced new 
ones cJt his own. 15 
The general premise of the theory is that economic processes are more 
'fundamental' to the development of ethnic antagonism in a given society 
than racial and cultural differences. The key concept, ' ethnic 
antagonism', was chosen by Bonacich for analytical accuracy. The use of 
the term 'ethnic' was preferred over the term 'racial' for two reasons; 
a) while races come from continents, Bonacich argues, ethnic groups come 
from 'subsections of continents'; b) discrimination (exclusion and/or 
caste-like treatment) could be found 'among national groupings within a 
racial category. 116 Similarly, the term antagonism was preferred over 
other terms such as prejudice and discrimination because the former 
carries 'fewer moralistic and theoretical assumptions' in that it allows 
for the possibility of reciprocity. 
The central hypothesis is that ethnic antagonism is one of the 
consequences of a labor market split along ethnic lines. In order for a 
labor market to be split two conditions have to be met: a) two or more 
15 Bosewell, T., 'A Split Labor Market Analysis of Discrimination 
Against Chinese Immigrants, 1850-1882,' American Sociological Review, 
1986, Vol. 51 June PP. 353-71. 
16 Bonacich, 1972, p. 75. 
11 
labor groups must exist in a society, and b) there must exist a 
discrepancy in the price of labor for doing the same work, or that a 
discrepancy in their price would exist if they were to do the same work. 
This split in the labor force is usually superimposed on the market by 
the business community. As a result of the expansion of the economy 
and/or high benefits and wages gained by local labor, business tends to 
turn to other sources of labor power. These sources are found either 
locally in distant and isolated communities, or through the importation 
of foreign labor, or through frontier expansion and occupation. The 
newly acquired labor force is paid, usually, less than the local labor. 
As a result of discrepancies in the price of labor, a conflict 
develops between "three key classes: business, high paid labor, and 
cheap labor" 17 The business class is mainly interested in keeping 
production costs as low as possible in order to compete in the market 
and/or increase the margin of profitability. Thus, when local labor 
costs are high business tends to either import cheap labor or use 
"indigenous conquered populations". Consequently, the higher paid labor 
feels threatened since the new class of cheap labor will replace the 
higher paid labor in some industries and/or geographical areas which has 
the effect of undermining the bargaining power of the high paid labor. 
In reaction high paid labor develops hostility and antagonism toward 
cheap labor, even though "cheap labor does not intentionally undermine 
more expensive labor". 18 In fact it is the cheap labor's weakness, 
1 7 Ibid. , p. 81. 
18 Ibid. , p. 83. 
12 
Bonacich argues, "that makes it so threatening, for business can more 
thoroughly control it." 19 If such a split in the labor market occurs 
along ethnic lines, Bonacich argues, then "the class antagonism takes 
the form of ethnic antagonism" 20 
Although the concept antagonism was chosen to allow for reciprocity, 
cheap labor initially plays only a passive role. The major conflict 
develops between the high paid labor and business. A victory for the 
former is manifested in either exculsion of or caste-like treatment for 
minority labor. While the exclusion movement aims at preventing the 
physical presence of cheap labor in and around employment areas, the 
caste system attempts to apply exclusivity to the higher paying jobs and 
:i:estrict cheap labor from entering these categories. Both systems 
result in the preservation of high pay for already advantaged labor and 
discriminate against low paid workers. Exclusion, however, represents a 
more complete victory for the high paid labor and, therefore, Bonacich 
argues, it is the preferred system even if it means the high paid labor 
has "to do the dirty work" 21 themselves. 
The split labor market theory is essentially a materialistic theory 
in that it takes economics as its most basic variable. Bonacich argues 
that the status of ethnic minorities in the occupational structure is 
determined by the outcome of a continuous conflict between employers and 
'white' labor. The formation of attitudes toward minority labor is both 
19 Ibid., p. 81. 
20 Ibid., p. 82. 
2 1 Ibid. , p. 88. 
13 
a part and a product of this conflict. As will be seen this point is 
made clearer by Bosewell who introduces the notion of 'racist 
discourse'. The 'cheapness' of cheap labor is attributed by Bonacich to 
lack of 'resources' which are available to it at the point of 
origination, and the inability of such labor to organize politically and 
economically thereafter. 
In this sense Bonacich diverges from Marxist analysis which argues 
that the capitalist class aided by the powers of the state is basically 
responsible for the creation and maintenance of ethnic divisions. The 
racist attitudes of expensive labor are explained by Marxists as the 
result of being bought off by capital which is responsible for the 
diffusion of false ideology, for the purpose of segmenting the working 
class, and the eventual adoption of such ideology by expensive labor. 
According to Burawoy, a Marxist scholar, racism is used to divide 
because it "is such a powerful ideology, binding together classes within 
racial groups, shaping class interests, promoting particular 
configurations of alliances, and generally shaping the terrain and 
expressions of class struggle."22 Bonacich, on the other hand, accords 
expensive labor a major role in the power struggle and considers their 
racist attitudes to be a consequence of their attempt to protect 
themselves from being displaced by the cheap labor, at the initiative of 
capital. She argues that "Business ..... rather than desiring to 
protect a segment of the working class supports a liberal or laissez-
22 Burawoy, 'The Capitalist State of South Africa: Marxist and 
Sociological Perspectives on Race and Class'. In: Zeitlin, M. (ed.), 
Political Power and Social Theory, vol. 2, Greenwich: Connecticut, 
1980, p. 292. 
faire ideology that would permit all workers to compete freely in an 
open market. Open competition would displace higher paid labor." 23 
14 
While the theory has been successfully used to explain antagonism 
between blacks and whites 24 certain areas and concepts of the theory 
remain either ambiguous or undeveloped. Bosewell mentions three such 
areas. He, rightly, points out that: 1) there is an ambiguity 
concerning the dynamics which reproduce split labor market conditions; 
2) the theory completely neglects the function of a racist ideology, or 
what Bosewell calls 'racist discourse', and the role of the state; and 
3) the theory does not elaborate on the consequences of the reproduction 
of split labor market conditions and racist discourse for labor market 
segregation. 25 
Related to the first point is the question of the continued cheapness 
of cheap labor. Burawoy, for example, rejects the notion of cheap labor 
altogether. He argues that the responsibility of the state for the 
reproduction not only of labor power but the labor process, i.e., the 
reproduction of the system of exploitation as a whole, makes the 'price' 
of cheap labor rather expensive. This is because in order to guarantee 
the 'cheapness' of labor to the individual employer, the state oppresses 
struggles, regulates the flow of labor and so on. 26 
23 Bonacich, 1972, p. 87. 
24 see Bonacich, 1975, 1976, 1980; Wilson, 1978; Bosewell, 1986. 
25 Bosewell, 1986, pp. 353-55. 
26 See Burawoy, 1980, p. 285. 
15 
While this argument by Burawoy is basically correct it is only half 
the truth. If the state is as powerful as Burawoy believes it to be 
(which is not altogether erroneous), then the state can create and 
justify the existence of mechanisms through which the costs are passed 
on to minority labor. Such was the case, for example, with the Chinese 
immigrant workers who were required in 1852 by a California law to pay 
$3 per month for the privillage of mining. It did not matter that the 
law was declared unconstitutional in 1870 because by then mining had 
become unprofitable anyway. 27 Beyond that, maintaining 'law and order' 
and regulating the flow of minority labor in underdevelopd societies may 
not be as expensive as Burawoy supposes. One should remember that in 
such societies where unequal development is characteristic, minority 
labor is dependent on the developed segment for many services, the most 
important of which is transportation. Without such a service minority 
labor is usually immobile and unthreatening. 
In Israel, for instance, Ian Lustick (1980) shows that the Israeli 
authorities achieved almost total control over the Arab minority through 
three mechanisms all of which were handled at a fraction of the cost. 
These were: segmentation through isolation and fragmentation; economic 
dependence; and co-optation of leadership. The last is shown to be 
particularly effective and cheap in light of the traditional Arab mode 
of family organization exemplified by the extended family. 
27 For more details see Bosewell, 1986, p. 359. 
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Hence, although the intervention of the state is necessary to 
generate and maintain the cheapness of low-cost minority labor other 
factors influence the discrepancy in the price of labor and should be 
considered, at least during the initial stages. For example, the 
differential cost of labor can be a result of differential resources 
(economic and political) which are available to the two groups of labor 
respectively, as Bonacich argues. Or, such differentials in wages can 
simply be the product of "regional or national differences in income and 
the cost of living which result from uneven development of 
capitalism. " 2 8 While such conditions can produce differential wages 
during the initial stages they cannot accour,t for the continuation of 
the low cost of minority labor. Bonacich explains the continuation in 
wage differential, or more precisely the low cost of minority labor on 
the basis of what she calls "weak market position". 2 9 She does not 
define the source of this weakness, however. 
In fact, beyond the initial stages one should expect wages to 
eventually equalize due to an increase in demand for cheap labor and a 
corresponding decrease in demand for expensive labor (the logic of 
supply and demand). Unless, of course, other factors are introduced 
which cause overcrowdedness of cheap labor in certain industries and/or 
geographic locations. Under such circumstances the split labor market 
is reproduced, and hence the continued 'cheapness' of minority labor is 
guaranteed. According to Bosewell, "market crowding increases the 
28 Bosewell, 1986, p. 353. 
29 Bonacich, 1976, pp. 39-40. 
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relative supply of minority labor for a position, thus reproducing the 
ethnic split in labor cost. Crowding in one industry will push 
minorities to other industries, spreading split labor market conditions 
and ethnic antagonism throughout the labor market." 30 
To create such conditions the function of ideology and the role of 
the state must be considered. While Bonacich (1980) completely ignores 
the role of the state, Burawoy (1980), as noted, accords it a major role 
in creating and maintaining cheap minority labor. This is particularly 
true in the case of settler colonial situations such as South Africa and 
Israel. As will be shown later, through confiscation of Arab property 
the Israeli government increased the availability of Arab labor. 
However, restrictions imposed on the movement of this labor to certain 
geographic locations forced Arab labor to accept even cheaper wages than 
they would have otherwise. The eventual replacement of geographical 
restrictions by sectoral and positional restrictions resulted, 
furthermore, in overcrowdedness which has had the effect of maintaining 
Arab labor at low cost. Bosewell (1986) elaborates on the role of the 
state from a split labor market perspective. The intervention of the 
state is required in conjuction with a specific ideology because, 
according to Bosewel l, "the initial ethnic differences in the cost of 
labor will not be continually reproduced under competitive market 
conditions unless workers continue to be ideologically identified. 1131 
However, the state actions cannot be seen as totally dependent on the 
30 Bosewell, 1986, p. 353. 
31 Ibid., p. 354. 
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political power of the 'victorious', i.e., expensive labor or capital. 
It is also contingent upon "the potential effects on the economy in 
general and tax revenues in particular, the national and international 
political environment, and the sequence of elections." 32 
Bosewell makes a significant contribution by distinguishing between 
the long term interests of the working class and the interests of the 
individual worker. While the long term interest of the working class is 
to prevent discrimination, he argues, it is in the individual worker's 
interest to support state actions aimed at limiting the competitive 
potential of minority labor. 
32 Ibid., p. 354. 
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ARAB-JEWISH RELATIONS 
The Pre-State Period: 
Intra-Jewish conflict of interest with respect to the Arabs seems to 
have surfaced long before the state was established. This intra-Jewish 
conflict revolved around the employment status of the Arabs in Jewish 
businesses and was manifested despite the continuing Arab-Jewish bloody 
conflict over the land of Palestine throughout that period. 
Relations between Arabs and Jews began deteriorating in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century when Jews, represented by the Zionist 
Organization, announced their intentions to return to Palestine to 
"rebuild" a homeland for the Jewish people and were exacerbated by the 
subsequent Jewish immigration which followed. Prior to that period, the 
Jewish community living in Palestine had developed good relations with 
the Arabs. Numbering around 24,000 and living mostly in the four towns 
of Hebron, Safed, Jerusalem and Tiberias, half of this Jewish community 
was Sephardic (Oriental), and the other half Ashkenazi or European. 
Even then, however, relations between the Arabs and the two Jewish 
ethnic communities were differentiated. According to Kalvarisky, a 
Jewish administrator of the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association, 
The Sephardim,.... in the course of their work or commerce had 
business connections with the Arabs and sometimes went into 
partnership with them. The relations between the Sephardic Jews and 
the Arabs were good, and many Jews and Arabs became firm friends. 33 
33 Cited in A. Cohen, 1970, p. 46. 
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The Ashkenazim, on the other hand, are described as having had no 
contact with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. 
The nature of relations between the Arabs and the Ashkenazim, 
however, began to change with the arrival of the first Jewish immigrant 
group to Palestine. This group of immigrants, known as the first aliyah 
(literally "ascendance", but implies immigration to Palestine/Israel), 
comprising 25,000 Jews from Russia and Rumania arrived in Palestine 
during the period between 1882 and 1903. The new settlers, according to 
Lucas, "had a capitalistic and colonialistic approach to the land and 
the Arab population was seen as a reservoir of extraordinary cheap 
labour. 1134 Indeed, it is reported that these early immigrants employed 
ten times as many Arabs as Jews. 35 
The exploitation of the native Arabs was not dissimilar to colonial 
patterns on the African Continent and elsewhere. 36 It was characterized 
by the settlers' cultural distaste and racist antagonism toward the 
natives. 3 7 Accordingly, out of sense of a superiority the Jewish 
settlers referred to the Arabs of Palestine as barbarians. 38 
34 Lucas, N. The Modern History of Israel, London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1974, pp. 24-5. 
35 Hirst, D. The Gun and the Olive Branch, London: Faber and Faber, 
1977, p. 25. 
3 6 Weinstock, N. "The Impact of Zionist Colonization on Palestine 
Arab Society Before 1948". Journal of Palestine Studies, 2 (Winter), 
pp. 50-51. 
37 Childers, E. "The Worldless Wish: From Citizens to Refugees". In 
I. Abu-Lughod (ed.), The Transformation of Palestine, Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1971, p. 166. 
38 Hirst, 1977, p. 22. 
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While organized Jewish groups continued to immigrate to Palestine the 
newcomers were not united in their approach to the Arabs. Between 1882 
and May 1948 (just before the establishment of the state was 
proclaimed), 517,200 Jewish immigrants had arrived in Palestine, mostly 
from East European countries (see Table 1.1). Whereas the First aliyah 
sought after and exploited cheap Arab labor settlers of the Second and 
Third aliyahs (1904-1923) objected vehemently to the employment of Arabs 
in Jewish businesses and enterprises. It was during the Second aliyah 
that the concept of "conquest of labourn, which meant the replacement of 
Arab workers by Jewish workers, was first introduced. The Histadrut, 
which was founded in 1920 as the General Federation of Hebrew Workers, 
was the strongest and most militant of all organizations which opposed 
Arab employment. In 1933 the Histadrut began using even force to remove 
Arab workers from Jewish enterprises. 39 
39 See the statement by Flappan in Chapter 6. 
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Table 1.1 
Immigration of Jews to Palestine and Israel 
by Continent of Origin and Period of Immigration 
1882-1975 
Period All Asia & Eastern Central Balkans Western Others 
Countries Africa Europe Europe 
(thnds) % (1) % (2) % (3) % (4) 
1882-1903 25,000 4.0 96.0 0.0 0.0 
1904-14 40,000 5.0 95.0 o.o 0.0 
1919-23 35,100 4. 7 84.2 4.6 2.1 
1924-31 81,600 12.3 78.3 2.7 2.7 
1932-38 197,200 9.0 60.3 22.9 3.9 
1939-45 81,800 18.3 34.4 37.0 6.8 
1946-My48 56,500 4.0 67.7 21.0 4.5 
1948 101,819 14.0 53.0 8.2 21.4 
1949 239,576 47.5 27.5 12.6 9.5 
1950 170,215 49.6 44.9 2.8 0.9 
1951 175,129 70.8 25.7 1.3 1.1 
1952·-54 54,065 75.8 11. 7 2.7 2.1 
1955-57 164,936 68.2 23.0 5.7 0.2 
1958-60 75,487 36.0 55.5 1.9 0.4 
1961-64 288,046 60.5 31.9 1.2 0.2 
1965-67 60,793 37.8 13.6 2.3 0.1 
1968-73 247,802 26.8 37.5 2.2 0.1 
1974-75 52,007 9.2 62.4 1. 7 0.0 
(1) Excluding South Africa. 
(2) USSR, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania. 
(3) Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. 
(4) Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Turkey. 
Europe 
% (5) % 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
4.4 0.0 
4.0 0.0 
3.9 0.0 
3.5 0.0 
2.8 0.0 
0.7 2.6 
0.5 2.4 
0.6 1.2 
0.3 0.8 
3.8 3.9 
1. 7 1.1 
3.5 2.5 
4. 7 1.5 
8.8 4.2 
18.7 7.9 
19.5 7.2 
(5) Other European Countries, North America, South America, South 
Africa and Oceania. 
Source: Figures are calculated on the basis of Tables 2.7, p. 37 and 
2.11, p. 41, in Dov Friedlander, The Population of Israel, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1979; figures for the years 1882 to 1914 are 
from Sammy Smooha, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1978, Table 9, p. 281. 
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It is important to note that while Jewish immigration to Palestine 
was continuing, more and more Arab peasants became hired labor. This 
was precipitated mostly by land purchases by the Jewish National Fund 
(J.N.F) and the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association from 
Palestinian and non-Palestinian feudal landlords (See Chapter 4 for 
more details). Since the beginning of the twentieth century the two 
agencies had embarked upon an ambitious program of land purchases 
through which large tracts of land were bought during a relatively short 
period of time. These purchases, however, resulted in either 
disposession or eviction of the Arab peasants who were working the land. 
Having led a peasant life and lacking other alternatives the Arabs were 
willing to work for low wages. This fact was never absent from the 
minds of Jewish employers as well as Jewish workers. As Granott 
testifies: 
The extent of Jewish labor in the old villages, which served as the 
center for private agricultural investment, was as a rule only 
limited, and even in those plantations which engaged Jewish workers, 
there was always a group of Arab employees receiving low wages in 
comparison with the Jews (emphasis added). The existence of such 
bodies of Arabs in Jewish villages was somewhat of a danger to 
security in times of emergency, and even more to the maintenance of 
a higher economic standard. 40 
As this quotation indicates Jewish employers were not completely at 
liberty to reap the fruits of cheap Arab labor. Various Jewish groups 
fought against it and attempted to prevent it. Tensions among the 
Jewish population concerning the status of Arab labor surfaced as early 
as the early 1900's. The different resolutions passed by the Zionist 
40 Abraham Granott, Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel, London: 
Ayre and Spottiswood, 1956, p. 51. 
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organization and the Histadrut condemning and prohibiting employment of 
Arab labor in Jewish businesses and enterprises, and prescribing 
,sanctions against Jewish violators testifies to the seriousness of the 
"problem". This is to say, in addition to the national conflict which 
characterized Arab-Jewish relations, there was a conflicting material 
interest among the different Jewish groups which played a significant 
role in determining relations of the different Jewish communities with 
and attitudes toward the Arabs. 
The Arab-Jewish war of 1948 ended, (at least temporarily), the bloody 
clashes between Arabs and Jews which had lasted almost fifty years. The 
immediate result of that was the establishment of the state of Israel 
and the dispersion of most of the Palestinian people who became refugees 
in adjacent Arab countries and elsewhere. A small Arab community, which 
numbered about 160,000 remained in Palestine and became a minority in 
the Jewish state. 
The Post-State Period: 
The state of war which has characterized relations between Israel and 
its Arab neighbours since 1948 has often been cited as the major 
impediment to the integration of the Arabs into the political, social 
and economic life of the state, mainly on security grounds. Government 
policy in the Arab sector, it is claimed, has been determined on the 
basis of security considerations. The claim has been made that Israeli 
Arabs, in view of their cultural affinity with the Arabs across the 
border and their physical and legal presence within the boundaries of 
Israel, pose a security risk to the state. 
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True, it would be an historical inaccuracy to ignore the national and 
security factors on shaping the predicament of the Arabs in Israel. 
After all, the Arabs are part of the Palestinian people who have been at 
war with the state since the beginning. Furthermore, it is doubtful 
that they have resigned themselves to accepting the state and its 
policies unconditionally. If anything the Arabs have been undergoing a 
process of re-Palestinianization and show an increased awareness of 
their Palestinian nationality and affiliation. 
Furthermore, between Arabs and Jews there are primary linguistic, 
cultural and religious differences which have been institutionalized and 
cannot be expected to weaken as a result of Arab modernization, social 
mobility, the end of the state of war, or any other development. The 
Arabs are Arabic-speakers whereas Hebrew is the official language of the 
state and the Jewish population. Arabs are either Arab or Palestinian 
in nationality and Moslem, Christian or Druze in religion. They are 
therefore alienated from the basic ideology of a Jewish and a Zionist 
state. 
In addition to their national and political losses, the Arabs have 
suffered great economic losses as a result of the establishment of the 
state. Many villages were destroyed during the 1948 war and the period 
after that, and much property and Arab land were confiscated. While 
some of the inhabitants of these villages remain in Israel they were 
never allowed to go back and reclaim their property and therefore became 
internal refugees. Add to that the fact that even though the Arabs are 
a minority in the Jewish state they are part of a greater majority in 
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the region. This is never forgotten by either the Arabs or the Jews. 
Hence, the national question constitutes a major division between Arabs 
and Jews in Israel. 
Several institutional arrangements have been built into the very 
structure of the state which are designed to emphasize its Jewish 
sectarian character and consequently increased the rigidity of the Arab-
Jewish division. Among these arrangements are: the Law of Return which 
grants automatic citizenship to Jews who immigrate to the state but not 
to Arabs; the adoption of Jewish symbols in the Israeli public domain; 
and, the induction of Jews but not Arabs into the armed forces. The 
last has come to constitute an admission criterion to many positions and 
job-categories and for entitlement to housing subsidies, grants, 
admission to institutions of higher education and even child allowances 
and other benefits. Using service in the armed forces as a basis for 
either entitlement or increased benefits -was done with the prior 
knowledge that the Arabs are the only group which would not qualify. In 
consequence, these arrangements have institutionalized the Arab-Jewish 
division favouring Jews and discouraging the development of Arab 
(Palestinian) nationalism. 
The security question is derived from this division. Consequently, 
certain policies and practices have been specifically designed to 
address the security issues which cover areas unrelated to security as 
the concept is applied in the West. To mention only one example, a 
return of those internal refugees to their former property would have 
been considered a threat to security, a possibility against which the 
Israeli authorities evidently felt compelled to guard. 
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Nonetheless, it would be equally misleading to attribute the state of 
Arab-Jewish relations in Israel to the national and security factors 
alone. For one thing the use of national security as a justification 
for differential treatment against the Arabs has been inconsistent. 41 In 
addition, the differential attitudes toward the Arabs among the Jewish 
population along the Ashkenazi-Oriental axis, for example, weakens the 
security argument. While antagonism and prejudice by both ethnic groups 
towards the Arabs are high, they are higher among the Orientals than 
among Ashkenazim (see Chapter 3). Hence, unless one is willing to make 
the unreasonable assumptions that either the Orientals are more 
conscious than the Ashkenazim of ~he security requirements of the state, 
or that Orientals are more chauvinistic than other Jews, it is very 
difficult to explain this variation in antagonism on the basis of 
security grounds. As Schermerhorn points out "prejudice is a product of 
situations, historical situations, economic situations, political 
situations; it is not a demon that emerges in people simply because they 
are depressed. 1142 
The limitations of the security argument can further be demonstrated 
when one considers the status of the Druze community. This community 
constitutes about 10 percent of the non-Jewish population. Despite the 
fact that members of this community are the only non-Jews who have been 
inducted into the armed forces, their status does not fare much better 
than that of the other members of the Arab minority when it comes to 
41 See Waschitz, 1975. 
42 Schermerhorn, 1970, p. 6. 
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land confiscation, economic development, or the attitudes of the Jewish 
majority. Beyond that, however, the validity of the security argument 
can be questioned on the grounds that many of the official and 
unofficial policies and practices toward the Arabs pertain to areas 
which have no bearing whatever on national security. The expropriation 
of Arab lands (Chapter 4) and the refusal of the Histadrut to admit Arab 
labor to its ranks until 1959 (Chapter 6), are only two examples. 
Liberalization of policies and practices toward the Arabs, as limited 
as they may be, which have ensued over the years despite the 
continuation of the state of war, suggests that other factors, in 
addition to the national aspect and the ensuing security considerations, 
are involved in the determination of the status of the Arabs. That 
these policies have not gone far enough toward integrating the Arabs in 
the social, political, and economic life of the state on an equal basis, 
despite the demonstrated military superiority of Israel vis-a-vis all 
the Arab countries combined, further reduces the explanatory power of 
the security argument. 
Between 1948 and 1959 Arabs were almost completely excluded from 
Israeli economic, political and social life. Through a combination of 
military government orders which restricted the movement of Arabs and 
controlled a wide range of their daily activities and the successful 
efforts by the Israeli labor union (Histadrut) to keep Arab labor away 
from the Jewish labor market, a rigid Arab-Jewish division was 
maintained. The residential segregation between Arabs and Jews further 
enhanced this division (Chapter 2). 
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While the Arab-Jewish division continues to be maintained, a certain 
elasticity in the dividing line began to appear in the late 1950's. 
This was represented by: 1) the beginning of a process of relaxation of 
travel restrictions, 2) the eventual abolition of the system of military 
government in 1966, 3) the extension of union protection by the 
Histadrut to Arab workers in 1959, and 4) the opening of certain social 
mobility routes, although limited, to Arabs. 
In this thesis, I will attempt to demonstrate that the status of the 
Arabs in Israel has been influenced by conflicting material interests of 
two Jewish ethnic groups: Ashkenazim and Orientals. It will be shown 
that, while the maintenance of a rigid Arab-Jewish division which 
excluded Arabs from the economic, political and social life of the state 
worked to the benefit of both Jewish groups, the Orientals benefited the 
most from such a situation. By contrast, Ashkenazim gain greater 
benefits from a certain elasticity in, but not the complete elimination 
of, the dividing line. 
A rigid division which excludes Arabs provides employment 
opportunities to educated Orientals who man those agencies which either 
control or serve the Arabs because of their knowledge of and familiarity 
with the Arabic language and Arabic culture. In addition, the exclusion 
of Arabs provides protection for lower class Orientals who mostly man 
unskilled and semi-skilled positions. A rigid Arab-Jewish division, 
however, limits the access of Ashkenazim (who are mostly either managers 
or employers) to cheap Arab labor. The maintenance of an elastic 
division, on the other hand , while it continues to benefit the Oriental 
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middle-class, does not provide as effective a measure for protecting the 
lower-class. As to Ashkenazim, elastically maintained division results 
in the expansion of the system (because of the need to create extra 
organizational apparatus to maintain the division) which enables the 
accommodation of some of the demands of Orientals for equality without 
any loss to Ashkenazim. At the same time Ashkenazim can enjoy greater 
access to Arab labor. Consequently, it will be shown that while 
Orientals express greater hostility and support exclusionary policies 
toward the Arabs, Ashkenazim support more 'liberalized' policies. 
Rather than being ethnically anchored, the intention of this thesis 
is to demonstrate that the heightened antagonism by Orientals toward the 
Arabs is partially derived from their material interests which are best 
served by the exclusion of Arabs. To be sure, the study does not intend 
to show the extent of discrimination and oppression against the Arabs in 
Israel. Much has already been said and written about the subject. Nor 
does the study intend to analyze Arab-Jewish relations in their 
totality. I only wish to demonstrate that the status of the Arabs in 
the Jewish state has been influenced by conflicting material interests 
of two Jewish ethnic groups; namely, Orientals and Ashkenazim. In 
consequence the analysis does not intend to detract from the 
significance of the national conflict between Arabs and Jews. The 
fundamental contradictions imbeded in the Arab-Jewish historical 
conflict over the land of Palestine continue to be the most significant 
element which governs the Arab-Jewish relations in Israel. My attempt 
here, therefore, is to add an additional dimension by examining the 
effects which the dynamics of the intra-Jewish conflicts have on 
maintaining the Arabs in a segregated, subordinate position, and to 
explain some of the changes which have accrued over time. 
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The significance of this analysis stems from the fact that if indeed 
the heightened Oriental antagonism toward the Arabs is anchored 
ethnically rather than being materially motivated, the ascendence of 
Orientals to positions of power in Israel should be particularly 
worrisome to the Arabs. Worth noting in this regard is the fact that 
the Orientals' ability to influence policies has been gaining momentum. 
This is partly due to their increasing proportion in the Jewish 
population due to a relatively high birthrate and a decline in 
immigration from Western countries. The Orientals constitute over 60 
percent of the Jewish population. While they are still grossly 
underrepresented in the country's military, political, and economic 
elites a noticeable rise in Oriental ascendance to positions of power 
(economic and political) can be expected. 
If, on the other hand, this analysis is correct, and the attitudes of 
the Orientals toward the Arabs are indeed a derivative of their material 
interests, then the prospects of Orientals gaining a substantial 
representation in the country's institutions will not be accompanied by 
any dramatic changes in policies toward the Arabs because a change in 
their occupational positions will lead to a subsequent shift in their 
material interests. 
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As to the attitudes of the Jewish population in general, while one 
expects antagonism against Arabs to remain high, a convergence of 
attitudes between Ashkenazim and Orientals is very likely. When such 
time comes and occupational positions and power are more equitably 
allocated between the two Jewish groups, it is likely that the Jewish 
ethnic cleavages will be transformed into class cleavages. But even 
then their attitudes toward the Arab population will continue to be 
antagonistic because the primary dynamic which governs their relations 
with this population; namely, control over enemy-affiliated minority, 
will remain essentially the same. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ARAB MINORITY 
The unequal development of the Arab and Jewish sectors in Palestine 
continued in the post-state period. Having come mostly from developed 
countries, Jewish immigrants (see Table 1.1) were more technologically 
and educationally advanced than the indigenous Palestinian Arabs. 
Furthermore, the economic activities of the Zionist organization and 
other Jewish institutions during the pre-state period undermined 
economic development in the Arab sector. 1 The persistence of these 
conditions meant that from the beginning of the state of Israel 
conditions existed which produced wage differentials between Arabs and 
Jews. 
In addition, the perpetual forced co-existence which typified Arab-
Jewish relations since the inception of the Zionist settlement did not 
change with the establishment of the state. To the contrary, the Arab-
Jewish division was now institutionalized. The maintenance of the Arab-
Jewish division legitimized discrimination against the Arabs and 
provided the ideological basis for the continuous reproduction of split 
labor market conditions, condemning the Arabs to dead-end low paying 
1 For further details on the effect of the Jewish economic activities 
on the Arab economy see Zureik, The Palestinians in Israel: ~ Study in 
Internal Colonialism, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1979, 
especially chapter 3. 
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jobs. Thus, while certain conditions initially existed which were 
responsible for the initial Arab-Jewish differentiation, others were 
'constructed' and became instrumental in perpetuating this 
differentiation. 
This chapter will describe these constructed conditions: the 
demographic distribution and continued segregation of Arabs; the 
methods, mechanisms and institutions responsible for boundary 
maintenance between Arabs and Jews; and the availability of and access 
to economic, educational and political resources. In addition, I will 
discuss the effect of ideology on how Arabs are viewed in Jewish 
academic circles which in turn has the effect of perpetuating the 
dominant ideology. 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARABS 
The most immediate consequence of the establishment of the state was 
the reduction of the demographic status of the Arabs from a majority to 
a minority. Close to 900,000 Palestinians inhabited Palestine at the 
time of the issuance of the Declaration of Independence proclaiming the 
establishment of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948. Following the 
1948 Arab-Jewish war, only 160,000 Arabs remained within what came to be 
known as the Armistic lines -- later the Green lines--. 2 The rest of the 
Palestinians were dispersed and became refugees scattered throughout the 
Middle-East and beyond. 
2 J. Abu-Lughod, 'The Demographic Transformation of Palestine', in I. 
Abu-Lughod (ed.) The Transformation of Palestine, Evanstons: 
Northwestern University Press, 1971, p. 161. 
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Hence, contact between Arabs and Jews involves what Stanley 
Lieberson 3 calls subordination of an indigenous population by a migrant 
group. Whereas the Arabs represent only a fraction of the original 
indigenous Palestinian people, the Jewish population grew mostly as a 
result of immigration. From 1882 to May 1948 (just before the 
proclamation of the establishment of the state), 517 ,200 Jews had 
immigrated to Palestine. From 1948 to 1975 another 1,629,875 Jews 
entered the country as immigrants (Table 1.1). 
While the number of Arabs in Israel increased over the years their 
relative proportion in the general population remained somewhat 
constant, ranging between 11 and 14 percent. High birthrates, 
especially within the Moslem community, a decrease in infant mortality, 
and low levels of out migration on the part of the Arabs seem to have 
offset the high level of immigration among the Jewish population (Table 
2.1) 
3 Lieberson, S., 'A Societal Theory of Race and Ethnic Relations.' 
American Sociological Review, 1961, vol. 26, pp. 902-10. 
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TABLE 2.1 
Jewish and Arab Population in Israel: 
1949-1981 (in thousands) 
Year Total Jews Arabs Arabs as % 
Population of Total 
1949 1,173.9 1,013.9 160.0 13.6 
1955 1,789.1 1,590.5 198.6 11.1 
1960 2,150.4 1,911.3 239.1 11.1 
1965 2,598.4 2,299.1 299.3 11.5 
1970 2,944.0(a) 2,582.0 362.0 12.3 
1975 3,405.2 2,959.4 445.8 13.1 
1980 3,811.7 3,282.7 529.0 13.8 
1981 3,877.3 3,320.3 545.0 14.0 
Source: Statistical Abstracts of Israel, Jerusalem, no. 33, 1982, p.31 
(a) Includes Arabs of East-Jerusalem. 
It is estimated that almost 70 percent of the Arabs are Mos lems, 4 
about 20 percent Christians and 10 percent Druze. 5 
The great majority of the Palestinians who had inhabited the area in 
which Israel was established either fled or were forced out during the 
war or were expelled by the Israeli authorities thereafter. Only 107 
4 The addition of the Arabs of East Jerusalem raises the proportion 
of Moslems to about 78 percent. 
5 A sect which is an offshoot separated from Islam around the 11th 
century. The Druze are concentrated basically in Northern Israel, Syria 
and Lebanon. For a detailed yearly estimates in the relative proportions 
of the three religious groups, see Dove Friedlander, 1979, Table 2.4, 
p.34; Sabri Jiryis, 1976, Table 4, p. 291. 
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villages out of 585 in this area remained. 6 The large urban centers were 
almost totally emptied of their Arab inhabitants. Only 10 percent, or 
close to 29,000 Palestinians, out of the over 300,000 who inhabited the 
big urban centers of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Lydd-Ramleh, Nazareth, 
Akka, Tiberias and Safed remained in these cities. 7 
Most of the remaining Arabs live in Galilee in the North, with two 
other major concentrations in the Little Triangle, in the Center, and in 
the South where the Bedouins reside. The annexation of East Jerusalem 
since 1967, however, added another major concentration in the Jerusalem 
district (Table 2.2). As noted earlier, those Arabs, who numbered 
around 66, 000 in 1967, do not share the experience of the Arabs in 
Israel. They are still considered by most of the world community, which 
does not recognize the annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel, and in 
turn consider themselves to be, under occupation. While they are not 
included in this analyis, their inclusion in the demographic statistics 
is due to the difficulty of separating them from the general figures 
given by the Israeli Abstracts. 8 The increase in the Central district, 
however, came as a result of an agreement between Israel and Jordan in 
1949 which gave the former control over the villages of the Little 
Triangle. 
6 Zayyad, T., 1976, p. 94. 
7 See Lustick, I., 1980, Table 2, p. 49. 
8 The number of Arabs in East Jerusalem is estimated by Smooha (1978, 
p. 280), to have reached 92,000 in 1975. 
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TABLE 2.2 
Distribution of Arab Population by District: 
1948-1973 (percentages) 
District 1948 1961 1968 1973 
Jerusalem 1.4 1. 7 18.2 17.7 
North 73.4 57.8 48.0 47.6 
Haifa 8.4 19.4 16.3 16.4 
Central 2.2 10.4 9.2 9.6 
Tel-Aviv 3.2 2.7 1.9 1.8 
South 11.4 7.5 6.4 6.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Zureik, E., The Palestinians In Israel: ~ Study in Internal 
Colonialism, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1979, Table 5.2b, p. 110. 
The evacuation of the urban centers meant that most of the Arabs who 
remained in Israel were rural residents. Over 80 percent live in all-
Arab rural areas and two all-Arab towns (Nazareth and Shafa-Amr); the 
rest live in mixed towns the most notable of which are Akka, Haifa, Tel-
Aviv-Jaffa, Ramleh and Lydd (Table 2.3). 
TABLE 2.3 
Distribution of Arab Population by Area of Residence: 
1955-1973 (percent) 
Year All Arab All Arab Mixed Total 
Villages Settlements Settlements 
1955 74* 10 16 100.0 
1961 74* 13 13 100.0 
1971 69* 13 18 100.0 
1973 44 31 25** 100.0 
* Includes Bedouins, who by 1971 amounted to 10 percent of the Arab 
population. A settlement has a population of 5,000 or more. 
Altogether there are fifteen all-Arab settlements and six mixed 
settlements. 
** Includes East Jerusalem. 
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Source: Zureik, E., The Palestinians In Israel: ~ Study in Internal 
Colonialism, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1979, Table 5.3, p. 111. 
What is remarkable in Table 2.3 is the fact that since 1948 the Arabs 
have remained residentially segregated in their villages and no 
significant movement from village to urban centers can be detected. 
Even in the so-called mixed towns, Arab and Jewish neighborhoods are 
segregated. The Arabs usually inhabit those run-down and decaying 
neighborhoods under slum-like conditions: Wadi-Nusnas in Haifa; Hai-el-
Ajami in Jaffa, and the Old city in Akka are some examples. 
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The refusal of the authorities, as well as the Jewish public to 
integrate the Arabs in mixed neighborhoods is the most important single 
factor which is responsible for this segregation. Requests by Arabs to 
live in developmental towns such as Carmeil, Upper Nazareth and others 
have consistently been turned down by local Jewish authorities as well 
as officials of the housing ministry. Most telling is the experience of 
the Arabs in Akka. Despite their desparate need for housing and despite 
the existing vacancies in newly built apartment houses in the new city 
the Arabs are not admitted to those housing projects. Instead, they are 
being encouraged to transfer to Maker, a near-by village on the Western 
tip of lower Galilee, to housing units erected by the government for 
this purpose. 
As will be shown later, keeping the Arabs segregated in their 
villages and towns proved to be expedient for the purpose of control, 
and for discrimination in terms of government allocation of services, 
development funds and employment opportunities. In addition to being 
discriminatory, differential allocation has been particularly 
instrumental in perpetuating unequal development between the Arab and 
Jewish sectors and proved to be significant in reproducing split labor 
market conditions as a result of crowdedness of Arab labor in the only 
available jobs in the Jewish sector. 
It should not be understood from the above that the Arabs live in 
secluded areas far away from Jewish settlements and urban centers. The 
size of the country prevents such a conclusion. But beyond that, under 
a policy of Jewish population distribution the authorities have built 
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Jewish settlements and towns in the heart of every Arab concentration, 
which has had the effect of reducing the proportion of Arabs relative to 
Jews in all districts (see Table 2.4). 
TABLE 2.4 
Population Distribution of Arabs and Jews: 
1948-1971 (Percent) 
District 1948 1961 1971 
Jews Arabs Jews Arabs Jews Arabs 
Jerusalem 96 4 98 2 76 24 
North 37 63 58 42 51+ 46 
Haifa 84 16 82 13 84 16 
Centarl 87 13 93 7 92 8 
Tel-Aviv 99 1 99 1 99 1 
South 28 72 89 11 91 9 
Source: Zureik, E., The Palestinians In Israel: ~ Study in Internal 
Colonialism, London: Routledge & Kegan, 1979, Table 5.3, p. 111. 
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The most dramatic decreases in the proportion of Arabs occured in the 
Southern and Northern districts (Table 2.4). In the South the 
proportion of Arabs has decreased between 1948 and 1971 from 72 percent 
to only 9 percent. Similarly, the proprortion of Arabs in the Northern 
district has decreased over the same period from 63 percent to 46 
percent. While these decreases in the proportion of Arabs have been a 
result of systematic policy by the government this policy was not 
applied successfully in all districts. Although in the South the policy 
has been most successful, in the Northern District the success of the 
Israeli authorities has been rather limited, although the Arabs ceased 
to constitute a majority in the region. The 'Judaization of Galilee' is 
one such project designed to further reduce the proportion of Arabs in 
the Northern District.' 
While Arabs, as noted, are barred from residing in these settlements 
and towns, they are 'welcomed' as commuting laborers but not as 
enterpreneurs. 10 The immediate consequence of this policy of population 
distribution has been the tapping of all sources of cheap Arab labor by 
the Jewish settlements and employers. 
In addition to geographical segregation other societal and structural 
arrangements have also been constructed to emphasize the Arab-Jewish 
demarcating line. These will be discussed in the next section. 
9 See an expanded discussion of the programs and policies which are 
designed to address this issue in Zuriek, E., 1979, especially pages 
106-112. 
10 See the experience of the Arabs from Der-el-Asad, Bina, Nahef and 
Majd-el-Kurum with Carmiel, in Chapter 4. 
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SOCIETAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARY MAINTENANCE 
The Arab minority was promised full equality by the 'Declaration of 
Independence' which emphasized that Israel will maintain 'complete 
equality of social and political rights for all its citizens, without 
distinction of creed, race or sex'. The Declaration went on to call 
upon the 'sons of the Arab people dwelling in Israel to keep the peace 
and to play their part in building the state on the basis of full and 
equal citizinship'. Although they were enfranchised the Arabs became a 
nonassimilating minority in a state in which religion defines 
nationality, and ethnicity and class overlap. Membership in the group 
is ascriptive in that Arabs are born to their minority status. 
Several structural arrangements have made crossing over between the 
majority and minority groups very difficult. Among these, and the most 
important perhaps, is the legal separation between the religious 
communities and the unavailability of civil marriage which makes 
intermarriage impossible unless one of the parties converts so that 
marriage can take place within the confines of one religion. Civil 
marriage does not exist in Israel nor is it recognized. Hence, 
notwithstanding a few exceptions, endogamy is the practice of members of 
both majority and minority. In addition, the definition of a Jew as one 
who was either born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism limits 
the mobility of individual Arabs to a majority status to its minimum. 
Moreover, the Arabs are easily identifiable by a special combination of 
appearance, accent, name and address. The fact that the identity cards, 
which must be carried at all times and presented upon request,. state 
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clearly a person's identity as either Arab or Jew, eliminates ambiguity 
concerning one's identity altogether. Hence, Arabs can rarely pass as 
Jews. 
Discrimination against the Arabs was legitimized through other 
institutional arrangements which were built into the very structure of 
the state since the beginning and came to emphasize its Jewish sectarian 
character. The Law of Return was among the first laws to be enacted and 
it is one of the most exclusionary of the Israeli laws which represents 
to a great extent the state's sectarian character. By extending the 
right of citizenship to all Jews of the world who wish to immigrate to 
the state while refusing such rights to native Palestinian refugees the 
law clearly established a favourable status for Jews in Israel. The 
extensive incorporation of Jewish symbols in Israel's public domain, 
such as the flag with the star of David and the national anthem (which 
speaks of the Jewish 2000 years of yearning to return to the holy land), 
further testify to this Jewish sectarian character and act as an 
alienating force toward the Arabs. 
On the other hand, the policies and mechanisms which were, and 
continue to be, devised by the Israeli authorities to deal with the Arab 
minority seem to be aimed at continued segregation and subordination of 
this minority making them economically and politically dependent on the 
Jewish sector. The most diffuse pattern of this institutional behavior 
is reflected in the setting-up of special departments, within the 
ministries and other institutions, to handle the affairs of the 
minorities which include the Arabs. Needless to say these departments do 
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not apply the same standards and guidelines, in assesing needs and 
eligibility, which are applied to the Jewish population by the general 
departments. For example, programs and projects which are designed to 
aid certain underprivileged groups, such as subsidized public housing, 
income tax deductions, low interest loans and grants to investers are 
limited to the Jewish population. The local council of Ma'alot-Tarshiha 
in the northern district exemplifies this point in its extremity. The 
council was established in 1963 by a municipal union of Jewish Ma'alot 
and the Arab village of Tarshiha, to be a model of cooperation on an 
equal basis between Arabs and Jews. Despite the fact that the council 
has a common budget, the government continues to give preferential 
treatment to the Jewish population by classifying Ma' alot, but not 
Tarshiha, as a development town, a border settlement and a locality with 
a needy population. 11 
Differential treatment of Arabs by the authorities was further 
manifested in three other areas: free movement, land confiscation and 
service allocation. The movement of Arabs was restricted by the 
military government which was imposed on the Arabs between 1948 and 
1966. 12 Land was confiscated from Arabs and given to Jews, 13 and there 
has been a differential allocation of services such as connecting Arab 
villages to water and electric networks, pavement of roads, building of 
schools and development funds. These policies have resulted inevitably 
11 See Smooha, 1978, fn. 25, p. 399. 
12 See Chapter 5 for more details on the Emergency Regulations, the 
activities of the military government and the rationale given. 
13 See Chapter 4 for details. 
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in the generation of a surplus of Arab labor with employment 
alternatives being limited to Jewish businesses and enterprises which 
were not completely free to use this labor. The next section will 
present an overview of the experience of Arab labor. 
ARAB LABOR 
Despite the granting of full citizenship to Arabs the Histadrut and 
other labor organizations continued their pre-state struggle against the 
employment of Arabs. Only this time their success was almost complete 
in that Arabs were, until 1959, exc.luded from the labor market through 
two legally sanctioned methods: first, the Histadrut was put in charge 
of all labor exchanges through which it chose to serve only its members 
who were, by definition, Jews (Arabs were not admitted to the Histadrut 
until 1959); and second, the Arabs were placed under a military 
government and their movement out of their villages was restricted. To 
move out of the villages, even for the purpose of employment, Arabs 
required special permits which were issued by !!- regional military 
governor on a very selective and limited basis. 14 Hence, during the 
first few years of statehood, the Arabs had a very limited access to the 
Jewish labor market. 
On the other hand, the few employment alternatives which existed in 
the Arab villages were limited to agricultural work. An extensive 
program of Arab land confiscation by the Israeli authorities, however, 
eliminated many of these employment opportunities. This resulted in a 
14 See Chapter 5 for further details. 
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high unemployment rate among the Arabs. 
High unemployment rates were not limited to Arabs during this initial 
period of statehood, however. During the first few years the country 
experienced great economic difficulties which necessitated even the 
rationing of food and other commodities. Not until the mid fifties did 
the economy begin to show some signs of recovery. Until then the Jewish 
population experienced the highest unemployment rates the country was 
ever to experience (Table 2.5). The flow of hundreds of thousands of 
Jewish immigrants to the newly created state was the most important 
single factor which contributed to this state of affairs. Between 1948 
and 1951 over 686,000 new immigrants entered the country, half of them 
coming from Asia and North-Africa (Table 1.1). Clearly, unde:"." these 
conditions, namely, economic depression and hightened Jewish 
immigration, there was hardly any demand for Arab labor. Hence, labor 
organizations were successful in their bid to limit access of Arabs to 
the Jewish labor market. 
Year 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
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TABLE 2.5 
Unemployment as a Percent of the Labor Force 
1949 -1965 
Percent 
Unemployed 
13.9 
11. 2 
8.1 
8.8 
11.5 
9.2 
7 .4 
7.8 
6.9 
5.7 
5.5 
4.6 
3.6 
3.7 
3.6 
3.3 
3.6 
Civilian Labor Force 
(thousands) 
343 
450 
545 
584 
599 
608 
619 
646 
690 
698 
714 
736 
774 
818 
840 
884 
912 
Source: Nadav Halevi and Ruth Klinov-Malul, The economic Development of 
Israel, New York: Praeger, 1968, Table 14. 
Changes in both conditions beginning in the mid 1950's, i.e., 
expansion of the economy and a significant decline in the number of 
immigrants entering the country, precipitated an increased demand for 
Arab labor. Only 294 ,484 immigrants entered the country between 1952 
and 1960, which was less than half of what had entered the country 
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during the first three years of statehood (or a yearly average of 29,448 
compared with a yearly average of 228, 913 immigrants during the first 
period). But in order to have more open access to Arab labor it was 
necessary to lift, or at least partially relax, the restrictions on the 
movement of Arabs. A step the authorities proved willing to undertake, 
under pressure from different Jewish groups who began intensifying their 
campaign of opposition to the restrictions around 1958. This step 
proved to be the first on the road toward a gradual and eventually total 
elimination of the whole system of military government in 1966. 
The Arab labor force, which had been partially generated through land 
confiscation since 1948, was disoriented as a result of disposession and 
control by the military government. Lacking other employment 
alternatives this labor force was eager to work for wages and benefits 
below what was offered to Jewish labor. Most of the Arabs became wage-
earners working for Jewish employers. This increased the Arabs' 
dependence on the Jewish sector and the Jewish economy which gradually 
incorporated them heavily in the lower ranks of the occupational ladder 
concentrating mainly in specific employment sectors and job-categories. 
As will be shown, under these conditions the Histadrut elected to admit 
Arab laborers to its ranks 15 
15 See Chapter 6 for more details. 
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ARAB EDUCATION 
The Arab educational system and education for Arabs in Israeli 
universities is still problematic. Although more and more graduates of 
the Arab educational system are being accepted for higher education in 
Israeli universities, the situation is still far from satisfactory. In 
1983/84, for example, only 4.4 percent of the total Israeli students 
enrolled in Israeli universities were Arabs, (of whom only 25 percent 
were enrolled in the natural sciences). In addition, 1,900 out of 4,700 
or 41 per cent of total number of Arab students were enrolled in 
universities outside Israel. Statistics show that the proportion of 
Arab students to the Arab population in Israel is 4 students per 
thousand citizen. This proportion falls far below the Palestinian 
average of 40 students per thousand. 16 
Comparing Arab and Jewish students Mar'i shows that until 1973 Arab 
university students comprised 2 percent of the total student population 
in Israel. Since 1974, however, this proportion has increased to 3.5 
percent which is still very low relative to the 15 percent which 
represents the proportion of Arabs in the general population. 17 In 
addition, vocational schools for Arabs are scarce and where they exist 
they are usually poorly staffed and equipped. Despite a rising demand by 
the Arab population for such education the government is still very slow 
to respond. 18 
16 Falestine Althowrah, 22.6.85, No.563:33 (Arabic). 
17 Sami Mar' i, Arab Education in Israel, Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1978, p. 106. 
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Arab university graduates have great difficulty finding appropriate 
employment, commensurate in status and income with their training. In a 
government-sponsored survey of Arab university graduates who received 
their degrees between 1961 and 1971 it was found that 47.3 percent of 
those employed in white collar occupations worked as teachers. 19 Since 
nothing has been done to remedy this situation, it is likely that these 
findings continue to be reflected in current employment patterns. 
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
Although the Arabs are enfranchised, during the 38 years of Israel's 
existence, the Arabs have never been allowed to form their own political 
parties. On the contrary, any attempts at such political organization 
were very quickly suppressed. The late fifties and early sixties 
witnessed a particularly increased interest by the Arabs in organizing 
politically. The Al-Ard (the land) movement was the most serious of 
these attempts. All these attempts, however, were crushed. Not until the 
election of 1984 did the Arabs attempt to organize politically again. 
This time some elements of the Al-Ard movement formed a coalition with 
leftist Zionists to form a slate called 'The Progressive Slate for 
Peace'. Although the Elections Committee initially denied the group 
their request to run in the elections, through a subsequent appeal to 
and ruling by the High Court of Justice (Supreme Court) the group was 
granted the right to enter the elections. They were not allowed to 
campaign fully and were not sure they would be allowed to enter the 
18 Ibid., especially Chapter 8, pp. 145-172. 
19 Lustick, 1980, p.21. 
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elections, however, until a confrontational meeting with the minister of 
defense, who has the authority to outlaw the group despite the ruling by 
the Supreme Court, took place. During their meeting with the defense 
minister the Arab delegates were cross examined by the minister who, 
under intense pressure from the Jewish -delegates, finally gave the go-
ahead. The slate won two seats in the Knesset which were alloted to an 
Arab (head of the slate) and a Jew. The Arab member evetually lost his 
immunity on the ground that he holds extreme political views. 20 
EXPLAINING THE STATUS OF THE ARABS 
The Arab-Jewish division has continuously been used as a basis for 
explaining the predicament of the Arabs. Everything is derived from 
security requirements and every decision is claimed to be merely 
political as though politics are completely divorced of societal 
undercurrents. Such claims have been so widespread that even academic 
circles have come to accept the situation as fait accomplis. Despite 
the public and institutional recognition of the status of the Arabs as a 
separate ethnic entity they have rarely been considered by Israeli 
sociologists as an integral part of the Israeli society, differing 
ethnically yet deserving of analytic consideration and investigation 
within this framework. Indeed very little has been done in the form of 
any serious academic work concerning the Arabs in Israel. 21 This curious 
2 0 A personal communication with the Arab member of Knesset in 
November 1985. 
21 See Zureik, 1979, particularly Chapter 1. 
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lack of interest in the sociology of the Arabs in Israel is what 
prompted Lipset to conclude that: 
Almost none of the academic research and policy decisions about the 
problems of education, or social mobility, ever deal with Arab 
citizens of the country ..... Articles about the Israeli situation 
which break down attainments and statuses by ethnic background are 
generally headed 'The Israeli----- System', but have no column for 
over 400,000 Israeli Arabs who comprise 14 percent of the population 
of the state. 22 
As noted, such omissions are usually reasoned away by the claim that the 
problem of the Arabs is purely a political one. The following footnote 
by an established Israeli sociologist, Chaim Adler, in a paper entitled 
'Social Stratification and Education in Israel' is typical. He said: 
It ought to be stated quite clearly that this analysis does not deal 
with another aspect of stratification within Israel, namely the 
Arab-Jewish division. This has, unfortunately, so far been first and 
foremost a political problem and only secondarily a social or 
educational one. 23 
When such an 'apologetic' note is omitted, however, and the Arabs are 
included in the works, they are either underrepresented24 or, dealt with 
in terms of side issues. 25 Other investigations related to the Arabs 
have been limited mainly to socio-psychological and/or socio-
anthropological perspectives. 26 Henry Rosenfeld's research stands as an 
22 Seymour Lipset, "Education and Equality: Israel and the United 
States compared'', Society March/April, 1974, p. 65. 
2 3 Chaim Adler, "Social Stratification in Israel", Comparative 
Education Review, vol. 18, no. 1, p. 12. 
24 Out of 450 page book entitled "Israeli Society" Eisenstadt (1970) 
devotes no more than 16 pages to the Arabs. 
2 5 In a 700 page book entitled "Integration and Development in 
Israel" prepared by Eisenstadt, Bar Yosef and Adler (1970), the Arabs 
are represented through two articles entitled 'Sedentarization of the 
Beduins in Israel' and 'The Status of Arab Village Women'. 
26 See, for example, Raphael Patai's (1947) work on Middle Eastern 
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exception to the above rules. The most notable of his works is a 
research paper entitled 'The Origins of the Process of Proletarization 
and Urbanization of Arab peasants in Palestine' (1974). 
The lack of interest in, and under-representation of minorities in 
established sociological circles is not peculiar to Israel. In fact, as 
Zureik (1979) noted, interest in the sociology of minorities can be seen 
as a direct correlate of acts of protests and violence. Such research, 
when it is forthcoming, does not address the problems from the vantage 
point of the minorities. Rather, sociologists have tended to adopt the 
'official' labeling of what is problematic and borrow a world view which 
is in agreement with the dominant ideology. In this sense Zureik argues 
"it is the sociological locus of the problem which has become the 
problem itself" 2 7 such that "the formulation of the solution to a 
particular social problem is rooted within the problem itself, which in 
turn has been defined in terms of the minority at hand". 2 8 The Israeli 
sociologists do not seem to have deviated from such tendencies. 
The following quote from Sarni Smooha, himself an Iraqi Jew is only 
one example. Smooha writes: 
The mass of Jewish people regard the Arabs as outsiders, and their 
feelings toward them range from hostility, through contempt and 
pity, to indifference. They opt out of any responsibility for the 
Arabs, entrusting a free hand to the authorities to deal with them. 
societies, including Israel; Emanuel Marx's (196 7) research on the 
Beduins; Erik Cohen's (1971) work on Arab youth; Yochanan Peres' 
(1969,1971) investigations of Jewish-Arab ethnic relations; and Yalan et 
al. (1972) work on the modernization of Arab villages. 
27 Zureik, 1979, p. 4. 
28 Ibid. 
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The authorities being on the average more liberal than the general 
public, are interested in pacification and the continued compliance 
of the Israeli Arabs ... 29 
Irrespective of the accuracy of Smooha's description, the statement 
does not make clear why the authorities are more liberal than the 
general public, nor does it explain why this has continuously been the 
case despite the continued change in leadership. As will be shown in 
the next chapter the 'authorities' have not been independent of the 
influence of the general public in their policies toward the Arabs. Nor 
have policies been promulgated with complete disregard to their effect 
on the Jewish economy and population. More to the point, however, given 
the description of the harsh treatment of the Arabs it cannot be 
concluded that such has been a result of liberal policies. If anything 
the description by Smooha fits the dominant ideology which regards the 
Arabs as an inferior people and dispensable to the system. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter the major structures and mechanisms which define the 
boundaries between Arabs and Jews are identified. Boundaries have been 
maintained through residential segregation, institutional segmentation, 
laws and regulations, and the adoption of Jewish symbols in the public 
domain, which set Arabs apart from Jews. 
Whereas residential segregation and institutional segmentation made 
differentiation against the Arabs easy the laws and regulations provided 
not only the legal basis for this differentiation but also the 
29 Smooha, 1978, p. 46. 
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justifying ideology. Through segregation and institutional segmentation 
it was made easy, for example, to direct development funds to Jewish 
towns and settlements, encourage economic development through favorable 
tax laws, expand educational and recreational facilities in Jewish but 
not in Arab settlements. Even when Arab and Jewish settlements were 
grouped under one municipal jurisdiction, such as the case of Jewish 
Ma'alot and Arab Tarshiha, governmental and quasi-governmental agencies 
found the way to channel extra funds to the Jewish settlement only, by 
defining the Jewish but not the Arab as a development town, despite the 
geographic proximity of the two towns. 
As a consequence of these po~.icies the Arab and Jewish sectors 
continued to develop in an unequal pace. However, these policies and 
the accompanying unequal developments would not have been possible 
without clearly marked demarcating lines which were, and continue to be, 
maintained through residential segregation and institutional 
segmentation. 
While segregation and segmentation represent a manifestation of the 
physical separation between Arabs and Jews, this division would have 
been very difficult to maintain without the support of an ideology. 
Through the enaction of laws and the adoption of certain symbols, which 
emphasized the Jewish sectarian character of the state, the extension of 
superior status to Jews compared to the Arabs was justified. Hence, it 
was possible for governmental and quasi-governmental agencies such as 
the Histadrut to promulgate policies against the Arabs designed to 
further the Jewish interests. However, as it will be shown in the next 
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chapter some policies benefited certain Jewish groups more than others 
which resulted in the emergence of conflict of interests among the 
Jewish population. This conflict set the dynamics which underly changes 
in the attitudes of the Jewish population and in policies toward the 
Arab population. These dynamics will be discussed in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
THE JEWISH POPULATION AND THE ARABS 
A split labor market can be maintained only if the majority is 
clearly differentiated, and particularly if such a differentiation is 
along certain demarcating lines such as ethnicity. This chapter will 
highlight the Jewish inter-ethnic differentiation along the Ashkenazi-
Oriental lines emphasizing the respective benefits of each of the two 
ethnic groups from, and their attitudes toward, the different policies 
dealing with the Arabs. As part of the documentation of attitudes, 
voting trends in national elections will be examined in lieu of the 
advocated policies and platforms of two of the biggest political 
parties: Labor Alignment and the Likud. 
THE JEWISH INTER-ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND THE ARAB MINORITY 
Differentiation of the Jewish population along the Ashkenazi-Oriental 
lines seems to correspond to different attitudes along these lines 
toward the Arabs. Whereas Ashkenazim occupy managerial and elite 
positions in the economy, the polity and the military, Orientals man the 
lower rungs in all of these spheres. This Ashkenazi-Oriental division 
is well established in Israeli society and much has been written to 
describe and analyse its causes and consequences for Israeli society. 
While writers differ in their theoretical orientation and philosophical 
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leanings they all agree that a disparity exists between Ashkenazim and 
Orientals in the economic, social and political spheres. 
There are many causes for this Jewish inter-ethnic differentiation. 
While they will not be dealt with here extensively a few seem relevant 
to our discussion and therefore deserve attention. First, the 
immigration patterns: whereas the major Ashkenazi immigration pre-dates 
the establishment of the state, most Oriental immigrants arrived after 
the state and its institutions were already established (see Table 1.1). 
The implication of this is that not only did Orientals enter the new 
society from the bottom, they did not participate in the bloody fighting 
between Arabs and Jews which had lasted for almost fifty years prior to 
the establishment of the state. The fighting was carried out mostly by 
Ashkenazim who bore the consequences and paid the price. Thus, 
Ashkenazim have felt that they are the ones who are responsible for, and 
therefore they should enjoy the fruits of, the establishment of the 
state. 
Second, most Oriental immigrants came from Arab countries, speak the 
Arabic language, subscribe to the Arabic value system, and even resemble 
Arabs in their physical features. While they clearly had occupied a 
subordinate positions in these countries there is no evidence to suggest 
that they had been harshly mistreated. 1 The Ashkenazim, on the other 
hand, resemble European Gentiles and their cultural heritage is based on 
Yiddish, which is a German-Jewish dialect. 
1 See Smooha, pp. 49-50. 
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And third, Orientals were perceived and treated by Ashkenazim as 
inferiors who have nothing to offer the new society even before the 
establishment of the state: no efforts were expended by the Zionist 
Organization to either encourage or attract Oriental immigration to 
Palestine, nor were they received enthusiastically once they arrived in 
the country. 2 It was not an accident, therefore, that the social 
institutions which were built by the early comers, i.e. Ashkenazim, were 
geared to the needs of, and were controlled by Ashkenazim. According to 
Smooha, 
The neglect of the Oriental Jewry abroad by the Zionist movement was 
only duplicated by the East European establishment regarding 
Orientals in Palestine. Behind the lofty ideals of 'one people' and 
the neutralization of ethnicity there were the stark realities of 
superiority and paternalism of Ashkenazim toward Orientals which 
rendered impossible any meaningful relations between them. 
Orientals were looked upon as backward and incapable of contributing 
to the new society. They were considered marginal members of the 
Yishuv (Jewish Settlement) whose lack of adaptiveness was deplored, 
yet nothing was done to incorporate them as equal members. 3 
Even after they arrived in Israel the Orientals' reception was "far from 
cordial or enthusiastic". 4 
2 The experience of the Yemenite Jews who immigrated at the turn of 
the Twentieth Century provides a clear example of how Oriental Jews were 
treated and the role they occupied within the Yishuv. It is asserted 
that they not only occupied a subordinate position relative to the 
Ashkenazim but they were expected to play the role of Jewish working 
class and were treated accordingly, getting smaller plots of lands than 
did immigrants from Eastern Europe and smaller apartments etc. For a 
detailed history of the Yemenites' experience and treatment see Smooha, 
1978, pp. 54-55; Patai, 1970, pp. 187-8; Gluska, 1974, p. 110. 
3 Ibid., p. 59. 
4 Ibid., p. 86. 
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Clearly, as the above demonstrates, the similarities between Arabs 
and Orientals are striking. Arabs and Orientals share language, customs 
to a great extent, values, and a negative image bestowed upon both of 
them by Ashkenazim. Furthermore, since most Orientals immigrated after 
the state was established and the Arab-Jewish active hostility had 
subsided, they were saved the burden of exchanging reciprocal hostile 
acts with the Arabs. Hence, one would expect more cordial relations to 
have developed between Orientals and the Arabs. However, the evidence 
shows that the opposite happened. That is, Orientals are more hostile 
toward the Arabs than are Ashkenazim and support exclusionary policies . 
mJre often than do Ashkenazim. 
JEWISH DIFFERENTIAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ARABS 
Data from a variety of sources such as public polls, voting patterns 
and survey research point out that Orientals and Ashkenazim differ in 
their attitudes toward the Arabs. While systematic data are 
unfortunately not available, the few studies which attempted to address 
the subject seem to agree in their findings. On the basis of these 
studies three conclusions can be reached: 1) the proportion of those who 
express hostility toward the Arabs is very high among all Jewish groups; 
2) this level is higher among the religious than it is among the 
nonreligious; and 3) Oriental Jews, on the average, express negative and 
hostile attitudes in higher proportions than do Ashkenazim. 
For the following reasons the religious-nonreligious dichotomy will 
not be dealt with in this analysis. First, it is inherently difficult to 
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define the religious population. While the concept is vaguely defined, 
in Israel it connotes the orthodox Jews. This connotation, however, 
leaves out many reformists, observants and self-professed religious 
people. Certainly the three religious parties (the National Religious 
Party, Agudat Israel, and Poali Agudat Israel) do not.represent the 
entire religious population. According to Elyakim Rubinstein, only 13-15 
percent of the religious population vote for the religious parties. 5 
Second, the religious population cuts across ethnic as well as class 
lines. It is noted, for example, that the Oriental Jews vote 
disproportionately more for the National Religious Party. According to 
Smooha, the socioeconomic gaps between religious and nonreligions can be 
accounted for by ethnicity. 6 It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that 
the discrepancies in the expressed attitudes toward the Arabs between 
the religious and the nonreligious may also be understood as ethnically 
based. 
The finding that Orientals are more hostile to Arabs than are 
Ashkenazim was suprising even to veteran students of Israeli society. 
Commenting on the results of his survey on Jewish differential attitudes 
toward the Arabs in 1971 Peres wrote, "this discovery seems to be 
astonishing." 7 In 1971 when was asked about marrying an Arab in a state-
5 Elyakim Rubinstein, "The Lesser Parties in the Israeli Elections of 
1977". In Howard Penniman (ed.) Israel at the Polls: The Knesset 
Elections of 1977, American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, 
Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 177. 
6 See Smooha, 1978, p. 149 & p. 178. 
7 Peres, 1971, p. 1038. 
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wide sample of the adult urban population only 8 percent of Orientals 
said they 'agreed' or 'agreed but prefered a Jew' compared with 24 
percent Europeans. Twenty seven percent of the Orientals compared to 40 
percent of the Europeans expressed readiness for friendship with Arabs; 
and, 40 percent of Orientals compared to 48 percent of the Europeans 
expressed readiness to share a neighborhood with Arabs. 8 Furthermore, 85 
percent of the Orientals compared to only 64 percent of the Europeans 
agreed with the proposition that 'Arabs will not reach the level of 
progress of Jews'. And, 78 percent of the Orientals compared to 53 
percent of the Europeans did not want to have an Arab as a neighbor. 9 
Attitudes among the Jewish population toward the Arabs were also 
found to show significant diff irences when they were examined along the 
religious-nonreligious axis. In 1970 Zuckerman-Bareli, reported that as 
many as 94 percent of the religious and 89 percent of the partly 
observant, compared to 76 of the nonreligious, thought that the Israeli 
government did much or too much for the Israeli Arabs. 10 While the data, 
unfortunately, do not identify the ethnic origin of the respondents 
ethnicity can, nonetheless, be assumed to be a factor in the reported 
results. 
8 See Ibid., Table 11, p. 1039. 
9 See Ibid., Table 12, p. 1039. 
10 Zuckerman-Bareli, C., 'The Structure of Religious Concept-ion of 
Youth in Israeli Society', doctoral dissertation, Jerusalm: Hebrew 
University. Cited in Smooha, 1978, p. 199. 
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A substantial and ethnically differentiated antagonism continues to 
characterize attitudes of the Jewish population toward the Arabs. An 
unpublished study by the Van Lear Institute (a prestigious public 
opinion polling institute) reports that 40 percent of young Israelis are 
sympathetic to Meir Kahane or his ideas. 11 These ideas, which advocate a 
total expulsion of the Arabs from the state, are the most extreme ever 
expressed in public against the Arabs in Israel. 
Generally speaking, most interpretations of this phenomenon rely on 
socio-psychological models which are at best ahistorical and do not 
account for variation and change. Smooha, for example, is not sure 
whether the heightened hostility of Orientals toward the Arab5, is 
"largely a result of their lower socioeconomic status." 12 According to 
him, "it is possible that anti-Arab emotions and scapegoating are 
particularly intense among the Oriental lower classes as a result of the 
interaction of poor education, deprived status and blocked mobility." 13 
He further asserts that "the tensions generated by the conflicts among 
Jews are partially dispelled by scapegoating the Arabs. Lower-class 
Orientals are seemingly disposed to enhance their status within the 
Jewish quasi-cast by taking a harder line than the Ashkenazim against 
the Arabs." 14 
1 1 New Outlook, July, 1985, pp. 11-14. 
12 Ibid., P· 103. 
1 3 Ibid., p. 104. 
l" Ibid., p. 104. 
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Such interpretation is in line with the thought that Orientals aspire 
to be like Ashkenazim. This line of thinking negates reality which, if 
anything, shows an increase in Orientals' awareness of and rediscovered 
pride in their cultural heritage. This kind of thinking was dominant in 
the sixties and provided perhaps a framework upon which Peres (1971) 
based his analysis. Peres, a pioneer in the area of Arab-Jewish 
relations, asserts that "the Orientals feel that they must reject the 
remaining traces of their Middle Eastern origin to attain the status of 
the dominant European group. By expressing hostility to Arabs, an 
Oriental attempts to rid himself of the 'inferior' Arabic element in his 
own identity and adopt a position congenial to the European group which 
he desires to emulate" 15 
It is true that the cultural heritage carried by the Oriental Jews 
was detested by Ashkenazim during the fifties and sixties. It was 
feared that the impact of immigration from Middle-Eastern countries 
would have the effect of downgrading the Israeli society and many 
leaders articulated those fears in public, emphasizing the superiority 
of Ashkenazi culture and criticizing the culture, customs and values of 
the Orientals. Orientals were called primitive, ignorant and a people 
'with a 16th century level. ' 16 
15 Peres, Y., 1971, p. 1040. 
16 See quotes by Ben-Gorion, Israel's Prime Minister during the first 
decade and half; Eban, for a long time Israel's Foreign Minister; and, 
Golda Meir, and an expanded discussion of this point in Smooha, 1978, 
pp. 87-89. 
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Such an atmosphere may have generated certain feelings of inferiority 
among Oriental Jews. Furthermore, these feelings may have been even 
exacerbated by the fact that compared to Ashkenazim the contribution of 
Orientals to the establishment of the state was very limited. It should 
be recalled that most Orientals immigrated after the state had already 
been established. Hence, the burden of Israel's wars fell upon the 
shoulders of Ashkenazim who also reaped the glories of victory. Until 
1967 the Arab-Jewish wars (1948,1956) had produced Ashkenazi 'heroes' 
only. 
From this perspective the war of 1967 offered the Orientals an 
unprecedented opportunity because it offered them the chance to 
participate fully in the actual fighting and pay their dues to the 
system, so to speak. Furthermore, the occupation of vast and densely 
populated Arab areas (West-Bank, Gaza, Sinai and the Golan Heights) had 
two additional consequences. First, to communicate with and control the 
newly occupied Arab masses knowledge of the Arabic language and Arabic 
culture proved to be expedient. The fact that Orientals mastered these 
skills and were readily available to fill the newly opened positions 
highlighted their usefulness and contribution to the system, for the 
first time in the history of the state. Second, the continued 
occupation of these Arab areas also resulted in the expansion of the 
system which offered an opportunity to accomodate part of the Oriental 
elite without any loss to Ashkenazim. These developments capitalized on 
the early experiences of the system with the Arab minority prior to 
1967. 
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The early experiences show that the continuation of the state of war 
between Israel and the Arabs since 1948 coupled with the continued 
emphasis on the Jewish sectarian character of the state played a major 
role in solidifying the Arab-Jewish division. In and of itself the 
division gave Orientals the opportunity to stress their membership in 
the superior Jewish group, a status with which the Orientals were not 
familiar and had never experienced before and therefore were eager to 
emphasize. 
Nonetheless, while the status of superiority over the Arabs which is 
ensured by membership in the Jewish majority is not insignificant, the 
economic benefits which accrue to the Orientals as a result of 
maintaining a rigid Arab-Jewish division are no less important. These 
advantages for the Orientals are ubiquitous and serve all classes well. 
First, the agencies which either serve or control the Arabs provide many 
jobs for educated Orientals. This function cannot be overemphasized if 
one considers the fact that these agencies include several departments 
in the government ministries, in the Histadrut, political parties, 
Arabic-speaking schools and mass media, the internal security services 
and the police and most importantly the military government apparatus. 
While the last was abolished in 1966, in 1967 it was reinitiated in a 
much expanded version over the occupied territories of the West-Bank and 
the Gaza Strip. This provided, and continues to provide, considerable 
employment opportunities to Oriental Jews who speak the language and 
know the culture and whose loyalty to the state is never questioned. 
The support of Orientals for the continuation of the status quo in the 
occupied territories should be understood against this background. 
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Second, the continuation of exclusionary policies which translate 
into discrimination against the Arabs gives the Orientals an edge over 
the Arabs both during periods of recession and in times of full 
employment. During a recesssion the Arabs are the ones who are fired 
first, while during full employment the Arabs take up manual and low 
paid jobs, which has the effect of upward displacement of Orientals in 
the occupational hierarchy. 17 Recent comparative data show that Jewish 
in-mobility to the occupational category of office administrators 
between the years 1969 and 1982 was almost twice as high as Arabs, while 
out-mobility from unskilled labor of Jews and Arabs was about 3: 1 
ratio. 18 Furthermore, the authors also show that whereas Ashkenazim have 
experienced the highest in-mobility into the occupational category of 
professional, scientific and technical work, Orientals' mobility into 
the middle rungs positions as office administrators was the highest. 19 
The process of upward displacement of Orientals was further enhanced 
by the entry of the Arabs from the occupied territories, but it is 
significant to note that, irrespective of the findings of the study, the 
public in Israel perceives this to be the case. This perception was 
captured magificently in a monologue of a North African Jew recorded by 
the famous Israeli novelist Amos Oz: 
17 Stock, 1968, pp. 22-3. 
18 Lewen-Epstein, N. & Semyonov, M., 'Ethnic Group Mobility in the 
Israeli Labor Market'. American Sociological Review, 1986, vol. 51 
June, Table 1, p. 345, and p. 348. 
19 Ibid. 
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If they give back the territories the Arabs will stop coming to 
work, and then and there you'll put us back into the dead-end jobs 
like before .... Look at my daughter; she works in a bank now, and 
every evening an Arab comes to clean the building. All you want is 
to dump her from the bank into some textile factory, or have her 
wash the floor instead of the Arab. 20 
Third, as a result of exclusionary policies, ethnic gap (pa'ar adati) 
has come to mean Oriental-Ashkenazi differentiation in the public minds 
as well as in government circles. Hence, programs designed to promote 
ethnic equality whether initiated and financed by the government or 
other Jewish institutions such as the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut and 
others are devoted completely to the Orientals. Under less rigid 
exclusionary policies ~ome of these funds would have to be redirected to 
the Arab areas which are no less needy. 
However, while there are clear advantages to the Orientals, the 
policy of exclusion has had its drawbacks. For Orientals the 
continuation of the state of war has made full equality between them and 
Ashkenazim less imperative. The study by Epstein-Semyonov shows that 
while both Orientals and Ashkenazim experienced occupational upward 
mobility, "the two Jewish groups retained their relative (emphasis in 
original) hierarchical position in the occupational structure. " 2 1 
Furthermore, as a consequence of rigidity in the Arab-Jewish division, 
Arabs have been concentrated in the lower ranks of the occupational 
hierarchy where they present direct competition to the basically 
Oriental lower classes. Orientals and Arabs have a much higher 
20 Ibid., p. 344. 
21 Ibid., p. 350. 
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concentration in unskilled occupations than do Ashkenazim who exit these 
occupation at a greater rate than either group. 22 
The Ashkenazim have also benefited from the system of exclusion. 
First, whereas the implementation of equality between them and Orientals 
would have resulted in a real loss to Ashkenazim, the maintenance of a 
rigid division between Arabs and Jews has resulted in the expansion of 
the system through which certain of the Oriental demands are met without 
any significant loss to Ashkenazim. Yet a complete exclusion of the 
Arabs would have limited employers' (basically Ashkenazim) access to 
cheap Arab labor and would have resulted in making expensive Jewish 
labor even more expensive. Hence, only when employers' demands for such 
r.heap labor were minimal were they inclined to tolerate a complete or a 
near complete exclusion of the Arabs during the period 1948-1958. When 
their demands for such labor increased, however, the disadvantages of 
exclusion outweighed the benefits and therefore had to be relaxed. 
The system of exclusion was not cancelled altogether, however. Under 
the influence of labor it was only transformed to a caste-like system 
limiting the Arabs to certain positions and job-categories. These 
dynamics were set forth in the Employment Service Law which was passed 
in 1959. Through two of its provisions the law legitimized 
discrimination on security grounds and provided protection to local 
workers. These two provisions were clearly directed against the Arabs 
since they are the ones considered security risks and also against whose 
'intrusion' local employment, i.e. Jewish employment, needed to be 
22 Ibid., Table 1, p. 345 and p. 348. 
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protected, since no significant employment opportunities exist in the 
Arab sector (see further details on the law and its provisions in 
chapter 6) 
It is clear, therefore, that both Orientals and Ashkenazim benefit 
from the Arab-Jewish division. While the gains of Orientals are 
greatest under a policy of exclusion, the Ashkenazim can benefit most 
from treating the Arabs as caste-like segregation. Both systems, 
however, result in oppression of the Arabs. By way of interpolation, 
furthermore, it must be added that while the occupied West-Bank and the 
Gaza strip are not the subject of this analysis one dares say that the 
political attitudes of Israel vis-a-vis these occupied territories are 
not completely divorced from the influences of such dynamics. 
On the basis of the foregoing it should be expected that Orientals 
more than Ashkenazim support those parties which advocate hard line 
policies toward the Arabs. In the following section ethnic voting 
trends will be documented showing the relationships between shifts in 
party politics and corresponding shifts in ethnic voting. 
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JEWISH ETHNIC VOTING PATTERNS AND THE ARABS 
-- -- ---
It cannot be claimed that the status of the Arab minority occupies a 
central role in election campaigns. That is not to say, however, that 
the issue of the Arabs is one which has no effect whatever on voting 
decision. It constitutes one of those undercurrents which also 
characterize the Jewish inter-ethnic rift. The Oriental-Ashkenazi 
division, which by all accounts constitutes a central domestic issue, is 
hardly raised as a campaign issue by any political party as one 
deserving public debate. 23 To the contrary, the issue has hardly ever 
gone beyond general declarations of all parties emphasizing the need for 
greater integration without specifying a program or programs to achieve 
such an end. Even in internal discussions at party conferences the 
issue of ethnicity is suppressed because of its explosive nature. 24 
In general it must be emphasized that many factors influence voting 
decisions in Israel. While these factors are interrelated, not all are 
articulated as issues to be raised during an election campaign. On the 
other hand, issues which are raised in election campaigns are not 
neccessarily determined on the basis of their saliency. An issue may be 
raised because it appeals to the greatest margin of voters. Most 
central to all election campaigns, for example, have been defense and 
23 Efraim Torgovnik, 'Party Factions and Election Issues". In Arian 
(ed.), The Elections in Israel-1969, Jerusalem: Academic Press, 1972, p. 
16. 
24 See a discussion of the Labor Party's conference in 1971 by 
Arone ff, 1979. pp. 126-29. Also see an excellent review of the 
determinants of an issue which is to be raised in election campaign, how 
it is formulated and the issues which were raised in the 1969 Israeli 
elections,in Torgovnik, 1972, pp. 21-40. 
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foreign affairs, two issues over which criticism of the position of the 
Labor Party is least tolerated by its leadership. 25 To a lesser degree 
the economy has also been raised as an issue during some election 
campaigns. 
Despite the lack of public debate among political parties during 
election campaigns the influence on voters of issues pertaining to 
ethnic division can hardly be overemphasized. The mass switch of the 
Oriental vote from Labor to the Likud in 1977, which played a major role 
in the defeat of Labor and gave the Likud the opportunity to form a 
government for the first time in the history of the state, is mostly 
attributed to the disenchantment of Orientals with the slow pace with 
which Labor was implementing their integration. In fact, the Oriental 
support for the Labor party had been waning since the early sixties and 
in the mid-seventies it reached its highest proportions. 26 
On the basis of this discussion it should hardly be expected that the 
status of the Arab minority would be publicly debated during election 
campaigns. Nor can the extent to which a party's 'Arab' policy 
influences voting decisions of its constituency be determined. Hence, 
rather than seeking causal relationships between Jewish support for a 
specific political party and that party's declared policies toward the 
25 Aroneff, M., 'The Decline of Israeli Labor Party: Causes and 
Significance'. In: Penniman, H., (ed.) Israel at the Polls: The Knesset 
Elections of 1977, American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, 
Washington, D. C., 1979, pp. 115-45. 
2 6 See Arian, A., 'The Electorate: Israel 1977' . In: Penniman, H., 
(ed.) Israel at the Polls: The Knesset Elections of 1977, Amexican 
Enterprise Institute for Public Research, Washington, D. C., 1979, pp. 
59-89. 
Arab minority, non-causal ethnic voting trends will be discussed and 
documented in this section. 
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Mapai, which following several alignments became the Labor Alignment, 
has won every single election from 1949 to 1973. Its first defeat 
occured in 1977. Between 1948 and 1977 the party was in control of the 
government and other Jewish institutions. It still holds the majority 
vote in the Histadrut. Hence, the party can be considered responsible, 
or take credit, for the policies toward the Arabs. 
On the other hand, between 1948 and 1977 Likud was in the opposition. 
In fact, during the first two elections the Likud, o~ Herut (freedom) as 
it was known, was not the biggest of the opposition parties (see Table 
3 .1 below). And, until 1964 it was not part of the Histadrut. The 
party was formed in 1948 by the leaders of the Irgun Tsevai Leumi 
(National Military Organization known as Etzel) which was one of three 
Jewish underground groups that operated in Palestine during the years of 
British rule and was known for the brutality of the atrocities committed 
by its members against Arabs and British. Menachem Begin, who had been 
the leader of Irgun since 1942, became Herut's leader. In 1977 he 
became prime minister, a position he held until his resignation in 1984. 
Party 
Mapai 
Achdut 
Ha'avodah 
Map am 
Rafi 
He rut 
Liberal 
Indep 
liberal 
TABLE 3.1 
Distribution of Seats, First Through the Ninth Knesset 
1949-1977 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 
1949 1951 1955 1959 1961 1965 1969 1973 
9th 
1977 
46 45 40 47 42 } } Labor Alignment 
} 45 } 
} } 
10 7 8 } } 56 51 32 
} 
19 15 9 9 9 8 } 
} 
10 } 
Gahal Likud 
14 8 15 17 17 } 
} 
} 26 26 39 45 
7 20 13 8 } } 
} 17 } 
5 4 5 6 } 5 4 4 1 
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Source: Abridged from Penniman, H., (ed.) Israel at the Polls. 
American Institute, Washington, D. C. 1979, p. 310. 
During the early years of statehood Herut adopted extreme 
nationalistic stands and according to Akzin, "came to be recognized as 
the foremost nationalist party in Israel". 27 Hence, it could not have 
27 Akzin, B., 'The Likud'. In: Penniman, H., (ed.), Israel at the 
Polls: The Knesset Elections of 1977, American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Research, Washington, D. C., 1979, p. 93. 
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been expected to object to Mapai's (representing the government) 
policies of Arab land confiscation, and indeed no such objection was 
ever raised. 28 
On the other hand, on economic matters Herut stood for the broadening 
of private enterprise; compulsory arbitration of labor conflicts; and, 
curtailment of preferential treatment of collective and Histadrut-owned 
enterprises. 29 These stands have, rightly, been perceived as anti labor, 
i.e., Jewish labor. Their consistency is further evidenced by the fact 
that Herut opposed the policy of movement restriction on the Arabs. 3 0 
These stands were neither popular among nor supported by organized 
labor. According to Akzin, Herut's supporters and voters during those 
early years "came from both middle-class and working-class elements 
within the population". 31 
Following a series of alliances during the sixties between Herut and 
other parties (see Table 3.1) Likud was formed and entered the elections 
of 1973 under that name. Since then, the greatest difficulty which 
faces the party prior to an election campaign has been the formulation 
of the socio-economic plank in its platform. The difficulty is embedded 
in the need to reconcile differences separating the different factions 
of the party, those who support the encouragement of private initiative 
28 See Chapter 4 for details. 
29 See Akzin, 1979, p. 94. 
3 0 See Chapter 5 for more details on Begin's speech in the Knesset 
and his subsequent comments on the outcome of a vote against the 
military government which fialed to abolish it in 1964. 
31 Akzin, 1979, p.105. 
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and freedom from government controls and those labor-minded groups who 
are anxious to preserve the cooperative and collectivist features of the 
Israeli economy. An additional problem is the desire to raise the 
living standards of the economically and educationally disadvantaged 
while preserving the interests of the wealthier and educationally 
advanced strata. 32 Paradoxically, while the Likud sought in 1977 to 
limit the role of the Histadrut 33 this move, unlike its similar position 
during the fifties, was not perceived by the lower classes as being anti 
labor, let alone anti-Oriental. 
Hence, whereas during the early years of statehood the party (Herut) 
advocated certain liberal (inclusionary) policies toward the Arabs, in 
the later years it has shifted its attention somewhat to the 
disadvantaged, mostly Orientals and the exclusion of the Arabs. The 
party's stands vis-a-vis the status of the occupied territories 
following the 1967 war provide further testimony to this trend. Its 
advocacy of harsh measures against the Arabs, the control of all the 
occupied territories with minimum political and civil liberties for the 
inhabitants (which is what the 'Autonomy' advocated by the Likud means) 
contrasts sharply with Labor's advocated position of territorial 
compromises. The latter policy, of course, would result in an increase 
in the number of enfranchised Arabs in the state and the closing off of 
many agencies which deal with the Arabs and the loss of many jobs by 
middle-cless Jews (mostly Orientals) who man these positions. 
32 See Ibid., pp. 105-6 for a detailed account of these conflicting 
views and their solutions by the party prior to the elections of· 1977. 
33 Ibid., p. 106. 
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These shifts in policies of the Likud contributed to the increased 
support the party received among the Orientals. On the other hand, 
Labor, which had administered the most exclusionary policies toward the 
Arabs, was also supported by Orientals. The waning of support for its 
policies and leadership among Jews correspond to the beginning of 
liberalization in its policies toward the Arabs. In an article entitled 
'The Electorate: Israel 1977', Asher Arian presents a tabulation of 
actual election results and data collected through surveys following the 
elections of 1969, 1973 and 1977. Tables 3-2, 3-8 and 3-10 show a clear 
shift in ethnic voting and support for both parties. Whereas on the 
average in 1969 Labor received over half of the Oriental vote, this 
proportion dropped to about 40 percent in 1973 and to about 30 percent 
in 1977. By contrast, support for the Likud by Orientals has increased 
from about 27 percent in 1969 to about 44 percent in 1973 and about 60 
percent in 1977 with more profound increases among the young Orientals 
than among the old. 34 
In sum, while these shifts in voting trends have been significant, 
they cannot be directly attributed to shifts in Party's stand toward the 
Arabs. As noted at the beginning of this section many factors have 
precipitated this shift. We can conclude, however, that such changes 
represent what we might expect if our ongoing analysis of the 
relationship of attitudes of Orientals toward the Arab population has 
some validity. These attitudes, as I have maintained so far, are 
motivated by the Orientals' economic interests as they are conceived to 
34 See Arian, A., 1979, pp. 62-66. 
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be best served by the maintenance of a more rigid division between Arabs 
and Jews. The upshot of such division is on the one hand the 
maintenance and even the expansion of control agencies, which offer 
employment opportunities to middle-class Orientals and, on the other 
hand the limiting of the competitive potential of Arab labor against the 
Jewish lower class which is composed mostly of Orientals. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter I have shown that the interests of Orientals and 
Ashkenazim did not, and do not, always coincide. This lack of 
coincidence is derived from the inter-ethnic Jewish rift and 
differentiation. Whereas Ashkenazim occupy mostly managerial and elite 
positions in the occupational heirarchy Orientals occupy mostly the 
middle and lower positions. Despite continued demand by Orientals for 
equality the inter-ethnic Jewish differentiation has persisted. 
Differentiation between the two Jewish ethnic communities was also 
reflected in ethnic variations in attitudes toward the Arabs. While 
both Jewish groups were shown to benefit from an Arab-Jewish division, 
their respective benefits vary with the extent of rigidity in this 
division. Whereas Orientals gain most from a rigid division, one which 
views Arabs as outsiders and therefore must be kept under control and 
prevented from participation in the social, political and economic life 
of the state, Ashkenazim gain more from allowing certain elasticity in 
the dividing line, one which allows Arabs at least a minimal 
participation in the economic sphere so that they are more accessible to 
Jewish business under least favorable conditions. 
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As expected, these conflicting interests were expressed through 
different attitudes adopted by each Jewish ethnic group and through 
voting trends to political parties in accordance with these attitudes. 
Hence, many changes in policies toward the Arabs were the result of the 
interplay of these dynamics. The next three chapters will describe 
these dynamics in more details. In these chapters it will be shown that 
opposition to policies and practices against the Arabs was mostly 
related to the interests of the opposing group. For example, whereas 
hardly any Jewish opposition was raised against confiscation of Arab 
lands, opposition against the military gover.nment particularly the 
policy of movement restriction was progressively intensified in 
accordance with economic expansion and demand for Arab labor. 
CHAPTER IV 
LAND POLICIES AND IMPLICATIONS 
According to the split labor market theory an initial discrepancy in 
the price of labor can be a result of differences in resources which are 
available to two ethnically distinguishable groups of labor. This is 
also true of the Arab-Jewish contrast in Israel. Arabs began losing 
control over a major economic source through land purchases by the 
Zionist Organization during the pre-state period as well as through land 
confiscation following the establishment of the state. No other single 
factor has contributed as much as the confiscation of Arab land to the 
generation of cheap Arab labor and eventual total economic dependence of 
Arabs on the Jewish sector. 
The exodus of the Palestinians in 1948, as a result of the Arab-
Jewish war and its atrocities, left Israel in control of large areas of 
cultivable land. Despite this, Israel enacted laws and set up 
mechanisms which allowed it to continue to confiscate Arab land. Thus, 
since 1948, hundreds of thousands of dunums (a dunum is equal to a 
quarter of an acre) of Arab owned cultivable land have been confiscated 
by the Israeli authorities. Since the Palestinians depended on the land 
for their subsistence, this loss brought about a total transformation of 
the Arab occupational structure. 
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Since the establishment of Israel, the decline in the proportion of 
the Arab labor force who are employed in agriculture has been dramatic. 
Available data show that in 1955 almost half (48.8 percent) of the Arab 
labor force was employed in agriculture. This proportion dropped to 44 
percent in 1962, 30.9 percent in 1968, 1 19.9 percent in 1972 and by 1981 
had dropped to a mere 11.5 percent (Tables 4.2,4.3,4.4). 
No doubt, general modernization of agricultural methods and the 
introduction of technology to agriculture are partly responsible for 
this decline. But the central factor responsible for this decline has 
been the confiscation of Arab land. 
In this chapter I examine Israel's land policies and their 
consequences on the Arab occupational structure from three vantage 
points: first, I examine the extent to which land expropriation is 
responsible for the decline in the proportion of Arabs employed in 
agriculture; second, the extent to which this labor was channelled into 
the Jewish labor market and under what conditions; and third, I examine 
the respective benefits of Jewish labor and Jewish capital as a result 
of these developments and, conversely, the extent to which these 
benefits were instrumental in determining the status of Arab workers. 
1 See Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, Monthly Review Press, New 
York, 1976, Table 13, pp. 304-5. 
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The Acquisition of Arab Land £y the Israeli Government 
Following the 1948 war Israel was in control of almost four-fifths 
(4/5) of Palestine's area (21 million out of 26 million dunums). Eighty 
percent of the area which fell under Israeli control represented land 
abandoned by the Arab refugees. 2 Within this area many villages were 
emptied and destroyed. Out of 585 Arab villages only 107 remained: the 
rest were destroyed and their population scattered within, as well as 
outside of, the territory that became Israel. 3 
This abandoned property (referred to later on as absentee property), 
represented, according to Peretz, "one of the greatest contributions 
toward making Israel a viable state. 114 Both movable and immovable 
properties were immediately put to use by the Israeli authorities. The 
immovable property consisted of millions of dunums of Arab land, citrus 
orchards, olive and orange groves, apartment buildings, shops, offices, 
storehouses and the like. In 1954, more than one-third of Israel's 
Jewish population lived on absentee property and nearly a third of the 
new immigrants, (250,000 people), settled in urban areas abandoned by 
Arabs. The Arabs left whole cities like Jaffa, Akka, Lydd, Ramleh, 
Baysan, Majdal. In all, 388 towns and villages, and large parts of 94 
other cities and towns containing nearly a quarter of all the buildings 
2 Don Peretz, Israel and the Palestine Arabs, The Middle East 
Institute, Washington, D. C., 1958, p.143. 
3 T. Zayyad, "The Fate of the Arabs in Israel". Journal of Palestine 
Studies, 6 (Autumn), pp. 92-103. 
4 Don Peretz, 1958, p. 141. 
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in Israel 5 were abandoned. 
In order to manage this property, Israel created mechanisms and 
enacted special laws to provide the 'legal' basis for formal control 
over the property. The first regulations concerning absentee property 
were published on December 12, 1948 by the Provisional Government. 6 The 
regulations, known as the Absentee Property Regulations, were 
promulgated by the Finance Minister in accordance with the powers 
bestowed upon him by the Law and Administration Ordinance of 1948. 7 In 
addition, the Minister of Finance appointed a Custodian of Absentee 
Property to replace the Custodian of Abandoned Property. On March 14, 
1950, the Knesset replaced these regulations with the Absentee Property 
Law. 
The interest of this study in these regulations stems from the fact 
that, as promulgated, the regulations had a far reaching effect on the 
Arabs in Israel. Over 81,000 out of 160,000 Palestinians who remained in 
Israel and became citizens were defined by the regulations, and 
subsequently by the law, as absentee and consequently their property was 
confiscated.' 
5 Haaretz, June 15, 1951. Cited in Peretz, 1958, p. 143. 
6 Kovetz Ha-Takanot (Official Gazett) 37 Dec. 12, 1948, p. 91. 
7 Jerusalem Post, Dec. 19, 1948. Cited in Peretz, 1958, p. 150. 
8 Ian Lustick, 1980, p. 174. 
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The Regulations defined all persons who held property in Israel as 
absentees if, on or after November 29, 1947 (the date of the United 
Nations Resolution on the Partition of Palestine), they were: "a) 
citizens or subjects of Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
Iraq or the Yemen, or b) were in any of these countries or in any part 
of Palestine outside the area of the regulations, or c) were Palestine 
citizens and left their places of habitual residence." 9 Thus, every Arab 
in Palestine was liable to be classified as an absentee under the 
regulations. As Peretz notes: 
All Arabs who held property in the New City of AcrP., regardless of 
the fact that they may never have traveled farther than the few 
meters to the Old City, were classified as absentees. The 30,000 
Arabs who fled from one place to another within Israel, but who 
never left the country, were also liable to have their property 
declared absentee. Any individual who may have gone to Beirut or 
Bethlehem for a one day visit, during the latter days of the 
Mandate, was automatically an absentee. 10 
Indeed, over 40 percent of the land owned by legal Arab residents of 
Israel was confiscated by the authorities as part of the absentee 
property policy. 11 
The Arabs, Israeli citizens who lost property as a result of the 
regulations' stipulations, were of three categories: about 15,000 Arabs 
from Galilee who for whatever reason were "not at their place of 
residence" when the area was occupied by Jewish forces; about 31, 000 
Arabs from the Little Triangle in the center, who became Israeli 
residents as a result of the Armistic agreements in 1949 between Israel 
9 Peretz, 1958, p. 151. 
10 Ibid., P. 152. 
11 Peretz, p. 142. 
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and Jordan; and about 35, 000 Arabs who, during the first years of 
Israel's existence, either infiltrated back across the borders or were 
legally admitted as part of a limited family reunion program. 12 
Expulsions of Arabs from their villages and homes - long after 
hostilities had subsided - and the confiscation of their property was 
another method by which Arabs were deprived of their lands. In some 
cases whole populations were evicted and scattered in neighboring 
villages and their property confiscated. In others, part of the 
population was scattered in different villages while others were forced 
to cross the armistic lines to the neighboring countries. In still 
others, only some of the inhabitants were rounded up and sent across the 
borders. 
Representing the first category are the villages of Ikrit whose 
inhabitants were expelled on November 5, 1948, 13 Khasas, Qatiya and 
Yanuh which were emptied of their Arab population on June 5, 1949, and 
the village of Ghabsiya whose inhabitants were expelled in January 1950. 
All of these villages are located in Western Galilee in the north. 
12 See Lustick, 1980, pp. 173-74. For a detailed account of the court 
battles between the Custodian and an Arab, resident of Jaffa, who was 
. legally admitted back through London only to find his property 
confiscated, see Don Peretz, 1958, p. 177. 
13 For a detailed account of the eviction of the people of Ikrit, and 
the legal and popular struggle for the return of its inhabitants, see 
Elias Shakour, Blood Brothers, Chosen Books, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 
1984. 
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The second category is represented by Kufr Anan in the Triangle which 
was emptied of its inhabitants on February 28, 1949, and the inhabitants 
of Majdal in the south who were expelled over a three-week period across 
the Egyptian borders, to the Gaza strip, on August 17th. And on November 
17, 1951, the inhabitants of Khirbet Buweishat in the Triangle were 
expelled and forced to cross the Jordanian border to the West Bank. 
Representing the third type, i.e., selective expulsion, are the 
villages of Rihaniya in Galilee from which seven families were expelled 
in October 1953, and on October 30, 1956 the Baqqara tribe was forced to 
cross the northern border to Syria. 14 As late as 1959, Bedouin tribes 
were expelled to Jordan and Egypt and their return to Israel was later 
secured only after United Nations intervention. 15 
Between the years 1953 and 1954, the Bedouins in the south were 
particularly harassed by the army. Haaretz reports that: 16 
The Army's desert patrols would turn up in the midst of a Bedouin 
encampment day after day dispersing it with a sudden burst of 
machine-gun fire until the sons of the desert were broken and, 
gathering what little was left of their belongings, led their camels 
in long silent strings into the heart of the Sinai desert. 
Many other villages were either partly or completely demolished with 
many of their inhabitants now living in various parts of Israel but with 
no access to their 'former' property. Among these villages are Batat, 
Amqa, Saffuriya, Mijdal, Mansura, Ma'ar, Kuweikat, Berwa, Damun, and 
14 See a more detialed description of these expulsions in Sabri 
Jiryis, 1976, pp. 81-92. 
15 Sabri Jiryis, 1976, p.82. 
16 Haaretz, Nov. 19, 1959. 
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Ruweis, to mention only a few. 
Few Arab land owners were saved from some kind of confiscation 
procedure. Those Arabs who escaped the Absentee Property Regulations 
and expulsion orders were hardly missed by other laws and regulations. 
From the early 1950' s until the late 1970 's, numerous laws and 
regulations provided the legal basis for land confiscation. Among these 
were: 
1. The Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, upon which the 
military government was based. Article 125 of the regulations 
was particularly designed to address the issue of land. 17 It 
empowered the military governors to order any area closed. 
Upon the issuance of such an order access to such areas became 
restricted, for "security reasons", to holders of special 
permits, the issuance of which were to be approved by the army 
chief of staff or the minister of defense. A few years later 
the land in a closed area or parts of it were confiscated and 
given to Jewish farmers and later declared open. 18 
Even the High Court for Justice (Supreme Court) could not 
challenge the authority of the military government. And when 
such a challenge was presented and the Court ordered the 
government to allow the villagers to return to their homes and 
property, the military made sure there were no homes to which 
the inhabitants could return. It either dynamited the homes 
17 See the remarks of Shimon Peres and Shmoel Segev concerning the 
function and use of Article 125 in chapter 5. 
18 See Lustick, 1980, pp. 178-179. 
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in the villages, such as the case of Ghabsiya, or attacked and 
destroyed the village through air strike as was the case of 
Birem and then the village and the land surrounding it were 
ordered closed areas. 19 
2. Regulations which were promulgated by the minister of defense 
in 1949; the Emergency Regulations (security zones). These 
regulations were renewed periodically by the Knesset until 
December 1972 but no renewal requests have been submitted 
since. The regulations empowered the minister of defense, with 
the approval of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security 
Committee, to designate certain areas along the borders as 
"security zone". Exploiting his power the minister declared 
almost half of Galilee, all of the Triangle, an area near the 
Gaza Strip in the south, and another along the Jerusalem Jaffa 
railway as security zones. 20 All of these areas cover large 
tracts owned by the Arabs. 
Once an area was declared closed the defense minister was 
empowered to order, if he saw fit, any permanent resident of 
such an area to leave the security zone within fourteen days 
of the order. Large areas of land were confiscated by this 
method. Some of the expropriated lands were later sold to the 
Jewish National Fund (JNF) (also known as Ha-Keren Ha-Kayemet 
19 For a detailed account of the legal battles between the villagers 
of Ghabsiya and the military government, see Sabri Jiryis, 1976, pp. 
89-90. 
2 ° Kovetz Ha-Takanot (Official Gazett), 18, June 8, 1949, p. 230; 
215, November, 2, 1955, p. 144. 
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Le-Yisrael), in accordance with an agreement made earlier with 
the government's legal advisor in a meeting near the end of 
1948. 21 
3. The Emergency Regulations for the Expropriation of 
Uncultivated Lands (also known as the Cultivation of Waste 
Land Ordinance), is another law which enabled the government 
to confiscate Arab land. Passed in October 1948, 22 the law 
empowers the minister of agriculture to take possession of 
uncultivated land or of any lands in cases where the minister 
"is not satisfied that the owner of the land has began or is 
about to begin or will continue to cultivate the land." 
(Article 4) This law was used extensively in conjunction with 
Article 125 of the Emergency Regulations. 
4. The Emergency Land Requisition Law, passed in 1949, gave the 
government the right to expropriate land whenever a "competent 
authority" (appointed by the government) determines that the 
land "is required for the defense of the state, the security 
of the people, to safeguard essential provisions or services, 
or to absorb immigrants or settle retired soldiers or men 
disabled while on active service". 23 
21 Joseph Weitz, Diaries and Letters to the Children, Tel-Aviv, 1965, 
3, pp. 373-4. Cited in Jiryis, 1976, p. 91. 
22 Laws of the State of Israel, 2 (1948/1949), p. 72. 
23 Ibid., 4, p. 3. 
5. In 1953 the Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and 
Compensation) Law was passed. The law empowered the finance 
minister to make a list of lands that had been confiscated, in 
whatever manner, from the establishment of the state on May 
14, 1948, to April 1, 1952. If the minister certified that 
these lands were "used or assigned for purposes of essential 
development, settlement or security" and were "still required 
for any of these purposes," then, as a result of this 
certification, these lands would automatically become the 
property of the Development Authority. 24 
The purpose of this law, according to the finance minister 
who proposed the bill was "to legalize certain actions taken 
during the war and after it ... when the government began to 
take over absentee property ... " 2 5 That is to say, the aim of 
the government in proposing this bill was to legitimize the 
massive land transfer that had taken place from 1948 to 1952 
and to preclude legal attempts by Arab residents to take 
advantage of loopholes in the laws or the absence of due 
process in order to press their claims in the courts. 
According to Lust ick, 2 6 "Under the terms of this law fully 
1,250,000 dunums were expropriated". 
24 LSI 4, p. 43, Land Aquisition (Validation of Acts and 
Compensation) Law, Section 2, article (a). 
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25 Knesset Debates, June 3, 1952, p. 2202. Cited in Jiryis, 1976, p. 
96. 
26 Lustick, 1980, p. 175. 
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6. In 1958 yet another law dealing with land expropriation was 
passed. This law, known as the Prescription Law, amended the 
older Ottoman law so that occupiers of unregistered land were 
required to demonstrate unchallenged possession, not for ten 
years as had been the rule, but for fifteen to twenty-five 
years. 2 7 Under the terms of this law Arabs were forced to 
produce records from the British Mandate period. According to 
Oded, the government lawyers who drafted this law knew that 
the British Mandatory authorities had undertaken 
the systematic survey and settlement of title to land, aimed 
inter alia at establishing the occupier's rights on more 
exact and secure foundations; but in view of the need to 
adjudicate first of all the area where Arab and Jewish claims 
conflicted, the all Arab parts of Palestine were left till 
last, and the process of settlement of title only began in 
most of Arab Galilee after Israel's establishment. 28 
In the context of its overall survey of land registration in 
Israel, according to Oded, the government has made a point of 
challenging every Arab claim to land ownership, no matter how 
small the plot of land involved. As a result the government has 
become a "major land holder in every village .... endowed with 
thousands of separate plots, some of them tiny, with which it can 
do very little. 1129 However, the aim of the government by such 
action was soon cleared by the following bill which was 
introduced to the Knesset but was not passed. 
27 LSI, 12, p. 129, Law of Prescription. 
2 8 Yitzhak Oded, "Land Losses Among Israel's Arab Villages," New 
Outlook, 7, no. 7 (September 1964), p. 13. 
2 9 Ibid. , p. 15. 
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7. The Land Concentration bill which was proposed to the Knesset 
on November 7, 1960. Although the bill was rejected by the 
Knesset its mere proposal sheds further light on the 
government's Arab land policies. When proposing the bill the 
minister of agriculture argued that: 
The state, the development authority and Ha-Keren Ha-Keyemet 
Le-Yisrael are the legal owners of hundreds of thousands of 
dunums in Galilee, the Triangle, and Wadi Ara (all are Arab 
areas, ed. note). There are more than 250,000 dunums divided 
into small plots which are swallowed up among the plots owned 
by the Arabs. In this form it is impossible to make use of 
the land for settlement or development. We need government 
intervention to concentrate this land and the proposed bill 
would enable the state and the development authority to merge 
the plots they own into larger areas which could then be 
s<~ttled or developed or improved according to the needs of 
the nation. 3 0 
In order to accomplish this concentration, the bill proposed 
empowering the minister of agriculture to declare a given area 'a 
land concentration area' and the authority to exchange plots or 
pay compensation depending on the availability of state land as 
is decided by the minister. 
It is clear from the foregoing that under the guise of an elaborate 
legal code the Israeli government has utilized every means to gain 
control of Arab lands. The ease with which the government got the 
Knesset to pass the laws and regulations needed for this purpose has 
more to do with the Israeli political system than with fairness and any 
apparent consensus. 31 The fact that the laws which deal with land enable 
30 Knesset Debates, November 7, 1960, p. 132. Cited in Jiryis, 1976, 
p. 100. 
3 1 According to the Israeli political system for any party or 
coalition of parties to be able to form a government it is essential to 
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the government to gain control of privately owned Arab land under every 
possible circumstance shows that this policy was systematic, consistent 
and with clear goals and objectives. 
Land Losses and Arab Labor 
Since the data with respect to the extent of land losses by Arabs to 
the Israeli authorities and hence to Jewish individuals and 
institutions, are scarce, it is very difficult to provide exact figures. 
However, a few examples can illustrate the pattern. According to the 
table below (Table 4.1) over 68 percent of the total land privately 
owned by Arabs was expropriated. Tb.at is to say only one third of the 
land owned by Arabs before 1948 remained under their control. 
have control in Knesset (the legislature). The fact that the Knesset 
members do not represent a specific constituency and are members of 
specific parties, makes voting follow party line more often than not. 
Such a system guarantees the support of the parliament for any laws 
and/or policies the government wishes to introduce and pursue. 
Table 4.1 
Expropriation of Arab Land Since 1948 (Selected Villages) 
(Dunums) 
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Name of Village 
Area Possessed 
in 1947 
Area Possessed after 
Expropriation 
Total Area # 
Expropriated 
Aksal @ 
Abu Snan @ 
Ara-Arara * 
Arrabe * 
Baka el-Ghrbiyeh * 
Beisan-Ein al Assad @ 
Beit Jann * 
Buqaia'h@ 
Deir-el-Assad, Binah 
and Nahaf * 
Deir Hana * 
Jaljuliah * 
Jatt * 
Kf ar Bara * 
Kfar Kara' @ 
Kfar Kassem * 
Maghar @ 
Maker @ 
Mi' lya @ 
Majd el-Krum * 
Qalansawe * 
Sakhnin * 
Taibeh * 
Tamra (Acre) @ 
Tira * 
Um el-Fahm * 
Yirka * 
Total: 
13,666 
12,871 
26,000 
95,000 
22,000 
25,594 
26,000 
10,276 
16,000 
16,000 
14,000 
12,000 
4,000 
14,543 
12,000 
45,590 
8,661 
19,136 
20,000 
18,850 
55,000 
45,000 
30,549 
40,000 
125,000 
55,000 
793,012 
4,396 
5,434 
7,000 
11, 350 
7,000 
10,204 
13,000 
3,500 
7,000 
9,500 
0,800 
9,000 
2,000 
2,618 
9,000 
12,227 
3,884 
2,997 
7,000 
6,780 
30,000 
13,000 
14,489 
8,000 
25,000 
18,000 
246,679 
9,270 
7,437 
19,000 
83,650 
15,000 
15,390 
13,000 
6,776 
9,000 
6,500 
13,200 
3,000 
2,000 
11, 925 
3,000 
33,363 
4,777 
16,139 
13,000 
12,070 
25,000 
32,000 
16,060 
32,000 
100,000 
37,000 
546,333 
Source: * Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State, 1980, p. 179. @ Sabri 
Jiryis, The Arabs in~ei-:- 1976, (Table ~pp. 292-95 (data presented 
by Jiryis do not include expropriations after 1963). 
# Numbers are calculated on the basis of the information in the first 
two columns. 
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In addition to material loss to the Arabs, confiscation of land has 
had other consequences on the Arab population living in Israel, the most 
important of which has been the transformation of the Arab labor force 
from self-employed farmers to unskilled hired labor. As can be seen 
from the three tables below (Tables 4.2,4.3,4.4) most of the Arab labor 
force (57%) in 1931, was employed in agriculture. This proportion 
declined to 38 percent in 1963 and to about 20 percent in 1972. By 1981 
the percentage of the Arab labor force employed in agriculture had 
declined to mere 11.5 percent. This decline corresponds to an increase 
in the category of unskilled labor. Furthermore, if we examine the 1972 
figures we find that over a quart~r of the Arab labor force (26.4%) are 
employed in construction. Combining this category with the category of 
miners and craftsmen (for comparative purposes), we find that while in 
1963 39.3 percent of the Arab labor force was employed in this category, 
by 1972 this proportion increased to 42.8 percent. This represents an 
increase of 3.5 percent or about 10 percent of the 1963 figure. 
Table 4.2 
Employed Arabs and Jews by Category of 
Employment (Percntages) * 
Economic Sector 
Agriculture 
Industry, crafts, construction 
Transportation 
Commerce 
Liberal professions 
Public service 
Domestic service 
Rent, others 
Total 
1931 
Arabs 
57.1 
12.0 
6.0 
8.2 
2.7 
3.9 
3.2 
6.9 
100.0 
Jews 
18.1 
33.5 
6.4 
19.1 
11. 6 
2.2 
3.5 
5.6 
100.0 
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Source: Y. Ben-Porath, The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, Israel 
Universities Press, 1966, p. 19. Cited in Zureik, The Palestinians ... , 
1979, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, p. 123. 
* Sample size is not provided in original. 
Table 4.3 
Employed Arabs and Jews by Category of 
Occupation (Percentages) 
Occupation 
Professional, scientific, technical 
Administrative, executive, 
manegerial, clerical 
Traders, agents, salesmen 
Farmers, fishermen and related work 
Workers in tarnsportation and 
communication 
Construction, quarrymen 
miners, craftsmen, etc. 
Service, sport and recreation 
Total (percent) 
Abs. (thds) 
1963 
Arabs 
5.5 
2.0 
4.7 
38.0 
4.3 
39.3 
6.2 
100.0 
66.2 
Jews 
12.9 
16.8 
8.4 
11. 8 
5.5 
32.1 
12.5 
100.0 
747.0 
1972 
Arabs 
6.6 
3.9 
8.2 
19.9 
6.6 
26.4 * 
18.4 
10.0 
100.0 
94.6 
Jews 
17.6 
19.0 
8.4 
6.9 
5.0 
6.7 
24.0 
12.4 
100.0 
902.5 
* The 1972 Israeli census separates construction workers, quarrymen and 
miners, etc. Thus among the Arabs 26.4% are in construction and mining 
(unskilled jobs), compared to 6.7% among Jews. (Zureik, p. 123) 
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Table 4.4 
Employed Arabs and Jews in Israel 
By Occupation (Percentages) 
1981 
Jews 
Born in Born in Born in 
Occupation Arabs Total Israel Asia-Africa Europe-Amerca 
Total (thds) 133.0 1,144.5 451.5 313.7 379.3 
Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Scientific & 
academic wrkers 2.8 8.8 9.5 2.7 13.0 
Other Prof. , 
technical & 
related workers 9.4 15.5 19.5 9.0 16.1 
Administrators 
& managers 1.2 4.0 4.1 2.5 5.2 
Clerical & rel. 
workers 5.5 20.4 24.1 15.8 19.8 
Sales workers 7.0 7.7 6.2 8.5 8.8 
Service workers 10.7 11. 2 8.0 19.0 8.6 
Agricultural 
workers 11.2 4.9 6.2 5.4 2.9 
Skilled workers 
in industry, 
building, trans 
& other skiled 
workers 38.2 24.4 20.7 31.9 22.8 
Other workers 
in indust, buil 
& trans. & 
unskilled wks. 13.7 3.2 1.8 5.3 2.9 
Source: Statistical Abstracts of Israel, Jerusalem, No. 33, 1982, pp. 
333-349. 
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One cannot conclude on the basis of these data alone that such a 
shift in the occupational undertakings of the Arabs was a function of 
land loss. After all, many contemporary urban societies were still at a 
rural stage forty or fifty years ago and such a shift was not only 
natural but was considered desirable and economically rational. In the 
case of the Israeli Arabs, however, the relatively high rate of such 
transformation coupled with the rate and extent of land losses to the 
Israeli authorities make the argument concerning a possible link between 
land losses and occupational transformation tenable. 
Over a period of less than 20 years (from 1963 to 1981), 32 the Arab 
labor force employed in agriculture declined from 38.0 percent to 11.5 
percent. In comparison with the figures from 1931 -i.e. over a fifty 
years period- the figure in 1981 constitutes only 14 percent of the 57.0 
percent in 1931, a decline of 86 percent. 
The same pattern of decline holds even if we limit the analysis of 
data to the period which covers the years since Israel came into 
existence in 1948. Despite the initial loss of property by thousands of 
Arabs during the 1948-49 period, as a result of the Absentee Property 
Law, 50 percent of the Arab labor force was still employed in 
agriculture in 1950. Thus, 80 percent of the Arab labor force which was 
employed in agriculture in 1950 was eventually diverted to other 
sectors, mainly as unskilled and semi-skilled workers. A survey of the 
construction industry in 1975 in Haifa showed that only 36.5 percent of 
32 The 1963 is taken as base because it is the year when restrictions 
on the movement of Arabs were relaxed considerably. This gave Arab labor 
the opportunity to seek employment as hired labor. 
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those who worked in construction were Jews, working primarily in 
supervisory positions, while 42.9 percent were Israeli Arabs, and 20.5 
percent were Arabs from the West Bank. 33 
While this decline in the proportion of the Arab labor force employed 
in agriculture is very significant, one can further argue that the rate 
of decline would have been even greater had it not been for some Jewish 
land 'owners' who were either leasing the land to Arabs or employing 
Arabs on farms as hired labor, a practice which was denounced by many 
Jewish officials as well as some journalists 34 (see below pp. 108-111). 
This suggests that while the relationsr·ip between the rate of decline 
in the Arab labor force employed in agriculture and the rate of land 
expropriation may not be highly correlated it is, nevertheless, clear 
that a certain relationship does appear to exist between the two 
variables. The fact that access of dispossessed Palestinians to labor 
sites was controlled through travel restrictions by the military 
government (see chapter 5), from 1948 to 1966 (the years during which 
33 Y. Waschitz, 'Commuters and Enterpreneurs', New Outlook, vol. 18, 
1975' p. 46 
34 Habib Kanan was among the first journalists to call attention to 
such practices by the Jewish settlers. Writing in Haaretz on December 7, 
1964, Kanan complained that 
When a Jewish farmer hands over the work on his land to Arab 
peasants, he is supporting one of the important claims of Israel's 
enemies, namely, that the Jews in Israel do not have deep roots in 
the land they claim as their father land. They have the support of 
facts when they point to the Jews as city dwellers whose only 
interest is the exploitation of Arab labor. Nor would it be 
difficult to describe the Jews as a negative element turning back 
the social clock several decades to the time when the landowning 
effendis (landlords, ed. note) lived in the cities while the 
peasants did the farming on their land. 
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most land confiscation occured), makes it almost impossible to evaluate 
the extent to which land confiscation resulted in Arab labor for hire 
because under these circumstances unemployed Arab labor seeking work was 
invisible. 
Furthermore, the continued restriction by the so-called national 
institutions (JNF, Jewish Agency, Histadrut etc.) against hiring Arab 
labor, coupled with the lack of data on Arabs who were willing and able 
to work, further distorts the real impact land confiscation has had on 
the transformation of Arab labor. Whether this lack of reliable data on 
the number of Arabs who became hired labor as a result of dispossession 
was part of an attempt by the Israeli authorities to prevent bad 
publicity inside as well as outside the country, remains to be 
determined. 
Since it has been established that confiscation of Arab land resulted 
in the generation of Arab labor for hire in the Jewish markets, the 
question then becomes: to what extent was Arab labor needed by the 
Jewish markets? Stated differently, to what extent did the need of the 
labor market for unskilled labor influence confiscation policies? Who 
were the beneficiaries and who were the losers, among the Jewish 
population, as a result of this policy? 
The importance of these questions stems from the fact that by 
establishing a connection between government policies and meeting the 
labor needs one can demonstrate government responsiveness to the needs 
of employers, . i.e., owners of the means of production. Hence, the 
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relations between the government, employers and labor will be better 
understood. 
A satisfactory answer to these questions, however, would entail the 
availability of: a) detailed data on the supply of Jewish labor and the 
demand of the labor market at specific historical periods; b) detailed 
data on the extent and period of expropriation and the amount of labor 
generated as a result of each expropriatory act. Unfortunately, these 
data are not available. But even if these data were available, one would 
still have to consider a third factor before reaching any definite 
conclusions, namely the proportion of Arabs who were channeled to the 
labor market. As will be pointed out in chapter 5, throughout the 
1950's until the mid 1960's the flow of Arab labor to employment sites 
was controlled by the military government. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of existing data one can safely say that 
expropriation of Arab land resulted in no loss to any segment of the 
Jewish population. Al though, theoretically one could argue that the 
generation of a large army of reserve labor must have hurt Jewish 
workers, in reality that did not happen. While this army of Arab labor 
was ready and willing to work, its movement was restricted and therefore 
its potential as a possible competitor in the labor market was 
curtailed. Thus, in reality the Arab labor force lacked the minimal 
'offensive weapon' necessary to present any threat to Jewish workers, 
namely, free movement to and from employment sites, and free negotiation 
for work conditions and salaries. One has to remember that most 
expropriation of Arab land occured during the years 1948 and 1966 which 
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correspond to the period during which the Arabs were under the control 
of the military government. 
The fact that Arab labor did not materialize as a threat to Jewish 
labor does not mean that other segments of the Jewish population did not 
benefit from the availability of 'cheap' labor. Thus, as far as the 
Jewish population was concerned, this was not a zero-sum game. The 
continuously expanding Israeli economy and its need for labor found in 
the Arabs an easy reservoir from which to fill its needs cheaply. The 
efficient mechanism of control over the flow of such labor and the fact 
that Arabs were not members of the Histadrut (labor union) whereas most 
Jews were, (which meant Arabs, almost by definition, were the last to be 
hired and the first to be fired), undermined the Arab labor bargaining 
position for higher salaries and better work conditions which 
contributed in turn to an ideal situation for both the Israeli economy 
as a whole and the individual employer, without any real cost to Jewish 
labor. 
That is to say, all three factors combined -- the generation of Arab 
labor through confiscation of land, the regulation of the flow of Arab 
labor through the restriction on their freedom of movement, and the lack 
of union-protection to the Arab worker forced Arab labor into 
accepting a position inferior to Jewish workers in terms of work status 
and pay. On the other hand, union-protected Jewish labor was not 
threatened by the availability of Arab labor because the flow of the 
latter to employment sites was 
'threatening' potential was limited. 
restricted and therefore its 
Thus, the development .of what 
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could be envisioned as a class conflict between Jewish labor and Jewish 
capital over the status of cheap Arab labor was avoided. 
That these policies were calculated, systematic and with clear 
objectives can further be supported by the following episode. Toward the 
end of 1961 the authorites announced the confiscation of 5, 100 dunums 
from the Arab villages of Deir el-Assad, Bi'nah, and Nahaf, in Western 
Galilee. In the early years of Israeli statehood, these villages lost 
3,500 dunums of cultivated land. This time the regime, as part of its 
continuing efforts to "Judaize the Galilee," decided that more village 
lands were needed in order to build a new Jewish development town, 
Carmiel. The lands e.'Cpropriated included quarries and orchards from 
which the bulk of the villages' workers made their living. Although the 
inhabitants suggested that other of their lands in the area be used for 
the construction of the new town so that they would not be forced to 
travel to Jewish cities for employment, their requests were refused. 
Rather, the government indicated that the industries to be built in 
Carmiel would create jobs for those Arabs left unemployed as a result of 
the expropriation. 35 
The villagers' complaints were brought before the Knesset Finance 
Committee by two Knesset members: Moshe Sneh (member of the Communist 
party) and Yusef Khamis (an Arab Knesset member of Mapam party). In its 
draft report the minority on the committee stated that "the Committee is 
not convinced that there is no alternative to the expropriation of the 
agricultural land belonging to the three villages. There is no 
35 Lustick, 1980, p. 177; Jiryis, 1976, pp. 109-111. 
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justification for this land seizure, not only because the government has 
no means of compensating the owners with comparable land (there is no 
land of this quality in the area), but because there is no need for the 
land for the establishment of the town, since the planning authority has 
no intention of constructing any buildings on the site. 1136 
After the establishment of Carmiel, Arabs were denied either 
residence or investment in the town. 37 On the other hand, Arab labor, to 
work on construction sites for new housing and road pavement, was 
welcomed. 
I have noted elsewhere the military governor's concern with the 
'overflow' of Arab labor to Jewish colonies and the extra restrictive 
orders issued by the governor to limit such an overflow. While the 
Carmiel episode is not unique, 38 it nevertheless illustrates a pattern 
which was used over and over again, a pattern in which everybody gained 
except the Arabs. The Arabs were forced out of their lands and out of 
their occupations as independent farmers, to become landless laborers 
for hire without the advantage of fair competition in the open labor 
market. 
36 Knesset Dates, October 31, 1962, p. 24. Cited in Jiryis, 1976, pp. 
109-10. 
3 7 The minister of housing is quoted as saying, in response to an 
Arab applicant to live in Carmeil, that "Carmeil was not built in order 
to solve the problems of the people in the surrounding area. 11 Knesset 
Debates, Dec. 2, 1964, p. 485. In Jiryis, p. 110. For the objection to 
an Arab contractor to invest in industries in Carmeil in which both 
Arabs and Jews will be employed, see Maarive, Jan 30, 1972. 
38 Jewish Upper Nazareth by the old city of Arab Nazareth and Ma'alot 
by the Arab village of Tarshiha in the north provide other examples. 
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Even the Islamic waqf (an Islamic endowment) was confiscated as 
absentee property and put under the control of the Custodian despite the 
fact that God can hardly be considered an absentee (especially in the 
holy land), and the Moslem community -for whose sake the waqf was 
endowed- did not disappear. This action by the Israeli government 
enraged the Arabs and was the basis of a poem by Rashid Hussain, an Arab 
poet, in which he declares, sarcastically: 
God has become a refugee sir! 
Expropriate then, even the rugs of our mosques. 
The significance of the property of the Islamic waqf lies in its size. 
It is estimated that one eighth (1/8) of Palestinian wealth belonged to 
the waqf. In terms of fertile land it was estimated to be somewhere 
between 750,000 and 1.1 million dunun,s, half of it inside Israel. 39 This 
was in addition to many businesses and shops which had they been left to 
the Islamic community to manage would have provided employment and 
income for thousands of needy Arabs. Such a possibility, however, would 
have meant the forestallment of the Israeli policies (or part of them) 
toward the Arabs. Thus, the fact that the Israeli government chose to 
take the extra step and expropriate this property, despite the outrage 
of the Arabs and certain segments of the Jewish population, 4 0 and 
despite reservations expressed by the Supreme Court as to the legality 
of the government's action, 41 provides further evidence that the Israeli 
39 Yaacov Shimshoni, Palestine Arabs, Tel-Aviv, 1947, p. 90. 
(Hebrew), and Atallah Mansour (an Arab journalist), in Haaretz, Dec. 13, 
1965. 
40 See Habib Kanan, Haaretz, April 21, 1951. 
41 See Sabri Jiryis, 1976, p. 118. 
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government was following its policy with consistency and clear 
objectives. 
Arab and Jewish Opposition to Land Expropriation 
Although most segments of the Jewish population benefited from the 
government's policy of confiscation, this policy was not always welcomed 
by all these segments. Both Arabs and Jews, for different reasons, 
fought against the expropriation of Arab lands. As can be seen from the 
following discussion, no clear pattern can be discerned from the Jewish 
opposition to certain of these policies. Even members of the ruling 
party (Mapai), and members of the Herut party, which is known for its 
extreme views against the Arabs, objected at one point or another to 
certain of these policies. 
Opposition to government's policies concerning the expropriation of 
Arab lands was apparent from the early stages and was expressed by both 
Arabs and certain segments of the Jewish population. The first signs of 
opposition to the government's handling of Arab property were manifested 
against the proposed Absentee Property Law in 1950. While the law 
closely resembled the emergency regulations which had dealt with 
absentee property since December 1948, the proposal of the law to the 
Knesset offered an opportunity for Knesset members and others to voice 
their opposition. During the Knesset debates over the provisions of the 
law several Knesset members, Arabs as well as Jews, spoke against the 
law. Most opposition was raised against provisions which dealt with the 
Arab citizens of the state. 
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There was a general feeling among those opposing the law that 
depriving the Arabs of their property: a) would poison relations between 
the Arabs and Jews of the country; b) would hamper any future prospects 
of integrating Arabs into the life of the state; and c) could undermine 
security. Some Knesset members expressed the belief that the law was 
not free from racial discrimination. The following quote from the daily 
Haaretz42 summarizes the arguments. Haaretz called for the return of 
property or payment of just compensation to Arab residents. 
We have nothing to be proud of in rejection of Dr. Sneh's and Mr. 
Elyashar's amendment .... We are not at war with the Arabs who are 
established citizens of the state ..... A law which automatically 
makes them absentee is insufferable. . . . . This is a matter of 
conscience and political understanding. 
The newspaper warned that there would be little possibility of 
integrating Arab farmers into the state "if Israel condemns them to a 
life of perpetual poverty." 
David Elston, a columnist for the Jerusalem Post, also expressed his 
opposition to the law. Writing in Haaretz on July 8, 1951, Elston 
described the law as "perhaps the most serious factor creating 
embitterment among all Arabs." He pointed out that in Galilee twenty 
villages had been deprived of their property by Jewish collectives, 
which "arrogated to themselves, through long-term leases granted by the 
Minister of Agriculture, lands of Arabs who were free from any guilt or 
wrong doing." 
42 Haaretz, March 20, 1950, and July 2, 1951. Cited in Peretz, 1958, 
p. 172. 
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The excessive powers and freedom the law accorded the Custodian of 
absentee property were particularly singled out for criticism by other 
members of the Knesset. Ben-Ami of the Sephardim party (a party which 
later disappeared), argued that the law's definition of absentee harmed 
the whole community. The two sections most objected to by Ben-Ami were 
the section which classified as an absentee any individual who had moved 
from one section of the country to another, and the section which gave 
the Custodian the full power to determine who was and who was not an 
absentee. Eliahu Elyashar, another Sephardim member, believed that the 
law violated the rights of non-absenr.ees, both Jews and Arabs, because 
it was "arbitrary" and "un-Jewish". 
The powers of the Custodian were also criticizP.d on different 
grounds. Members of Herut and the General Zionist parties, for example, 
saw party favoritism in the appointment of the Custodian by the Mapai 
Minister of Finance. The concentration of a quarter of Israel's wealth 
and most of its lands in the hands of the Custodian and his authority to 
reallocate such wealth without any parliamentary control was feared for 
furtherance of party influence. 
Many amendments to the different provisions of the law were 
introduced by different Knesset members, all of which were defeated by 
the Mapai-Religious Bloc Government coalition. The amendment by Moshe 
Sneh (of the Mapam Party and later of the Communist Party), and Eliahu 
Elyashar (of the Sephardim Party), to protect the Arabs legally residing 
in the state, was defeated by the smallest margin of 8 votes (26 against 
and 18 for the proposed amendment). It received a cross-section of party 
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support. Members of the General Zionist, United Religious, Mapai, Arab 
members from Nazareth associated with Mapai and the Communist party 
voted for it. Two-thirds of the members present abstained. 43 
Absentee property handling was also criticized by the Hebrew author 
and columnist Moshe Smilanski who was known for his prestate activities 
in behalf of the Zionist Organization. Writing in the independent 
newspaper Haaretz, he said " The authorities had taken too long to 
remember their obligations to protect occupied property ...... Sometime we 
will have to account for its theft and despoliation not only to our 
conscience but also to the law". "Where", he asked, "were the 
authorities wh1-m the theft began?" 44 
Moshe Keren, then Arab-Affairs editor for Haaretz, also criticized 
the land acquisition of the late 1940's and early 1950's and called them 
"wholesale robbery in legal guise". In 1955, Keren wrote "Hundreds of 
thousands of dunums were taken away from the Arab minority.... The 
future student of history will never cease to be astonished at how it 
happened ... " 4 5 
43 See discussion on the amendments and vote in Peretz, 1956, pp. 
168-70. 
44 Haaretz, July 26, 1949. Cited in Peretz, P. 154. 
45 Moshe Keren, "Have We an Arab Policy?" Haaretz, January 1, 1955. 
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The Leasing of Land to Arabs 
As a result of economic expansion beginning in the late 1950's and 
early 1960's many employment opportunities in industrial and other works 
were opened up (see Chapter 5). Jews who had been working in 
agriculture began seizing upon these opportunities, leasing their lands 
to Arabs, and moving to a different line of work. As noted earlier, 
however, the practice of leasing lands to Arabs or hiring Arabs to work 
on the land was strongly denounced and steps to eradicate the practice 
were undertaken by the government. These practices by Jewish individuals 
and collectives were referred to as "irregularities". 
In 1966 Haaretz published an article in October entitled "Ishmael's 
National Fund" (a pun on the Hebrew name of the JNF), in which the 
author quoted the director general of the JNF as labeling the 
"irregularities" in the use of public land a "national sin". The author 
went on to say, "If Arab labor is not completely eradicated then the 
development plan for the Northern region will prove to be an empty 
dream". In the article the author quotes the deputy director of the 
Israel Land Administration to the effect that "only a clearly formulated 
law will solve the problem. 1146 In a second article on the same day 
Haaretz reports that in many cases individual Arabs have been sublet, or 
have been hired to work, the very same lands which were expropriated 
from them. 
46 
"Ishmael's National Fund," Haaretz, October 14, 1966. 
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Two weeks later the Agricultural Settlement Law (Restriction on use 
of Agricultural Land and Water) was introduced in the Knesset and was 
passed on August 1, 1967. According to the Law those who break it, i. 
e., continue to lease lands to Arabs and/or employ Arabs on their farms, 
would be deprived of their rights to use the land. 47 
Commenting on the law, Uri Avenery, an independent opposition member 
of the Knesset said: 
There are two conflicting trends to this law; it is a Dr. Jekyll and 
Mr. Hyde law. To all appearances what we have is a law with an 
extremely positive social aim; the landlords, who, through various 
kinds of favoritism, have succeeded in obtaining from the Israel 
Land Authority state land on cheap and easy terms, are to be 
compelled to return that land to the Israel Land Authority if they 
transfer their right to cultivate it to others .... 
What they really aim at are the Jewish ~ffendis (emphasis in 
original), and the Arab cultivators. What is meant is the land that 
was confiscated from the Arabs and handed over through favoritism to 
Jews who then leased it back to the Arabs who have thus become its 
cultivators. 48 
Ten years later the practice was still going on, and along with it 
the anger of the Israeli officials and the search by those officials for 
ways to 'eradicate' the practice. According to Chomsky, 4 9 "Ten 
settlements were recently fined 700, 000 Israeli pounds" because they 
were leasing land to Arabs, and the Minister of Agriculture warned that 
'anyone caught leasing land to Arabs will be punished'. The Minister, 
according to Chomsky, gave an estimate of 10,000 dunums that have been 
47 Laws of the State of Israel, 21, (1966/67), p.105. 
48 Cited in Zureik, 1979, p. 117. 
49 N. Chomsky, 'The Interim Agreement', pp. 24-5. Cited in. Amal 
Samed, Palestinian Women: Entering the Proletariat', Journal of 
Palestine Studies, Vol. VI, no 1, 1976, pp. 159-68. 
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leased to Arabs and commented that it is 'a very serious phenomenon 
which must be fought in every way possible'. In addition to the 
minister's warning, the Director of the Galilee region of the Jewish 
Agency also announced 'that his office has sent a circular to all 
(Jewish) settlements in which they are warned that leasing of national 
lands for cultivation by Arab lessees or rental of orchards for fruit 
picking and marketing by Arabs is in violation of law, regulations of 
the settlement authorities, and the settlement movement'. 
Two questions which must be asked are: why do the government and 
other 'national institutions' interfere with the practice of Jewish 
individuals and settlements who control the land?; wh:r are Arabs who are 
'full-time' citizens of the state not allowed to lease or rent land in 
the open market, from Jewish individuals and collectivities? 
Clearly, this practice by the authorities has two definite 
consequences: a) it prevents the Arabs from developing into independent 
workers making more of them available to Jewish employers; and, b) the 
policy had the effect of sharpening the Arab-Jewish division separating 
the insiders (Jews) from the outsiders (Arabs). This emphasis on the 
Arab-Jewish division is further supported through the use of concepts 
such as 'nation', 'national lands' and the 'division of labor' between 
the Israeli government and the national institutions. The concept 
"nation" does not mean people who live in Israel, which includes Arabs 
and Jews. Rather it means the Jewish people including those Jews who 
reside anywhere in the world as well as those who live in Israel. 
Consequently, "national land" is the land which belongs to the. Jewish 
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nation 50 which, properly speaking, includes only that land registered as 
owned by the JNF, the most prominent of the national institutions with 
regard to the land question. However, the JNF controls, either directly 
or indirectly, over 92 percent of Israeli land area. 51 
The recognition of the value of control over the land since the early 
days of Zionism is not untypical of colonial settlers elsewhere. Hence 
endowing the land to the Jewish rather than to the Israeli people and 
giving control over its management to non-Israeli organization (JFN) is 
designed to guarantee a continued control over the land without which no 
colonial settler project can ever hope to succeed. 
Since the JNF had been the major land purchasing Zionist Organization 
during the pre-statehood era, it is necessary to investigate its 
purchasing activities, its regulations of both Jewish and Arab labor, 
and the necessity for its continued existence as an independent 
institution even after the Jewish state was established. 
The JNF and its Land-Purchase Activities 
On the eve of the 1948 war and the establishment of the state of 
Israel the total Jewish land holdings did not exceed 7 percent. 52 Most 
larids were purchased from Arab landlords, some of whom did not even 
5
° For more elaboration on these definitions, see Uri Davis, 'Land 
Ownership, Citizenship and Racial Policy in Israel'. In: Sociology of 
Developing Societies-The Middle East, Talal Asad and Roger Owen (eds.), 
pp. 145-58; Lustick, 1980, pp. 106-7. 
51 Lustick, 1980, p. 107. 
52 A. Grannot, Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel, London: Eyre 
& Spottiswood, 1956, p. 28. 
115 
reside in Palestine. 53 The Jewish National Fund (JNF) was one of two 
Jewish organizations most active in land purchase in Palestine, besides 
individuals, the other was the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association 
(PICA). Founded with the financial support of Baron Edmond de 
Rothschild, PICA allotted its lands to tenants who were primarily 
private farmers obliged to defray their capital debt overtime. 54 Most of 
these lands were eventually sold to Jewish farmers and registered as 
their private property. 5 5 The JNF, by contrast, was founded by the 
Zionist Organization in 1901 and therefore was buying land on behalf of 
the 'Jewish people' as their 'inalienable property'. Thus, its 
allocation method differed from that of PICA. Here the allocation was on 
the basis of leaseholds to individual Jewish farmers, to companies, or 
to collective settlements. The agreements of such leases were usually 
drawn for 49 years. 56 During the 1930's and 1940's the JNF intensified 
its land purchase activity and in 1947 it became the largest Jewish 
landowner, owning more than a half of the Jewish-owned land in Palestine 
(see Table below). 
53 According to the Statistical Department of the Jewish Agency, as 
of March 1936, 52. 6~~ of Jewish owned land was purchased from "large 
absentee landowners", 24.6% from "large resident landowners", 13.4% from 
"various sources" such as the government, churches and foreign 
companies, and only 9.4% from small Palestinian farmers. Cited in Lehn, 
"The Jewish National Fund". Journal of Palestine Studies, 3 (Summer), 
19 7 4, pp . 7 4-91. 
54 Lucas, 1974, p. 112. 
55 Granott, 1956, p. 28. 
56 Ibid., p. 143. 
Year 
1882 
1900 
1914 
1927 
1936 
1947 
Table 4.5 
Jewish Landownership (in Dunums) 
By Year and Purchaser (1882-1947) 
P.I.C.A. J.N.F. 
145,000 
235,000 16,000 
323,000 197,000 
435,000 379,000 
435,000 933,000 
Private 
Purchaser 
22,500 
73,000 
167,000 
345,000 
426,000 
366,000 
Total 
22,500 
218,000 
418,000 
865,000 
1,231,000 
1,734,000 
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Source: A. Granott, Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel, London: 
Eyre and Spottiswood, 1965, p. 28. 
Following the establishment of the state the JNF continued to operate 
its own fund raising apparatus under the direction of the World Zionist 
Organization. In 1950 the Knesset passed the Development Authority Law 
which according to Granott, the chairman of the board of directors of 
the JNF from 1945 to 1960: 
expressly states that the Authority shall not be able to sell or 
alienate land ... in any manner except to the following four bodies: 
the State of Israel; the JNF; Local Authorities; and the 
institutions for settling landless Arabs. 
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In Practice only two of these bodies are of concern - the state 
and the JNF, since the body for settling landless Arabs has never 
been established. Thus a great rule was laid down, which has a 
decisive and basic significance - that the property of absentees 
cannot be transfered to ownership to anyone but (the ) national 
public institutions above, either the state itself, or the original 
Land Institution of the Zionist Movement. 57 
The law gave priority to the requirements of the JNF. In Granott' s 
words: "Every area must first be offered to the JNF and only if it gives 
notice in writing that it is not interested, may it be transfered to 
others, whether by sale or lease." 58 
The JNF shares responsibility for another body, the Israel Land 
Admnistration, with the Ministry of Agriculture. In this context it 
exercises administrative control over all state lands, which combin~d 
with JNF holdings equal 92 percent of Israel's land area. 59 
According to Lustick there are two reasons why the official status of 
the JNF is kept nongovernmental: first, as nongovernmental 
'philanthropic' agency the JNF enjoys a tax-exempt status from the 
American Internal Revenue Service which allows it to collect 
contributions in the United States and other countries. The second 
reason, which has a greater significance to this analysis, is the fact 
that by not being formally part of the Israeli government, the JNF does 
not have to serve a constituency of Israeli citizens. In Lustick' s 
words: "although the government of Israel is bound according to its own 
57 Granott, 1956, pp. 103-4. 
5 8 Ibid, p. 106 
59 Joseph Weitz (former Director of the Development Authority of the 
JNF), "Land Ownership", Cited in Lustick, 1980, p. 99. 
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democratic norms to address itself, in the laws it promulgates, in the 
programs it sponsors, and in the services it provides, to Jewish and 
Arab citizens alike, the Jewish Agency (another of the so called 
national institutions), and the JNF are mandated to operate only in 
regard to Israel's Jewish population." 60 
As indicated earlier, this is not to say that the government and the 
JNF act in total independence from each other. Nor does it mean that the 
government does not subscribe to the JNF principles. It only means that 
the JNF can apply those principles with greater freedom and under less 
pressure from inside as well as outside the country. Few laws were 
passed by the Knesset which are completely in accord with the )rinciples 
of the JNF. The Agricultural Settlement law refered to earlier is only 
one example. In 1960 the Knesset enacted Basic Law: Israel Lands 
according to which state land was defined as the 'inalienable' right of 
the Jewish people, a definition which conforms to the principles held by 
the JNF. The two most important principles of the original constitution 
of the JNF, which were resented by the Arabs are: 61 
(i) the principle that Jewish property is inalienable; no Zionist 
settler may dispose of his lease to anyone but a Jew, (ii) the 
principle carefully safeguarded by the powerful Jewish Federation of 
Labor, that only Jewish labour may be employed in Zionist colonies. 
The net result is that, when the Jewish National Fund makes a 
purchase the Arabs lose not only the land itself but also any chance 
of being employed on this land. 
60 Lustick, 1980, p. 106. 
61 Great Britain and Palestine: 1915-1945, Information paper No. 20, 
London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946, p. 36. Cited in 
Zureik, 1979, pp. 118-19. 
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True to these principals an official of the JNF declared in an interview 
with Lustick in 1979 6 2 that "The economic impact of our land purchases 
and our activities on Arabs is not considered .... The government would 
have to look after all citizens if they owned the land; the JNF owns the 
land, let's be frank, we can serve just the Jewish people." 
It is very difficult in light of statements such as these to argue 
that the JNF (the biggest land owner in Israel) and the Israeli 
government, are not aware of the consequences of land policies on the 
Arabs. As early as 1930 the Hope-Simpson Inquiry of 1930, a British 
committee set up to investigate the causes of the Jaffa riots of 1929, 
addressed the threat posed by Jewish land acquisition to the indigenous 
Arab population. The Committee stated that 
The result of the purchase of land in Palestine by the Jewish 
National Fund has been that land has been extraterritorialized. It 
ceases to be land from which the Arab can gain any advantage now or 
in the future. Not only can he never hope to lease or to cultivate 
it, but by the stringent provisions of the lease of the Jewish 
National Fund he is deprived forever from employment on that land. 63 
The fact that Zionist sources tend to underestimate the impact of 
land purchase by Jews on the Arabs by presenting low figures of 
previously cultivated areas and of displaced families provides further 
evidence that the Zionist institution then as now, and with it the 
Israeli government were aware of the real consequences of their actions 
on the Arabs and were attempting to distort these facts systematically. 
62 Lustick, 1980, p. 106. 
6 3 J. Ruedy, "Dynamics of Land Alienation". In: I. Abu - Lughud. (ed. ) , 
The Transformation of Palestine, Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1971, p. 130. 
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Thus, Miller, 64 relying on Zionist sources, gives a breakdown of lands 
sold to Jews in the plains of Isdraelon (Marj-Ibn-Amer) and Acre alone 
by previously tenated area and number of tenants. From those two areas 
alone Miller's figures show that 688 Arab tenants were affected by the 
sale. 
These figures, however, tell only part of the story. While they may 
account for tenants, they ignore completely the laborers who also worked 
on, and lived off, the sold land. In contrast to the 688 families which 
were displaced from the two areas, according to Miller, a figure of 
8,000 is quoted by Hirst 65 as the number of peasants, living in twenty-
two villages, who were displaced as a result of the sale of the (Marj-
Ibn-Amer) plain alone. Hirst emphasizes that "the fate of the 8,000 
peasants was never determined". 
The number of laborers who worked on the land becomes significant 
when one considers the fact that most large tracts in Palestine which 
were sold to Jews, were owned by landlords many of whom did not even 
live in Palestine proper. The figures in Table 6 show the distribution 
of land ownership according to a 1936 British Government investigation 
of 322 villages. 66 
6 4 Y. E. Miller, "Administrative Policy in Rural Palestine: The 
Impact of British Norms on Arab Community Life 1920-1948. in J. S. 
Migdal, (ed.), Palestinian Society and Structure, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980, p. 260. 
65 Hirst, The Gun and Olive Branch, London: Faber and Faber, 1977, p. 
29. 
66 R. Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries, London: 
Zed Press, 1979, P. 31. 
Size of holding 
(in dunums) 
Above 5,000 
1,000-5,000 
100-1,000 
0-100 
Table 4.6 
Land Ownership in Palestine in 1936 
Owners as % of 
the population 
0.01 
0.20 
8.00 
91. 80 
Area owned as % of 
total cultivated land 
19 
8 
36 
37 
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Source: R. Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries, 
London: Zed Press, 1979, p. 31. 
According to the figures in the Table, 91.8 percent of the population 
either did not own land at all or their land holding did not exceed 100 
dunums. The total holdings of this category amounted to only 37 percent 
while 19 percent of the total owned land were held by 0.01 percent of 
the population. The picture becomes even more clear by a further 
breakdown of the last (0-100 dunums) category. According to Sayigh 6 7 
27.6 percent of the population owned plots of less than 40 dunums, while 
21. 9 percent owned plots of less than 5 dunums. These plots of less 
than 40 dunums were far smaller than the minimum needed for family 
subsistence. 68 
67 Ibid., p. 32. 
68 The Hope-Simpson Report of 1930 defined the minimum amount of land 
needed by a family of five to sustain itself without other sources of 
income: 130 dunums of unirrigated land; 100 dunums of rich land with 
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SUMMARY 
In this chapter .I have attempted to untangle one of the most 
complicated and least documented subjects which touches upon Arab-Jewish 
relations in Israel. I have shown that the multiplicity of laws, 
regulations, and institutions which deal with the subject of land were 
designed to dispossess the Arabs of their land in a systematic way. 
Entrusting control over the land to a Zionist, non-Israeli, and 
nongovernmental agency (the JNF), which subscribes to discriminatory 
principles was done by the government (and the Knesset) for the purpose 
of avoiding legal and political (national and international) 
ramifications. 
Clearly, control over the land is of major importance to any colonial 
settler society, and without it no settlement project can ever hope to 
succeed. Israel, being no different, started the process of control over 
the land through purchase, before the turn of the century. The 
availability of cheap Arab labor seems to have been secondary during the 
initial stages of statehood to the objective of controlling the land. 
The loss of property by the Arabs, on the other hand, had two major 
consequences: first, since Arabs could no longer continue working as 
self-employed farmers they turned to hired work as the only means to 
earn their livelihood; and second, the very absence of this major 
economic resource to the disposal of Arabs forced them into accepting 
menial jobs and lower wages than their Jewish counterparts. 
livestock; 40 dunums of partially irrigated land with dairy farming; 15 
dunums of tree plantation. Ibid., p. 32. 
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However, as will be pointed out in the next two chapters, during the 
initial stages the Jewish economic sector in general and Jewish 
employers in particular were not allowed to make full use of this cheap 
labor power. Furthermore, through a combination of denying Arab labor 
access to Jewish labor sites by the military government (Chapter 5) and 
a denial of union membership to Arabs by the Jewish labor union (the 
Histadrut, Chapter 6) the development of a competitive labor market was 
prevented. Hence, the initial conditions which set the stage for a 
discrepancy in the price of labor were reproduced and no 'equalization 
effect' on wages was allowed to take place. 
CHAPTER V 
THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT 
Whereas limiting the availability of economic resources to Arabs set 
the initial conditions for a split labor market the "Military 
Government" or "Military Administration" (Memshal Tzvai), was 
instrumental in reproducing these conditions. It provided an 
'identifying ideology' through the claim that its very existence was 
necessitated by the security risk to the state posed by Arabs. It 
continuously curtailed the availability of political resources to the 
Arabs. It controlled the flow of Arab labor to Jewish employment sites 
through restriction orders on the movement of Arabs which had the effect 
of limiting the development of a competitive labor market. And it 
controlled a host of political, educational and even social activities, 
which would have resulted in a more independent Arab labor force. 
According to Lustick, the military government was the most important 
instrument used by the Israeli government to control its Arab citizens. 1 
The military government was also used for land confiscation. While 
it was not the sole mechanism through which confiscation of Arab lands 
was, and continues to be, made possible (see Chapter 4) the military 
government's methods, the legal basis under which it operated, and the 
1 See Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a 
National Minority, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1980, pp. 123-25, 
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system of justifications used, made land confiscation a smoother 
operation than it would have been otherwise. 
125 
In this chapter I describe the military government's methods of 
operation, the legal basis upon which its activities were predicated, 
and the spheres of Arab's daily lives over which the military government 
had a jurisdiction. I also examine the validity and function of the 
national security argument which was used to justify the existence of 
the military government, describe the struggle for its abolition, paying 
a special attention to the role played by the different Jewish groups in 
this struggle and outline the respective benefits (economic and 
political) of those Jewish groups who supported as well as those who 
opposed the continuation of the military government. 
Chronology of Events 
Military government over the Arab areas in Israel was formally 
established on October 21, 1948. The measure, which was signed by 
Brigadier General Elimelech Avner, gave official recognition to the de 
facto role which the Jewish units had been playing in those areas since 
their capture - that of an occupation army. According to the order, five 
military governors were named in the predominantly Arab districts 
conquered by Jewish forces in the course of the fighting. These 
districts consisted of Nazareth, western Galilee, Ramle-Lod, Jaffa, and 
the Negev - all of which fell in the area projected as the Arab state 
according to the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan of Palestine. The 
treatment of the Arabs in those areas seems to have varied widely, 
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according to the inclination of the local military governor. 2 
Following the end of fighting, and the subsequent signing of cease-
fire agreements between the Israeli government and the Arab governments 
of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, which determined the Armistic 
lines, Israel retained large areas beyond those alloted to the Jewish 
state by the Partition Plan of 1947. About 160,000 Arabs remained in 
those areas and subsequently became citizens of the state of Israel (see 
Chapter 2). 
The military government over these areas was eventually reorganized 
and reformed. In January 1950, the military government was formally and 
legally established on the basis of the Defense (Emergency) regulations 
of 1945, which gave the miltary governors the power to appoint military 
commanders, while judicial powers were entrusted to military courts 
appointed by the army chief of staff. 3 
After formal adoption of the emergency regulations, the minister of 
defense used the powers granted him to appoint military governors for 
the three principal regions corresponding to the geographical 
concentration of Israel's Arab inhabitants - the Northern Command, 
encompassing the Galilee and the Haifa area; the Central Command, with 
responsibility for the 'Little' Triangle; and the Southern Command, 
2 G. Shamir, "The Establishment of the 'Military Administration' over 
the Arab Population in Israel during the War of Independence" (seminar 
paper: Tel-Aviv University, 1973), pp. 12-13 (Hebrew). 
3 For a detailed description of the composition and authority of 
those courts, see Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs In Israel, Monthly Review 
Press, New York, 1976, pp. 15-17 
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responsible for the Bedouins of the Negev (see Chapter 2). In 1949 
these areas contained over 90 percent of Israel's Arab population, and 
even in 1958 fully 85 percent of all Israeli Arabs still lived in areas 
assigned to the Military Administration. 4 
From the beginning, however, the military government, and the Defense 
regulations in particular, came under attack from many different groups 
for very different reasons. Some of these attacks took the form of 
demonstrations, articles in the newspapers, and even motions for the 
complete abolition of the military government, which were introduced 
occasionally in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament). Under continuous 
pressure and criticism from the left, represented by the Communist 
Party, and from the right, represented by the Herut Party of Begin, the 
military government was forced to make continuous changes and reform. 
On November 8, 1966, Eshkol (the Prime Minister at the time), announced 
in the Knesset that the government had decided "to consider the military 
government apparatus abolished as of December first of this year, and to 
transfer the responsibilities it has shouldered until now to civil 
authorities." 5 
With this announcement, the struggle for the abolition of the 
military government came to an end although many of its activities and 
actions in the Arab sector have had a long lasting effect on the Arab-
Jewish relations the consequencies of which are still felt until this 
day. 
4 Ian Lustick, 1980, p. 123. 
5 In Jiryis, 1976, p. 63. 
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Policies and Practices 
It is very difficult, based on an analysis of the various articles of 
the Defense regulations, to comprehend the full scope of the military 
government activities and their real consequences. These statutes, 
consisting of 170 articles divided into fifteen sections, were inherited 
from the British mandate. The British had originally enacted these 
regulations to deal with the Palestinian Arab revolt of 1936-39. The 
regulations which gave the Mandate government the legal and 
administrative freedom of action it might choose were to be invoked only 
when a state of emergency had been declared. Thus, in a period of 
relative calm the regulations were rarely activated. 6 
Until 1945, however, the regulations were continuously being modified 
and changed. Although originally promulgated to deal with the Arab 
uprising, the regulations were soon to be used against the Jews of 
Palestine, particularly against the Lehi organization (Lochamei Herut 
Yisrael - Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, otherwise known as the 
Stern Gang). Consequently, Jewish opposition to the regulations was 
voiced on many occasions and in different forms. The following 
declaration by the Hebrew Lawyers' Union in 1946, is a typical one. 7 
The powers given to the ruling authority in the emergency 
regulations deny the inhabitants of Palestine their basic human 
rights. These regulations undermine the foundation of law and 
justice, they constitute a serious danger to individual freedom and 
they constitute a regime of arbitrariness without any judicial 
6 See Sabri Jiryis, 1976, pp. 9-11. 
7 See an excellent review of Jewish criticism of the regulations by 
Sabri Jiryis, 1976, pp. 11-13. 
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supervision.• 
Since the regulations, as they were originally promulgated by the 
Mandate authorities, could be invoked only after an "emergency 
situation" had been declared, in Israel, according to Lustick, 9 "an 
'emergency situation' was declared immediately following the 
establishment of the state and that declaration is still in force." 
This declaration gave the rationale for invoking the regulations and 
consequently setting security as the most frequently cited reason for 
the maintenance of the military government. Arabs have consistently 
been portrayed as enemies of the state and therefore the military 
government was needed to control and suppress any attempt by the Arabs 
for sabotage before it takes place. In March of 1956, for example, a 
report issued by a special committee, which was appointed by Prime 
Minister Ben-Gurion to examine the military government and make 
recommendations, stated that "the areas under military government and 
the scope of the activities of the military commander should not be 
abolished or reduced, because 
these areas are one of supreme importance from the security point of 
view, and need to be kept under control, since they might be made 
use of by the enemy in an emergency. 10 
As late as 1963, in a speech on February 20th during a Knesset debate on 
the abolition of the military government, Ben-Gurion expressed his 
determination to maintain the military government. The indispensibility 
8 Cited in Emanuel Dror, 'The emergency regulations', in Arie Bober 
(ed.), The Other Israel, New York, Doubleday, 1972, p. 134. 
9 Ian Lustick, 1980, p. 124. 
10 Quoted by Jiryis, 1976, p. 35. 
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of the military government, in Ben-Gurion's views, stems from the fact 
that 
three regions, Galilee, the Triangle, and the Negev, are hotbeds of 
hate and conspiracy, and therefore always a potential danger. Acting 
openly under cover of communism, there are elements in these areas 
who could instigate disturbances among the Arabs themselves, or 
between Arabs and Jews, in any moment of tension. 11 
Since security-related reasons were always given as justification for 
the activities of the military government, one would assume that 
invoking any of the 170 articles of the regulations is somehow related 
to security measures. Far from it. Article 125, for example, was among 
the most frequently invoked. This article "grants the military governor 
the power to proclaim any area o~ place a forbidden (closed) area .... 
which no one can enter or leave without ... a written permit from the 
military commander or his deputy ...... failing which he is considered to 
have commited a crime. " 12 Thus the article empowered the military 
commander to close areas which could include whole villages or districts 
and prevent anyone from either entering or leaving. By doing so, the 
military commander was able to control the flow of people on a daily 
basis to and from any area in the country. On the surface such actions 
could be explained on security grounds claiming that the security of the 
people entering or leaving such areas was at stake. Or, conversely, it 
could be claimed that by entering such areas the Arabs jeopardized the 
security of the state. As the following quotes will show however, it is 
doubtful that the security and the safety of the people (Arabs in 
11 Knesset Debates, Feb. 20, 1963, p. 1215 as quoted by Sabri Jiryis, 
1976, p. 44. 
12 Quoted in Jiryis, 1976, p. 17. 
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particular) who live in or near such closed areas were of concern to the 
military governor when he ordered those areas closed. Instead, one of 
his primary interests (although there were others which will be 
discussed later) was the confiscation of Arab land. 
Before a vote in the Knesset on the military government's abolition 
in 1962, Shmoel Segev, who was familiar with the work of the security 
services, wrote: 
The repeal of Article 125 which deals with the "closed areas" - the 
most important article as far as the military government is 
concerned - would mean in practice the abolition of the legal power 
to declare flreas closed .... The closing of an area by virtue of this 
article means that it is being prepared for Jewish settlement, 
(emphasis added), which is becoming more and more urgent with the 
increasing waves of immigration. 13 
Adressing the same subject Shimon Peres, then deputy minister of 
defense, wrote: 
It is by making use of Article 125, on which the military government 
depends to a large extent, that we can directly continue the 
struggle for Jewish settlement and Jewish immigration ..... In 
Galilee ... today, there are hundreds of thousands of dunams of 
unsettled land which are earmarked for programmed settlement. 14 
In his speech on Feb. 20, 1963, Ben-Gurion declared that "the military 
government came into existence to protect the right of Jewish 
settlements in all parts of the state. 15 These remarks were perhaps the 
first public indication of some of the intended consequences and 
functions of the military government, i.e. the confiscation of Arab land 
which amounted to hundreds of thousands of dunams (see Chapter 4). As 
13 Maariv, Dec. 29, 1961. 
14 Davar, Jan. 26, 1962. 
15 Knesset Debates, Feb. 20, 1963, p. 1217. Quoted by Sabri Jiryis, 
1976, p. 53. 
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described by Lustick, 16 the scenario worked in the following manner: 
A closed area encompassing Arab-owned agricultural lands is declared 
a "closed area". The owners of the land are then denied permission 
by the security authorities to enter the area for any purpose 
whatsoever, including cultivation. After three years pass, the 
Ministry of Agriculture issues certificates which classify the lands 
as uncultivated. The owners are notified that unless cultivation is 
renewed immediately the lands will be subject to expropriation. The 
owners, still barred by the security authorities from entering the 
"closed area" within which their lands are located, cannot resume 
cultivation. The lands are then expropriated and become part of the 
general land reserve for Jewish settlement. Eventually permission to 
enter the "closed area" is granted to Jewish farmers; alternatively 
the classification of the area as "closed" is lifted altogether. 
Arab as well as Jewish controlled areas were subject to the practice 
of i.;losure by the military government. Although a "closed area" in 
theory applied to both Arabs and Jews, in practice only Arabs were 
required to carry permits for entering or leaving such an area. This 
practice was described by the state controller in a report in 1959 in 
which he wrote: 
An order from the military governor declaring an area closed is, in 
theory, applicable to all citizens without exception whether living 
in the area or outside it. Thus anyone who enters or leaves a closed 
area without a written permit from the military governor is in fact 
committing a criminal offense. In practice, however, Jews are not 
expected to carry such permits and in general are not prosecuted for 
breaking the regulations in Article 125 .... There is something wrong 
in this law, which was drafted to apply to all citizens in the 
country but is in fact enforced only against some of them. 17 
The state controller may or may not have been aware of all the 
consequences of such discriminatory practices by the military 
government. 
16 Ian Lustick, 1980, p. 178. 
17 State Controller's Report on Security for Financial Year 1957/58, 
Feb. 15 1959, pp. 57-58. Quoted in Jiryis, 1976, p. 26 
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Although these policies may have been designed to enhance 
confiscation of Arab lands as an important goal, other goals were served 
equally well by these policies. One of these goals was the regulation of 
the flow of Arab labor to Jewish labor markets. This was made clear 
through an order by the military governor of the northern region issued 
to all the Arabs in his area to stay out of the Jewish settlements. The 
reason for such an order according to the governor was that "he could 
not control the increasing infiltration of the agricultural colonies by 
minority laborers who were becoming permanently employed in various 
fields". 18 In fact travel permits were very hard to come by in times of 
high unemployment. This prevented Arab laborers from reaching their 
place of work in the cities, thus securing work for the Jews. 19 
Furthermore, "until 1953 the military government determined the wages of 
Arab laborers in the areas under its control" because, according to Levi 
Eshkol, minister of finance, "there are no labor offices in the area." 20 
It would be misleading to conclude that this was the extent of the 
military government's intervention in Arab lives. Indeed the regulations 
gave the military governor dictatorial powers over the Arabs. His 
activities, according to the regulations did not fall under the 
jurisdiction of any civil court including the High Court for Justice. 
The military governor answered directly to the chief of staff and the 
minister of defense. Thus, many of the appointed governors' activities 
18 Haaretz, Oct. 11, 1955. 
19 Yorma Ben-Prath, The Arab Labor Force in Israel, (Jerusalem, The 
Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 1966), pp. 51-52) 55. 
20 In Jiryis, 1976, p. 274 
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went unchecked. 21 Of particular interest to this study is their power to 
restrict travel, since such restrictions seem to have been directed 
mainly against travel for employment purposes. In fact Lustick reports 
Israeli government statistics for the year 1953-1954 which show that 80 
percent of all travel permits to have been "issued in connection with 
employment, the rest being for medical treatment, contact with courts 
and legal advisors, and contact with Government departments." 22 
It does not follow, however, that permits were handed out freely and 
on demand. Although statistics showing the ratio of those granted 
permits to the number of applicants are impossible to find, 2 3 some 
observations are indicative of the limited number of permits issued at 
any particular time. As late as 1958, and at a time when this practice 
was supposed to have been liberalized, only one out of every three Arabs 
living in a military zone held a travel permit, with half of those 
permits granted for a short period. 24 In 1956, according to the 
Jerusalem Post, only 800 of the inhabitants of Um-el-Fahm, the largest 
21 Sabri Jiryis, p. 40, quotes an ex-military governor as saying: 
(The military government) interferes in the life of the Arab citizen 
from the day of his birth to the day of his death. It has the final 
say in all matters concerning workers, peasants, professional men, 
merchants, and educated men, with schooling and social services. It 
interferes in the registration of births, deaths, and even 
marraiges, in questions of land and in the appointment and dismissal 
of teachers and civil servants. Often, too, it arbitrarily 
interferes in the affairs of political parties, in political and 
social activities, and in local and municipal councils. 
22 Ian Lustic, 1980: 124. 
23 I do not believe that such statistics in fact exist. 
24 See Lustick, 1980, p. 125. 
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of the Arab villages, held such permits. 25 Considering the village's 
demographic composition -- over 60 percent of its 6,000 inhabitants at 
the time were internal refugees from neighboring villages which were 
destroyed during the 1948 war -- one can only wonder as to the real 
number who were in need of and applied for such a permit for employment 
purposes. 
The few permits which were issued specified the initiation and 
expiration dates and the destination and route to be travelled. The 
implications of such a policy of specification on the Arab worker were 
many. First, since these permits were only periodic and their renewal 
was never to be taken for granted, the stability and reliability of the 
Arab worker was, naturally, questioned by the Jewish employer. Thus, 
irrespective of qualifications, Arab workers were typically assigned to 
the secondary job sector performing unskilled work in dead-end jobs 
which paid minimum wages and carried no benefits. Secondly, the 
limitations on destination and travel route by the issued "permit" 
affected the Arab worker's ability for a wider job hunt and compromised 
his bargaining power for better wages, job conditions and/or job 
quality. Such a practice, on the other hand, impeded the development of 
a competitive labor market because Arab labor, due to their dependence 
on travel permits whose continuation of issuance was never guaranteed, 
were seen as unreliable. Hence, the stereotypes of "cheap" and 
"unskilled" were typical yet unjustified descriptions of the Arab 
laborer which contributed to a further erosion in his status and image. 
25 The Jerusalem Post, April 4, 1956. 
136 
Third, by also applying the restrictions to travel between Arab 
villages, the military government prevented any organization of Arab 
workers which may have struggled for better conditions. Such a policy, 
coupled with the fact that the Arabs were not permitted to join the 
Israeli labor union (the Histadrut) until 1959 (see chapter 6) left the 
Arab labor force fragmented, with each worker facing his situation by 
himself. These practices provided fertile grounds, politically as well 
as ideologically, for Jewish employers to use arbitrary measures in 
order to benefit from a fragmented, disoriented and cheap Arab labor 
force, assigning them to low status and menial work. 
Low status occupations for the Arabs seems to have been a matter of 
official policy, also justified on the basis of security. The following 
quote by Lubrani (then advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab affairs) 
articulates this policy rather well. In April 1961, Lubrani declared, 
in a lecture to a Jewish audience in Tel-Aviv, that the Arabs were the 
"sworn and everlasting enemies" of the state. Such declarations had, by 
that time, become routine by state officials. What was not routine, 
however, was his acknowledgement that: 
With one hand we take what we give them with the other. We give them 
tractors, electricity, and progress, but we take land and restrict 
their free movement. We give them high schools, but we prevent their 
graduates from entering honorable occupations ....... were there no 
Arab students perhaps it would be better. If they would remain 
hewers of woods perhaps it would be easier to control them. 26 
Needless to say, the statement does not refer to a fair and negotiated 
trade-off between the state and its Arab citizens. Clearly, the 'taking' 
of the land, the 'restriction' of movement, and the 'prevention' of Arab 
26 Zeev Schiff, "If I Were an Arab," Haaretz, April 4, 1961. 
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graduates from entering 'honorable' occupations were forced actions. 
Such actions, one would assume, were designed to fulfil certain policy 
objectives which, despite the official statements to the contrary, make 
the 'security' explanation untenable. 
It is in the light of such declarations that the military 
government's behavior towards the Arabs are to be interpreted. The 
harsh and indiscriminate methods of the military government were 
continuously being justified through statements such as the one 
mentioned above. While such practices and declarations provided 
ideological justification for differentiating Arabs, the continued 
existence of the military government and the system of travel 
restrictions were handicapping the efforts of Jewish employers to make 
full use of Arab labor because of the limited access to this demoralized 
and cheap labor. One would assume, therefore, that those who benefited 
the least from such policies and practices were among those who opposed 
the military government. Stated differently, certain segments of the 
Jewish population who opposed the military government did so because 
they would have benefited from its abolition. In general, those who 
could have used "cheap" Arab labor, for example, would have benefited 
from the abolition of the military government and the easy access to 
such labor which would have come as a result. And in the late fifties 
when the need for unskilled labor intensified (see Chapter 6) so did the 
campaign for the abolition of travel restriction against the Arabs. 
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The Struggle for the Abolition of the Military Government 
The significance of the struggle for the abolition of the military 
government lies in the fact that it lasted too long. It was no earlier 
than 1966 (18 years after the military government was established) that 
pressure against the government could produce total abolition. This 
suggests that the forces which benefited from its continuation and, 
therefore supported it, were far greater and more powerful than the 
forces against it. Clearly, that segment of the Jewish population which 
benefited the most as a result of continued operation of the military 
government opposed its abolition. These are: labor in general and 
unskilled labor in particular, employees of the military government's 
bureaucracy and its derivative agencies (see Chapter 3), and the ruling 
party because it can claim that its policies are designed to protect 
labor and therefore it desrves the support of labor, i. e., Jewish 
labor. The next three sections will describe this struggle, how it was 
waged and by whom. I will also describe critical periods during which 
the struggle intensified, the facilitating events for this 
intensification and the validity of the rationale used in the defense of 
the continuation of the military government. 
Both Arabs and certain segments of the Jewish population struggled 
against the military government either for modification of the emergency 
regulations, the "legal" basis for its operation, or for total abolition 
of the system. The struggle against the military government was a hard 
and continuous one. However, since this study is not concerned with the 
detailed history of this struggle, only a synopsis of these struggles 
will be discussed here. 
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The Arabs' opposition to and struggle against the military government 
can be understood in light of its activities in the Arab sector. The 
struggle for its abolition symbolized a struggle against the 
government's policies with regard to the Arabs. Arabs felt that with 
the abolition of the military government and all that it symbolized, 
their lives as citizens and as Arabs within the Jewish state could only 
be improved. 
Among the Jewish population, however, different groups voiced 
opposition to the military government for different reasons. These can 
be grouped into five categories: a) opposition to the military 
government for humanistic reasons; b) opposition as a result of concern 
for Israel's image in the international arena; c) opposition to the 
military government as a result of its political activities in terms of 
rallying Arab votes for Mapai, the ruling party; d) opposition to the 
military goverrllllent and struggle for Arab equality as part of a general 
struggle for the character and future of the Israeli society; e) 
opposition by the business community which was seeking an easier access 
to the "cheap" Arab labor force. 
Opposition to the military government were expressed in a variety of 
forms, the most visible (and perhaps least sanctioned), of which are the 
motions introduced in the Knesset for the military government's 
abolition. As early as July 1949, the minister of Justice introduced a 
bill to repeal the emergency regulations. 27 The bill was not approved, 
27 Knesset Debates, July 12 1949, pp. 975-78. Cited in Jiryis, 1976, 
p. 32. 
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however, because "of objection to it in the Knesset and among the 
people", according to the minister. 28 In May 1950, Zisling, a member of 
the United Workers' Party (Mapam), which served in the opposition, 
proposed a bill to repeal the defense regulations within three months. 
When his suggestion was turned down by the Knesset Committee on 
Constitution, Law, and Justice, Zisling proposed that the military 
government be abolished altogether within one year, on the ground that 
"its existence is not in the best interests of the nation nor conducive 
to better administration of the areas under its control, being a 
restriction on the freedom of the people. 29 
This time the proposal was turned over to the Knesset Foreign Affairs 
and Security Committee. After declaring that " the Defense (Emergency) 
Regulations, 1945, .... are incompatible with the principles of a 
democratic state", the committee asked the Committee on Constitution, 
Law, and Justice, to "present a new bil 1 on the defense of the state, 
within two weeks. 1130 The new bill was never prepared and on Feb. 12, 
1952, the Knesset approved the conclusion of the Foreign Affairs and 
Security Committe, which had been presented to it on Dec. 3, 1951. The 
Committee had concluded that "as long as the present security situation 
between the state of Israel and its neighbors continues, the military 
government has to be maintained for the protection of the nation". 3 1 
28 Ibid., Nov. 21 1950, p. 283. Cited in ibid., p. 32. 
29 Ibid., May 16 1951, p. 1787. In ibid., p. 32. 
30 Ibid., May 22 1951, pp. 1828-33. In ibid., p. 32. 
3 l Ibid., Dec. 3 1951, p. 1322. In ibid.' p. 33. 
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Subsequently, proposals dealing with the military government were 
crossed off the Knesset agenda. For example, on Dec. 1, 1954, Meir 
Vilner of the Communist Party proposed the abolition of Article 125 and 
the system of closed areas on the ground that "the military governors 
have lately made a habit of declaring whole villages and stretches of 
land 'closed areas' within the larger closed area under military 
government, in order to prevent Arab peasants from working the land". As 
noted, his proposal was crossed off the Knesset agenda. 32 Six months 
later two bills for the abolition of the military government, were 
introduced by the Communist Party and Mapam (United Workers' Party). 33 
The fate of these two proposals was not dissimilar to the earlier 
proposal by Vilner, i.e., both proposals were crossed off the Knesset 
agenda. 
Clearly, the government in general and Mapai in particular had the 
vote in the Knesset and the support of the public (manifested by 
election results, see Chapter 3) which enabled it to continue in its 
refusal to alter either its policies toward the Arabs or the activities 
of the military government. Hence, only when public support declined 
did the party agree to review this policy. This came toward the end of 
1955, following the results of the third Knesset elections. Mapai (the 
party which had been in power since the establishment of the state), won 
only 40 of the 120 seats Knesset. This was lower than the 46 and 45 
seats they had won in the first and second elections respectively. 34 In 
32 Ibid., Dec. 1 1954, p. 241. In ibid., p. 33. 
33 Ibid., May 18 1955, p. 1664. In ibid., p. 34. 
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order to form a government, Mapai had to form a coalition with two 
smaller parties: Achdut Haavoda and Mapam. Both parties were based in 
the Kibutzim movement which employed Arabs, and, generally speaking, had 
an Ashkenazi constituency. Upon forming the coalition, both parties 
insisted on a review of the government policy toward the Arabs. Only 
then did Prime Minister Ben-Gurion appoint a committee (headed by 
Professor Ranter of the Technion, the Institute of Applied Technology in 
Haifa), to study the question of the military government and make 
recommendations. But, as noted earlier, the Committee came out in total 
support of the military governmnet, attributing the need for such a 
system to the security requirements of the country. Nevertheless, some 
relaxation of travel restrictions was announced in 1957. 
Other major reforms in the military government were announced on 
August 5, 1959, on the eve of the fourth Knesset elections. These 
reforms constituted a relaxation of travel restrictions on the Arabs to 
certain Jewish urban centers. Further reforms and relaxation of travel 
restrictions took place in 1964. As noted earlier, toward the end of 
1966 the system of the military government was abolished completely. As 
will be shown in the next chapter these periods (1959, 1964) witnessed 
great economic expansion and a decline in the rate of immigration which 
increased the demand for Arab labor. 
34 Richard Scammon, 'Knesset Election Results, 1949-77', in: Howard 
Penniman (ed.), Israel At The Polls, American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, Washington, D. C., 1979, p. 310. 
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It should be emphasized that the parliamentary activities discussed 
here so far constitute only one manifestation of the public (Arab and 
Jewish) opposition to the military government. One should note however, 
that inasmuch as it conveys the seriousness with which the military 
government was perceived, the presentation does not provide the most 
dramatic picture. Nor does this presentation provide a complete account 
of all the motions which were presented in the Knesset for the reform 
and/or abolition of the military governement. I only tried to highlight 
some of the basic attitudes and policy guidelines which guided the 
military government and tts actions, and to provide some of the inter-
party dynamics which characterized the struggle over the military 
government. 
Other forms of protest included such tactics as public 
demonstrations, letter writing, petitions, editorials and others which 
were expressed by people ranging from political parties to 
intellectuals, to university professors and kibbutzim members as 
evidenced by the following statement signed by "representatives of 
twenty kibbutzim and about two hundred intellectuals including seventy 
professors and lecturers at the Hebrew University. 3 5 The signed 
statement reads as follows: 
About 200,000 of the inhabitants of Israel, belonging to another 
religion and with a different nationality, do not enjoy equal rights 
and are the victims of discrimination and repression. The over 
whelming majority of Arabs in Israel .... have neither freedom of 
movement nor of residence. They are not accepted as members with 
equal rights and obligations in the Histadrut or as employees in 
most concerns ..... The continuation of this situation could seriously 
35 Jiryis, 1976, p.38. 
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endanger the security of the nation. 36 
However, despite such wide opposition the military government continued 
to operate using national security as a rationale for the continuation 
of its existence. The next section will examine the validity of such a 
rationale. 
The National Security Argument 
Since national security seems to have been the most cited reason for 
the imposition and continuation of the military government, it is 
important to investigate the validity of this argument. That is to say, 
to what extent did the Arabs in Israel constitute a security problerr for 
the Jewish state? And secondly, to what extent were mechanisms such as 
the military government and the accompanying defense regulations needed 
to combat such a threat? 
For several reasons it is clear that no entirely satisfactory answer 
can be offered to either of the two questions. The subjectivity 
attached to the meaning of the concept of security, for example, makes 
it all the more difficult to operationalize and thus measure. 
Furthermore, even if it were possible to define the concept objectively 
and to operationalize it, the data needed for its investigation is 
usually classified and unavailable to researchers. 
One cannot, for example, examine the validity of the security 
argument by showing the rate of violation over a period of time. 
Assuming that such statistics are available their interpretation can be 
36 Ner, July-August, 1958. In ibid., p. 38. 
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totally misleading. Consider, for example, an Arab who was caught 
working in what had been declared a closed area. Such an Arab would have 
been tried and convicted on the ground of violating security regulations 
irrespective of the fact that he may have done nothing to harm the 
security of the state and/or the people. The fact that, regardless of 
whether the person was tried in a military or a civilian court, the 
military government did not have to supply any details to the court 
except stating that the individual in question was engaged in activities 
harmful to the security, 3 7 makes such statistics all the more 
meaningless. 
Beyond this, however, suclo statistics cannot be argued to show the 
extent to which the Arabs constituted a security risk. Such statistics 
can perhaps be used more adequately to show either the efficiency of the 
military government in apprehending violators, the extent to which Arabs 
obeyed the law, or both things combined. 
This is no justification to avoid tackling the two questions posed at 
the beginning of this section. The importance of these questions stems 
from the fact that if the answers to both questions were in the 
affirmative, one would be led to conclude that it was indeed national 
security which dictated to the military government its actions and 
methods. The maltreatment of the Arabs could then be analyzed as merely 
37 Sabri Jiryis, 1976, quotes a ruling by the High Court of Justice 
(Supreme Court) in Appeal 50/46 in which the court declared that "The 
responsibility of protecting the higher interests of the state rests on 
the military commander (emphasis in original), and it is up to him to 
decide whether these interests prevent him from revealing any additional 
details explaining the basis for his orders." p. 21 
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unintended consequence. Conversely, if the answer to either question is 
negative, one can reasonably conclude that the system of military 
government was created to serve something other than the declared 
security requirements. 
The difficulties inherit in the answer to both questions, therefore, 
make the discussion on the basis of statements made by Israelis who were 
as familiar with the security problems and the military system as those 
who advanced the security argument, an adequate strategy. 
As early as 1957, the influential newspaper Haaretz, for example, 
wrote: 
It is impossible to accept the claim that it is thanks to the 
watchfulness of the military gov~rnors that there has been no 
political sabotage and no serious attempt by the Arab population to 
organize an underground movement. If there are extremist groups 
among the Arabs willing to risk hostile acts against Israel, no 
military government will be able to stop them. The military 
government is not a solid organization and its manpower is limited. 
The physical presence of military rule in the Arab areas is not on a 
scale to prevent hostile acts on the part of the local population; 
it is rather the fear of the state's power to punish that has 
prevented deeds harmful to the nation, and this fear will remain 
even if the military government is abolished or its powers 
curtailed. 38 
A ministerial committee headed by Pinhas Rosen, the minister of 
Justice, which was appointed to reevaluate the military government, had 
come to the same conclusion. Although its official report was not 
submitted to the Knesset until 1962, the news about the committee's 
intentions to recommend "extensive improvements for the Arab minority", 
had been leaked to the press earlier. 39 In its report to the Knesset, 
38 Haaretz, Feb. 11, 1957. 
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the committee declared: 
.... Yet even if we assume that sections of the Arab population have 
not yet resigned themselves to the existence of the state of Israel, 
it does not necessarily follow that the Arabs in Israel will be 
prepared to engage in organized mass action against the state. Only 
such a threat on a mass scale could justify the existence of the 
military government and the normal resources of the security 
services are sufficient to control individuals..... If this 
nationalism, insofar as it exists at all, has not yet exploded, it 
is not due to the deterrent factor of the military government but to 
the lack of sufficient motive. 40 
Four things are made clear by the statement of the ministers: a) the 
statement defines "organized mass action against the state" on the part 
of the Arabs as a security concern; b) it sets this condition as the 
only justification for the existence of the military government; c) the 
statement determines that the Arabs do not have "sufficient motive" for 
such organized action; and d) the committee determines that outside the 
military government there are 'normal' resources which are "sufficient 
to control individuals". Pinhas Rosen who chaired the committee and was 
minister of justice at the time, declared later that "on the basis of 
what he had learned as chairman of the Ministerial Committee ..... the 
military government was not necessary for security purposes. 41 Despite 
such an unequivocal determination, however, the military government 
continued for another five years. 
39 Davar, March 26, 1959. 
40 Knesset Debates, Feb. 20, 1962, p. 1319. Cited in Jiryis, 1976, 
p.38. 
41 The Jerusalem Post, Nov. 15, 1962. 
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In his book Curtain of Sand, Yigal Allon (1960), a previous commander 
of the Palmach (a pre-state military group), a leader of Achdut Haavoda 
party (which formed a coalition with the government), a minister and 
deputy prime minister in many governments, and a member of Kibbutz 
Dgania in Galilee, wrote: 
There is absolutely no connection between effective control of the 
borders and the existence of the military government .... It is an 
error to believe that the existence of the military government can 
prevent espionage or that it can prevent the Arab population from 
harboring infiltration. This task can only be undertaken by a 
competent security department and an intelligence network worthy of 
the name .... Because it has no direct security task, the military 
government concentrates on internal political activities, such as 
the .... establishment of a counterforce to prevent the formation of 
undesirable political organization. 42 
Two other members of th·~ Achdut Haavoda Party spoke in opposition to the 
military government during a Knesset debate on Feb. 20, 1962. Bar-
Yehuda, an ex-minister of the interior, argued that the military 
government must be abolished because "for a long time, it has performed 
no real security function and has indeed become a factor greatly 
increasing the insecurity of the state."43 Moshe Carmel, another member 
of Achdut Haavoda and ex-cabinet member, also expressed his views on the 
military government. He said: 
46. 
This institution is no longer essential to the security of Israel, 
and its continued existence may well harm the establishment of 
heal thy relations between Israel's Jewish and Arab 
inhabitants ..... It blocks any genuine feeling of citizenship among 
the Arab population, and it damages Israel's reputation abroad. The 
military government .... no longer performs any positive functions in 
protecting the country from within, and its existence does more harm 
than good. 44 
42 Yigal Allon, Curtain of Sand, Tel-Aviv, 1960, pp. 327-8. 
43 Knesset Debates, Feb. 20, 1962, pp. 1322-3. In Jiryis, 1976, p. 
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Similar views were expressed by the Mapam Party through the statement of 
Yaakov Hazan, the second man in the party. He announced that: 
We are convinced that the military government does no service to the 
security of the state of Israel and it is incompatible with the 
principles of justice and law ..... The military government is making 
the Arab minority feel more and more strongly that it is despised, 
rejected, and discriminated against as race apart, and this can only 
breed hatred." 5 
Right wing parties such as Herut and the Liberal Party (which was formed 
in 1961 by a union between the General Zionists and the Progressive 
Party) expressed similar views in opposition of the military government. 
As was resolved by a conference of the Herut movement in January 1962, 
and expressed by Menachem Begin in the Knesset in February of that year, 
"the adminifitrative system called the military government no longer 
full filled any real security functions."" 6 This position by Herut and 
the Liberals should not be surprising since the two parties who later 
combined to form the Likud, advocated free enterprise and the 
curtailment of collective bargaining (see Chapter 3). These positions 
represent a clear support of capital and against labor. Advocating 
abolition of the military government is, therefore, in line with these 
stands since such abolition provided an easier access of Jewish 
employers to Arab labor. 
In 1965, less than a year after becoming prime minister (replacing 
the retiring Ben-Gurion), Eshkol ordered a review of the military 
government. The man Eshkol appointed for the job was Isar Harel, for 
""Ibid., Feb. 20, 1963, p. 1211. In Ibid., p. 46-7. 
"
5 Ibid., Feb. 20, 1962, p. 1317. In ibid., p.47. 
"
6 Ibid., Feb. 20, 1963, p. 1209. 
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years the head of Israeli military intelligence. It could be argued 
that this appointment by Eshkol was designed to emphasize that the 
military government was being kept for national security reasons only, 
for to admit otherwise would have been bad politics nationally and 
internationally. 
In the middle of December 1965 Hare! presented his recommendations. 
Although there were no official announcements, the speculation was that 
Harel recommended the abolition of the military government. 47 However, 
these speculations were confirmed two months later when spokesman for 
the prime minister stated that "1966 will be recorded in the history of 
the Arabs in Israel as the year of the abolition of the military 
government for all practical purposes, and the elimination of all other 
sources of discontent among the Arab population of the country." 41 
Six months later, on July 10, 1966, in a rare press conference in 
Tel-Aviv Hare! stated that 
The military government is not a necessity on security grounds and 
could be dispensed with. The army should not be concerned with our 
Arab citizens; it is a blot on our democracy .... that this is so. 
Even if there were a need for restrictions, they should be applied 
individually. This collective restraint is a violation of the 
feelings of the Arabs. It should be far better to put individuals 
under stricter observation than to cast doubts on the whole Arab 
population in the state, and thus humiliate them. 49 
47 Haaretz, Dec. 3, 1965. 
41 Haaretz, Feb. 10, 1966. 
49 The Jerusalem Post, July 10, 1966. 
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Clearly, if these statements do not dispel the security argument as 
the major reason for the continuation of the military government they, 
nevertheless, weaken such an argument considerably. Based on such 
evidence the national security cannot be accepted as a satisfactory 
explanation for the continuation of the system of military government 
for as long as it did. In fact the swift victory of Israel, in June 
1967, over three major Arab countries (Egypt, Syria and Jordan), only 
six months after the abolition of the military government, reduced the 
alleged threat of the Arabs in Israel to the state's security to a mere 
joke. 
Alternative Interpretation 
There are other explanations for the continuation of the military 
government, which must be examined. Clearly, the military government was 
instrumental in confiscating Arab lands. But lands continued to be 
confiscated by the Israeli government after the military government was 
long abolished. Furthermore, the Israeli legal code contains enough 
clauses which provide a 'legal' justification for the confiscation of 
Arab land. This suggests that the confiscation of Arab land could not 
have been a major reason for the continuation of the military government 
although gaining control of Arab land was a primary objective of the 
Zionist organization and the state of Israel (see Chapter 4). 
Another reason given for the continuation of the military government 
was its ability to stack Arab votes for Mapai, the ruling party at the 
time. Indeed, there is some evidence which points in this direction. 
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First, despite the harsh measures taken by the government (represented 
by Mapai Party), against the Arab population, Mapai received the lion's 
share of the Arab vote during Knesset and local elections from 1949 to 
1965. For example, in the first knesset elections, Mapai and its 
affiliated Arab lists received 61.3 percent of the Arab vote in the all-
Arab localities. The results of the second through the sixth Knesset 
elections -i.e., 1951, 1955, 1961, and 1965 - show the percentage of the 
Arab vote for Mapai and its affiliated Arab lists to be 66.5, 62.4, 
52.0, 50.8, and 50.1 respectively. 50 
Naturally, accusations were leveled by other parties against Mapai 
for its utilization of the military government to swing Arab votes. 
Aharon Cohen of Mapam argued that 
The refusal of Mapai, the main party in power, to give up this 
position of strength (the military government), was .... because the 
party secured for itself in this way both the majority of Arab votes 
for the Knesset elections and the possibility of exerting pressure 
on Arab electors supporting contending parties. 51 
Similarly, when in 1963 a close 57 to 56 vote in favor of 
continuation of the military government was received with two Arab 
members linked to Mapai voting in favor, Menachem Begin of Herut 
commented that "the military government safeguards a special corner in 
this house (a place for the Arab members linked to Mapai), and today .... 
this corner will safeguard the survival of the military government." 52 
5 0 Jacob Landau, The Arabs In Israel: A Political Study, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1969: 152. 
51 Cohen, A., Israel and the Arab World, Funk & Wagnalls, New York, 
1070: 494. 
52 Haaretz, Feb. 21, 1963. 
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This activity of the military government on behalf of Mapai seems to 
have intensified the opposition of other parties. According to Moshe 
Unna, 53 a former Knesset member and a member of the National Religious 
Party, Achdut Haavoda and Mapam played an influential role in the 
government's periodical reforms of the military government. In 1961 when 
both parties entered a coalition agreement with Mapai to form the 
government, both parties insisted on reserving the right to vote against 
the government, if necessary, over the military government. 
Such service by the military government to Mapai should not be taken 
lightly, considering the fact that the Arabs constituted between 11 and 
14 percent of the population, with no less than 70 percent turnout on 
election days of those eligible to vote. This means an average addition 
of between 5 to 8 Knesset members to Mapai, which is a large enough bloc 
to relieve Mapai of the need to seek unnecessary coalition partners. 
Needless to say, the selected Arab members who ran on Arab lists 
affiliated with Mapai were chosen, financed and campaigned for by the 
Mapai Party machine in cooperation with the military government. Thus, 
Arab Knesset members who were linked to Mapai owed their political 
positions to the party and were dedicated to its service. Such Arabs 
had never developed a constituency of their own and therefore could not 
have made it to the Knesset without the help of the party. Nor could it 
be claimed that they represented the interests of the Arabs. Arab MK's 
who decided to run on their own after being purged and replaced by Mapai 
stood no chance. 54 
53 Cited in Jiryis, 1976, fn. 40, p. 251. 
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No other party, since the abolition of the military government has 
ever managed to command such a political 'support' among the Arabs and a 
total control over 'their' Knesset members. However, it would be 
mis leading to conclude that this benefit was limited to Arab vote-
stacking. This would have been too obvious to the other Zionist parties 
who would have been more successful in fighting against it. The greater 
benefits of Mapai and one against which it was very difficult to fight 
is the role played by the military government in protecting the 
interests of Jewish labor through the military government's ability to 
limit the access of Arab. labor to Jewish employment sites. These 
policies for which Mapai could claim credit were in line with the wishes 
of Jewish labor and earned Mapai the support of the labor vote, which 
was proportionally far more significant thru~ the Arab vote. 
The segment of Jewish labor which was more threatened by a free entry 
of Arab labor to employment sites was unskilled and semi-skilled labor, 
because it is this sector which has continuously absorbed most Arab 
labor. 
54 The best example of this is the case of Salih Khneyfes, a Druz 
from Shfa Amr (one of the only two all-Arab cities), and Mas'ad Qassis, 
a Christian from Miilya, a small village in northern Galilee. Both were 
MK's on the eve of the fourth Knesset elections when Mapai decided to 
replace them, despite their objections and protests. They both then ran 
as independents, enlisting every possible support from their hamulas 
(extended families), and neighbors. Both MK's failed to gain their seats 
back and received less than .5 percent of the Arab vote. (See Mansour, 
'Israel's Arabs go to the polls', New Outlook, Jan. 1960:23. Schiff, 
'Israel's Fourth Elections', ibid. Jan. 1960: 15-23) 
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According to Table 5.1 below in 1963, 77.3 percent of the Arab labor 
force was concentrated in three main job categories. These were: a) 
farmers, fishers and related workers; b) construction workers, quarrymen 
and miners; c) craftsmen, production process and related workers. Among 
the Jewish population, the table makes it clear that those who 
immigrated from Africa-Asia (Orientals) were concentrated more heavily 
in those three job categories than those Jews who immigrated from 
Europe-America (Ashkinazim). The figures from the table add up to 61.1 
percent for those who immigrated from Africa-Asia during the years 
1948-1954 and 64.9 percent for those who immigrated during the 1955-1963 
period. The corresponding figures for the immigrants from Europe-
America for the two immigration periods are 39. 4 percent and 45. 4 
percent respectively. It is also interesting to note that the lowest 
concentration of the labor force in these jobs is found among the 
Israel-born (Jews) with 35.8 percent. 
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TABLE 5.1 
Jewish And Arab Employment By Occupation, Continent 
Of Birth And Period Of Immigration (1963) 
(Percentages) 55 
Immigrated from !Immigrated From I I 
Europe-America I Asia-Africa I Israel I Total 
!Born !Jewish 
Sincel1948-IUp tol ISincel1948-IUp to! I 
OCCUPATION 1955 11954 11947 11955 11954 11947 I I 
__ , __ , __ , , __ , _ I 
Professional, I I I I I 
Technical & 21.1 I 11.91 16.61 3.2 5.31 4.1 21.2 I 12.9 
Related Wrk. I I I I 
I I I I 
Administrative I I I 
Executive, I I I 
Managerial & 11. 7 I 18.ll 26.2 6.6 7.2 15 .1 21. 7 16.8 
Clerical Wrks. I I 
I 
Traders,Agents I 
And Salesmen 5.8 12.81 10,9 4.9 6.4 13.8 4.2 8.4 
Farmers, Fishe 
Arabs 
5.5 
2.0 
4.7 
rs And Related 12.0 7.1 8.3 24.3 17.6 6.8 10.7 11.8 38.0 
Workers 
Workers In I 
Transport And 1.4 5.3 5.6 3.31 4.3 7.5 9.11 5.5 4.3 
Communication I I 
I I I 
Construction I I I } 
Workers Quarry! 4.6 7.6 5.01 12.91 12.4 10.9 4.71 7.8} 
Men And Miners! I I I } 
I I I I I } 39.3 
Craftsmen, I I I I I } 
Production I 28.8 24.71 18.ll 27.71 31.1 22.4 20.41 24.3} 
Process And I I I I I I 
Related Wrks. I I I I I I 
I I I I I I 
Services,Sportl I I I I I 
And Recreation! 14.6 12.51 9.31 17.ll 15.7 18.8 8.11 12.51 6.2 
Wrkers I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I I 
I 
I 
Total % 1100.01100.01100.01 100.01100.01100.01 100.0 I 100.01100.01 
Abs. (Thds) I 55.0l147.4l168.9I 51.31163.61 30.01 130.81 747.01*66.21 
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The Orientals would have been hurt the most by any policy of 
liberalization of movement for the Arab labor force. In addition, as 
noted in Chapter 3, middle-class Orientals were also likely to suffer as 
a result of dismantling the military government apparatus and its 
supporting ideology, because these agencies were mostly manned by 
Orientals. One would expect the Orientals, therefore, to have been more 
antagonistic toward the notion of abolishing the military government. 
This cannot be ascertained, however, from the available data. No 
recognizable all-Oriental group which supported the military government 
or opposed its abolition can be identified. However, the overwhelming 
support of Orientals for Mapai (later the Labor Alignment) which 
controlled both the government and the Histadrut (see Chapter 3) co1Jld 
be seen as an expression of support for, among other things, the 
exclusionary policies toward the Arabs. And, as noted, the two 
institutions, the government and the Histadrut, were already doing more 
than adequate job in minimizing the 'threat' of Arab labor toward the 
Orientals. In fact, following the abolition of the military government 
in 1966, Mapai and its partners lost 7 mandates in the 1969 elections 
and its power decreased from 63 MK' s in 1965 to 56. 5 6 This loss is 
significant in light of the fact that two years earlier (1967) the 
leadership of Mapai gave the state its biggest victory ever over the 
55 Source: Data for the Jewish population were obtained from the CBS 
Statistical Abstract of Israel, Jerusalem, 1965, p. 319. For the Arab 
population data were obtained from Y. Porath, The Arab Labor Force in 
Israel, Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1966, p. 22. 
* The total for the Arab population was calculated as the difference 
between total employees and Jewish workers. CBS, 1965, pp. 317-19. 
56 See Penniman, H., 1979, p. 310. 
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Arab states, a record which was used extensively during the election 
campaign. However, the loss in 1969 (as well as a further decline in 
Mapai's power in 1973, and 1977) is partially attributed to a decline in 
the support among Orientals (see Chapter 3) who constituted the bulk of 
unskilled labor against whom the Arabs were competing (Chapter 6). 
A Final Note 
Evidence indicates that the national interest, i.e., the Jewish 
interest, was seen by the state authorities and its agencies as best 
served by a total control over the Arab population. This control was to 
be achieved partially through confiscation of Arab lands to be deposited 
in Jewish hands, and increased economic and political dependence of the 
Arabs on the Jewish sector. 57 The military government was used as the 
mechanism to enhance such goals. 
These policies, including the restrictions imposed on the Arabs in 
general and Arab labor in particular, were an extension for the Arab-
Jewish conflict waged for several decades prior to the establishmnet of 
the state. Attempts to restrict employment of Arabs in Jewish 
enterprises as a substitute for Jewish labor date as far back as the 
second wave of immigration (1904-1914) (see Chapters 1&6). The practice 
which came to be known as "conquest of labor" and meant rather the 
replacement of Arab workers, employed in the Jewish farms and factories, 
by Jewish workers was eventually spearheaded by the Histadrut (after its 
5 7 According to Ian Lustick, the mechanisms of control involved 
segmentation and fragmentation, along geographical, religious and 
communal lines, economic dependence, and cooptation of leadership. See 
Lustick, 1980, ch. 4, 5. 
159 
founding in 1920) and adopted by all Jewish institutions (see Chapter 
6). Together these institutions represented the organizational 
apparatus of the Zionist movement which was committed to the creation of 
homeland in Palestine, for the Jewish people. 
With the establishment of the state these institutions continued to 
function and their commitment to the basic tenets of Zionist ideology 
remained intact. When considering the position of the Arab minority in 
Israel, therefore, one must remember that the organizational ideologies 
of these institutions and the personal commitments of the individuals 
who controlled them are rooted in hostile attitudes toward the 
Palestinian Arabs for, among other things, land cont"."ol and ownership, 
and Jewish labor. It should not be surprising, therefore, to find that 
the men and women who filled the bureaus and agencies of the Israeli 
government, as well as those who remained at the helm of the 'national 
institutions', continued, after 1948, the fight against the Arab 
minority that they had waged in the decades before against the Arab 
majority of Palestine. Only now these struggles were sanctioned and 
encouraged by the Israeli government. 
The Histadrut, for example, continued in its refusal to accept Arabs 
(Israeli citizens) as members and/or employ Arabs in its economic 
institutions (see chapter 6). And the J.N.F. continued to consolidate 
its hold on Arab land and lease it to Jews only. The fact that the 
Israeli leadership which was responsible for the formulation of policies 
towards the Arabs, are alumni of these institutions is reflected in the 
biographies of the following individuals. 
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David Ben-Gurion, a cofounder of the Histadrut and its first 
secretary - general in 1921, also presided over the formation in 1930 of 
Mapai. From 1935 to 1948 he served as chairman of the Jewish Agency and 
for most of Israel's first fifteen years as a state, he was both prime 
minister and defense minister. 
Moshe Sharet, was head of the Jewish Agency's Political Department 
from 1933 to 1948. From 1948 to 1956 he served as foreign minister and 
as prime minister during Ben-Gurion's brief retirement in 1954. In 1960 
he became the chairman of the Jewish Agency and served in that capacity 
until his death in 1965. 
Levi Eshkol, was Israel's prime minister from 1964 to 1969 and its 
defense minister from 1964 to 1967. He had been very active in the 
1920's and 1930's in the financial affairs of both the Histadrut and the 
Labor Party (Mapai). Selected as the director of the Land Settlement 
Department of the Jewish Agency in 1948, he continued to serve in that 
capacity while holding, until 1963, the post of minister of finance. 
Golda Meir, worked as the head of the Political Department of the 
Histadrut in the late 1930' s and 1940' s. In 1946 she took over as 
director of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency while Moshe 
Sharet was under British arrest. In 1949 she was appointed minister of 
labor and later foreign minister, a post which she held from 1956 to 
1965. In 1965 she became secretary-general of the Labor Party. After 
Eshkol's death in 1969 she became prime minister and held that post 
until 1974. 
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Clearly, these individuals represent the highest levels of Israeli 
officials under whose auspices policies regarding the Arabs, including 
but not limited to the military government, were devised and 
implemented. Before the establishment of the state, these individuals 
and others were the leaders of organizations which had fought for Jewish 
labor and against Arab labor. It is inconceivable, therefore, that such 
individuals would have changed their attitudes and ideological 
commitments upon the establishment of the state. Thus, one cannot escape 
the conclusion that the question of Arab labor in Jewish enterprises 
must have been under consideration especially when the new state and its 
leadecs were facing grave economic problems compounded with the task of 
absorbing massive Jewish immigrants (see Table 5.2) to the new state. 
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TABLE 5.2 
Yearly Immigration By Continent of Birth 
(1948-1966) 
Period Absolute Numbers 
Total Asia-Africa Europe-AmericalNot Known 
I 
1948 101,819 12,931 77, 032 I 11, 856 
1949 239,076 110, 780 123,097 I 5,199 
1950 169,405 83,296 84,638 I 1,471 
1951 173,901 123,449 50,204 I 248 
1952 23,375 16,725 6,647 I 3 
1953 10,347 7,760 2,574 I 13 
1954 17,471 15,493 1,966 I 12 
1955 36,303 33,736 2,562 I 5 
1956 54,925 47,617 7,305 I 3 
1957 69,733 29,361 39,763 I 609 
1958 25,919 11,490 14,428 I 1 
1959 22,987 7,635 15,348 I 4 
1960 23,487 6,801 16,684 I 2 
1961 46,571 22,004 24,564 I 3 
1962 I 59,473 46,677 12,793 I 3 
1963 I 62,086 43,054 19,028 I 4 
1964 I 52,193 21,831 30,362 I 0 
1965 I 28,501 n.d n.d I n.d 
1966 I 13,451 n.d n.d I n.d 
I I 
I 
Grand Totalll,231,023 640,640 
I 
I 
Source: CBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel, Jerusalem, 1967, 18. p. 89. 
Thus, while the commitment of the leadership to give preference to 
Jewish over Arab labor must have been a real one, this preference could 
not have been expressed in any conventional way. The fragile position 
of Israel in the international arena did not allow Israel to 
institutionalize 'apartheid-like' conditions preventing Arabs from 
entering Jewish employment sites and/or limiting private_ Jewish 
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enterprises from hiring Arab labor, unless Arabs were stigmatized as 
disloyal and a national security risk. Otherwise, such actions against 
the Arabs would have been too obvious to the international community, 
where Arab delegations at the United Nations were already complaining 
about the "complete absence of security for the Arabs in areas under 
Israel control in violation of guarantees provided for minorities under 
the partition plan .... 1158 As a result of these complaints, the United 
Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), undertook the 
examination of some of the Arab demands such as the abrogation of the 
Absentee Property Act, the requisition and proscription of Arab houses 
and lands, the reunion of families, and the freezing of Waqf property. 59 
That the Israeli government was concerned about its international 
image and reputation with regard to its treatment of the Arab minority 
is further reflected in the fact that in May 1949 Abba Eban (later 
Israel's ambassador to the United Nations) found it necessary to 
elaborate on the Israeli government's objectives with regard to the 
Arabs, with more than a passing note during his address before the 
United Nations Ad Hoc Political Committe which was evaluating Israel's 
second application for membership in the United Nations. Eban stated 
that 
The government of Israel reaffirms its obligation to protect the 
persons and property of all communities living within its borders. 
It will discontenance any discrimination or interference with the 
rights and liberties of individuals or groups forming such 
5 8 United nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, General 
Progress Report and Supplementary Report, December .!_!, 1949-0ctober 23, 
1950, P. 12. Cited in Ian Lustick, 1980, p.61. 
59 Ibid., p. 16. In ibid., p. 61. 
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minorities. The government of Israel looks forward to the 
restoration of peaceful conditions which might enable relaxation of 
any restrictions on the liberty of persons or property.' 0 
With Israel still struggling for international legitimacy having had 
its first application for membership to the United Nations rejected, it 
would not have been conceivable or clever for it to incorporate 
apartheid conditions within its legal system without finding the 'right' 
rationale for it. The military government system, therefore, and the 
subsequent security argument as the justification for its existence, 
seemed the best solution. Although the military government fulfilled 
many functions, Arab labor was one of its main concerns. 
Summary 
In this chapter I highlight some of the activities of the military 
government. I have shown that its activities with regard to land 
confiscation fits well with the general policy discussed in Chapter 4. 
While dispossession resulted in the emergence of Arab labor for hire 
which furthered the dependence of Arabs on the Jewish Sector the 
military government was used to make the operation of land confiscation 
a smoother one. 
One of the most important of the military government's activities was 
the restriction of the movement of Arabs. Through these restrictions 
the access of Arab labor to Jewish business and enterprises was 
'
0 Aubrey S. Eban, Israel: The Case for Admission to the United 
NAtions (address delivered before the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the 
United Nations, May 5, 1949, published by Israel Office of Information), 
p. 41. 
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controlled and monitored by the military government in accordance with 
the demands of the Jewish labor market, i., e., only when the demand for 
labor was greatest did relaxation of travel restrictions begin to 
appear. From 1948 to 1959, when unemployment among the Jewish 
population was high, restriction orders were most rigid. A significant 
drop in Jewish unemployment rates and immigration patterns, on the other 
hand, resulted in a gradual relaxation of travel restrictions. It is 
safe to conclude, therefore, that one of the major roles played by the 
military government was the protection of Jewish labor against Arab 
competition. Taken together these distinctions created what Bosewell 
calls 'the identifying ideology' which has been responsible for the 
reproduction of split labor market conditions. 
Furthermore, the military government was shown to have played a 
direct role as Arab vote-stacker for Mapai (the ruling party at the time 
and later the Labor Alignment) which claims to be the representative and 
protector of labor's interests. That its policies with regard to the 
Arabs were supported by labor in general and Orientals in particular is 
evidenced by the heavy support the party enjoyed among both groups and 
the subsequent decline of such support following changes in these 
policies. 
These dynamics, in addition to other evidence presented throughout 
the chapter refute the argument that national security was the 
underlying reason for the existence of the military government. 
However, the use of such an argument in defense of the military 
government and its operation seems to have fulfilled other functions. 
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It weakened the struggle of Arabs against the military government and 
limited the support of Jewish elements to their struggle, and it 
disarmed critics of the military government both nationally, 
particularly Jewish employers, and internationally. 
It is these functions which enabled the military government to 
continue operating for as long as it did. A major consequence of the 
military government's operation and the subsequent national securtiy 
argument was that it highlighted the Arab-Jewish division. Accordingly, 
society appeared divided into two distinct groups: those who are loyal 
(Jews) and those who are disloyal (Arabs); those whose liberties and 
freedom are to be protected (Jews) and those whose freedoms are to be 
curtailed; those whose economic and political interests are to be 
safeguarded and furthered (Jews) and those whose economic and political 
interests are to be forsaken and controlled. 
As noted, the major beneficiaries from such policies and rational 
have been labor and Mapai, labor's representative. The struggle of 
Jewish labor against Arab labor will be discussed and detailed in the 
next chapter. As will be shown, the identifying ideology proved to be 
instrumental in limiting the Arabs to certain positions and job-
categories, despite the abolition of the military government. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE HISTADRUT AND THE ARAB LABOR FORCE 
Since the Arabs in Israel have been stripped of their property and as 
a result they became totally dependent on hiring out their labor (see 
Chapter 4), the status and well being of Arab labor becomes a reflection 
of the status and well being of the whole Arab community. 
The greatest 'enemy' of minority labor according to the split labor 
market theory is 'white' labor. As soon as the business sector begins 
employing minority labor (which by definition is cheaper than "white" 
labor) tension which develops into conflict erupts between expensive 
labor and business over the status of minority labor. While the 
preferred outcome of this conflict for expensive labor is a total 
exclusion of minority labor, which represents a complete victory for 
labor, a caste-like treatment of minority labor benefits both expensive 
labor as well as the business sector. Either resolution , however, will 
result in the continued cheapness of minority labor, limiting its access 
to certain job-categories and/or specific geographic locations and 
positions all of which contribute to the continuous reproduction of 
split labor market conditions. 
Whereas Chapter 5 examined the role of the military government in 
terms of maintianing and enforcing exclusion of Arab labor, limiting its 
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access to Jewish labor sites to the minimum possible, this chapter will 
examine the role played by the Histadrut, representing Jewish labor, in 
determining the status of Arab labor. Specifically, I will examine the 
attitudes and practices of the Histadrut toward Arab labor; the 
relationship between those attitudes and the structure and extent of 
demand for labor in general and Arab labor in particular; the 
Histadrut's reaction to the relaxation of travel restrictions; and, the 
effect of all of these on wages, occupational and hierarchical location 
of Arabs. I will begin with pre-state period. 
The Pre-State Period 
Throughout the pre-state period the question of Arab labor in Jewish 
colonies was continuously debated and addressed by the Histadrut and 
other Zionist institutions. Typically, the employment of Arabs was 
portrayed as a threat not only to Jewish labor but to the whole Zionist 
design in Palestine. The conflict between the Jewish and Palestinian 
peoples made perpetrating such typifications easier. The Histadrut 
seems to have played a major role both in the conflict itself and in the 
formulation of the Jewish perception towards Arabs in general and Arab 
labor in particular. Since its founding in 1920 as the General 
Federation of Hebrew Workers, the Histadrut set out to organize Jewish 
workers and waged a tireless campaign on their behalf. The principle of 
'conquest of labor' or '100 percent Jewish labor' seems to have been the 
pillar of the Histadrut's activity throughout its pre-state history. To 
implement this principle the Histadrut conducted extensive and sometimes 
violent picketing of Jewish firms and farms that employed Arabs .. 
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The implementation of the "conquest of labour" was practiced by all 
Zionist institutions. The J.N.F., which was responsible for the purchase 
of land and the leasing of such land to Jews, for example, prescribed 
fines and even the eventual eviction of farmers breaking the rule 
against employing non-Jewish labor. 1 Similarly, the Jewish Agency, 
founded in 1929 as the representative of the world Jewry, stated in its 
constitution that "The agency shall promote agricultural colonization 
based on Jewish labour, and in all works by the Agency, it shall be 
deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labour shall be 
employed." 2 
These policies by the other Zionist institutions were completely in 
line with the demands of the Histadrut which played a major role in 
their implementation. Once founded the Histadrut declared that it would 
aim to improve the conditions of the Jewish workers, whether cooperators 
or hired workers. The key element in this doctrine was "the assumption 
that Jewish capital had no national value without Jewish labour". 3 The 
importance of the "conquest of labour" was explained by Abraham Granott, 
who was then chairman of the board of directors of the Jewish National 
Fund (J.N.F.), this way: 
Without Jewish labour even the ownership of the land could not serve 
as a guarantee of the national character of the enterprise, and the 
Jewish future would not be assured .... The extent of Jewish labour 
in the old villages, ... was as a rule only limited, and even those 
1 Ruedy, J. 'Dynamics of Land Alienation', in I. Abu-Loghud (ed.), 
The Transformation of Palestine, Evanston, Northwestern University 
Press, 1971, p. 130. 
2 Cited in ibid., p. 130. 
3 Lucas, 1974, p. 54. 
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plantations which engaged workers, there was always a group of Arab 
employees receiving low wages in comparison with the Jews. The 
existence of such bodies of Arabs in Jewish villages was somewhat of 
a danger to security in times of emergency, and even more to the 
maintenance of a higher economic standards. 4 
By the early 1930's the Histadrut succeeded in gaining control of a 
large segment of the Jewish labour market through the enforcement of 
hiring rules, stating that only Jewish labor be hired. 5 The Histadrut's 
campaign against Arab workers went beyond mere declarations. According 
to Flapan, 6 force was also used to evict Arab workers from Jewish 
enterprises. He describes such campaigns which took place in 1933 this 
way: 
Specifically formed mobile units moved from place to place to 
identify and evict by force, if necessary, Arab workers from 
construction sites and other Jewish enterprises. Every single case 
of removal of Arab workers - and in many cases the operation took 
the form of an ugly scene of violence - was reported in the Jewish 
press and reverberated in the Arab media creating an atmosphere of 
unprecedented tension. 
Clearly, such actions by the Histadrut were against the interests and 
wishes of Jewish employers who prefered to continue benefiting from 
cheap Arab labor. Hence, to be more forceful the Histadrut described 
its actions as being on behalf of the national, i.,e., Jewish interest, 
rather than merely reflecting the interests of labor. This was not very 
difficult to do because since the early days of its founding the 
Histadrut had involved itself in the conflict between the Zionist 
4 Granott, A., Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel, London, Eyre 
and Spottiswoode, 1956, p. 51. 
5 Lucas, 1974, p. 153. 
6 Flapan, S., 1979, p. 266. 
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Organization and the Palestinian Arabs. One of the Histadrut's most 
notable activities in this regard was the creation and maintenance of 
the Haganah, the underground army which fought against the Arabs and 
British and became, in 1948, the foundation of the Israel Defense 
Forces. Hence, as a trade union the Histadrut's historical development, 
political aims and economic practices set it apart from most labor 
unions in the West. Having emerged as an integral part of a nationalist 
movement (the Zionist movement), and not as a result of mass workers' 
aspirations, the Histadrut was bound to adopt nationalistic, i. e., 
Zionist ideology. 
The most important aspect of the ideology adopted at the time by the 
Zionist movement and subsequently by the Histadrut was the exclusive 
national rights of Jews over Palestine. This aspect of the ideology 
resulted not only in the exclusion of Arab workers from membership in 
the Histadrut but helped enlist its members for the 'struggle' against 
the Arabs in general and the Arab workers in particular. As it was 
articulated by Yago, the task of the Histadrut 
was not solely to divert working class struggles, but to eliminate 
part of the working class (the Palestinian Arabs) from labour market 
competition in order to accomplish the two-pronged state building 
program of the Zionist movement- 'conquest of labour/conquest of 
land. I? 
Thus, the emphasis by the Histadrut on hiring only Jewish workers was a 
logical extension of its ideological commitments. In 1935 the Histadrut 
representatives on the Zionist Executive Council "promoted a motion 
7 Yago, G., "Whatever Happened to the Promised Land? Capital. Flows 
and the Israeli State." Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 21, 1976-7, p. 
126. 
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(which was unanimously adopted) emphasizing the duty of all members of 
the Zionist Organization to employ only Jewish labor. Defiance of this 
resolution would entail expulsion from the Zionist Organization."' 
While hostility against Arab labor continued throughout the pre-state 
history the establishment of the state in 1948 did not bring about an 
immediate change in the Histadrut's orientation toward the Arabs. 
The Post-State Period - (1948-1958) 
The importance of examining the attitudes of the Histadrut toward 
Arab labor lies in the power and influence of the Histadrut on the 
Israeli economic, political and social life. 
Since its founding in 1920 the Histadrut has grown into conglomorate 
holding corporations, companies, banks, industrial concerns, and agro-
industries. Although the Histadrut represents over 80 percent of Jewish 
employees, 9 its union activities, according to Davis, "constitute a 
fraction of its interests, concentrated in one of its numerous 
specialized departments, the Department of Labour Union." 10 
8 Zvi Sussman, "The Policy of the Histadrut with Regard to Wage 
Differentials: A Study of the Impact of Egalitarian Ideology and Arab 
Labour on Jewish Wages in Palestine", Jerusalem, Hebrew University 
Press, 1969, p. 162. 
· 
9 S. Smooha, Israel: Pluralism and Conflict, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978, p. 106. 
10 Uri Davis, Israel: Utopia Incorporated, London: Zed Press, 1977, 
p. 50. 
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Industries controlled by the Histadrut employ 23. 3 percent of 
Israel's total labor force and produce 20. 8 percent of Israel's GNP 
(figures for 1968/69). The Histadrut has a virtual monopoly over health 
insurance services (there is no national health insurance in Israel) 
with an extended network of Histadrut-owned and operated hospitals, 
dispensaries, and rest homes. It also operates mutual aid funds and 
pension funds for its members. Members of the Histadrut enjoy a variety 
of services offered by the organization such as Histadrut-sponsored 
vocational training programs, evening educational courses, social and 
cultural clubs, and sports leagues. The Histadrut also publishes books 
and periodicals, sponsors group tours abroad, and cond,1cts a host of 
educational, technical, and propaganda activities. The fact that wages 
and work conditions are negotiated between the Histadrut and the 
Industrialists' Union and the government on a nation-wide basis further 
extends the power, influence and prestige of the Histadrut. 
following the establishment of the state, the Histadrut did all in 
its power to preserve available jobs for Jewish workers and new 
immigrants. With a double-digit unemployment rate among the Jewish 
population, (see Table 2.5) the Histadrut was not in the mood to 'talk' 
Arabic. During this period (1948-1959), the preferred method of dealing 
with Arab workers by the Histadrut continued to be exclusion. Arabs 
were only allowed to take those jobs which were undesired by Jewish 
labor. As Aharon Cohen, writing in 1964, testifies: 
In the period 1948-58, the Arab worker was driven into the 
unskilled, manual jobs that were the most exhausting and least well 
paid, jobs shunned by the Jewish workers such as mixing plaster, 
cleaning jobs, unskilled jobs in quarries and construction _and the 
like ... 
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Most office and other work in the state was closed to the 
Arabs;.... when an Arab managed to "snatch" a few days on 
construction job or in other city work, in some primitive workshop, 
or on the margins of Jewish agriculture in some settlement, he was 
inevitably fired for not being "organized". "Attacks" on the Arab 
workers intensified during unemployment crises affecting the Jewish 
population, when even the meanest jobs were in demand. 11 
Two related conditions aided the Histadrut in making exclusion 
against the Arabs possible: a) control over all labor exchanges making 
them available to Histadrut members only (which excluded the Arabs as 
non-members); and b) the restriction on the movement of Arabs imposed by 
the military governemnt making Arabs unemployable in metropolitan areas. 
In fact, according to Ben-Porath, the Histadrut exercised a veto during 
this period over the granting of work permits by the military government 
to Arab villagers wishing to work in metropolitan areas. 12 
Even without the requirement of membership the Arabs would have been 
given the lowest priority in job allocation by the Histadrut labor 
exchanges. All the characteristics which weighed heavily in giving 
applicants priority worked against the Arabs. Among these criteria: 
service in the Israeli and British armies, a year of imprisonment or 
banishment in the Diaspora, or carrying out tasks for the Zionist 
movement which led to a delay in immigrating to the country. 13 
11 Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, Tel-Aviv, Merhavya, 1964, 
pp. 530-32. 
12 Ben-Porath, Y., The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Israel 
Universities Press, Jerusalem, 1966, pp. 52-55. 
13 Center of General Labor Exchanges, The Labor Exchange 
Constitution: The Work Priority Constitution, Tel-Aviv, 1954, pp. 12-13, 
(Hebrew). In Ben-Porath, p. 55. 
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In addition to the Histadrut and the military government, the 
Ministry of Labor was also involved in monitoring Arab access to the 
general market. Until 1958 the Ministry of Labor had opened a sum of 
nine labor exchanges in the Arab sector. Of these, three were opened in 
rural areas in three of the villages of the Little Triangle; Um-el-Fahm, 
Taibeh and Baqua-el-Gharbieh. The other six were opened in Nazareth and 
the mixed towns of Haifa, Akka, Jafa, Ramleh and Lydd. 
One should not get the false impression, however, that these 
exchanges were engaged in finding jobs for the Arabs. As Ben-Porath 
argues, the exchanges "played no role in actually finding work for Arabs 
in the Jewish sector". Because, he argues, "they (the exchanges), were 
cut off from tbe general network of labor exchanges", (which, as noted 
above, was controlled by the Histadrut), and "which objected to Arabs 
entering the Jewish labor market." 14 The function of the exchanges seems 
to have been twofold: a) the monitoring and regulati.on of Arab worker's 
entry to the Jewish sector; b) the distribution of relief workdays 
alloted to Arab workers by the government. 15 
The number and geographic locations of these exchanges further 
testify to their inadequacy in serving Arab workers. Despite the fact 
that the bulk of the Arab population resided in rural areas, only one-
14 Ben-Porath, The Arab .... pp. 52-53. 
15 The allotment of relief work days was used by the government to 
relieve unemployment and construct public projects. This method was 
discontinued in 1963. From 1953 to 1963 the average yearly allotment to 
the Arabs was about 93,000 work days. The figurs for 1961 show that in 
that year, for example, 35 work days were alloted per unemployed Arab 
compared to over 100 work days alloted to unemployed Jew. See Ben-
Porath, fn. 10, p. 53. 
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third of these exchanges were opened in such areas. This may have been 
due to the fact that the military government's use of restriction orders 
on the movement of Arabs proved to be effective in regulating the Arabs' 
entry to Jewish markets. As for the Arabs residing in mixed towns the 
military regulations did not apply nor was the rule of localism15 
applicable in their case. Since, according to Ben-Porath, "the 
Histadrut exchanges refused to deal with Arab manpower", without the 
labor exchanges of the ministry this manpower would have been left 
unregulated. 
The significance of those exchanges became clear when it was realized 
that Arabs who found work on their own needed the consent of the 
exchange for work permits. This consent depended on the employment 
situation in the intended place of work and on the applicant's right to 
employment. This right for employment was determined on the basis of, 
among other things, ownership of land. Since no minimum amount of land 
for such determination was ever specified, a person could be 
disqualified, in theory at least, for owning a very small plot of land. 
As for the Labor Ministry's exchanges in the rural areas it is 
important to emphasize that the three branches were all located in the 
area closest to the economic center of Israel where workers would be 
most in demand. Thus, the demand that workers obtain the consent of the 
labor exchange before accepting employment and the fact that those 
16 The rule of localism stipulates that workers residing in one 
geographic area have priority to jobs in their area over outsiders. 
This, as will be explained, was used as a form of protectionism against 
Arab workers who usually resided in all-Arab towns and villages with 
very little employment opportunities. 
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exchanges had the authority to withhold this consent seem to have been 
designed to restrict rather than enhance the entry of Arab labor to the 
Jewish sector. Neither the villages of Galilee, where most of the Arabs 
reside, nor the Negev in the South, where the Bedouins reside, had any 
labor exchanges in their villages. Applications for travel permits to 
search for and accept employment by Arabs residing in those areas were 
handled directly by the military government. As noted earlier (see 
chapter 5) the issuance of such permits not only was limited but took 
into account employment conditions in the Jewish sector. 
To summarize, during the first few years of statehood the entry of 
the Arab labor force into the Jewish sector was not only monitored but 
was controlled in order to give preference to Jewish labor. The three 
agencies most responsible for this monitoring and control were the 
military government and the Labor Ministry, both of which represent the 
government, and the Histadrut, representing the interests of labor. 
During this period both the government and the Histadrut were controlled 
by Mapai. The fact that Mapai enjoyed public support for its policies 
whereas Herut and the Liberals who represented mostly employers and the 
well educated, well to do middle-class, were politically weak (see 
Chapter 3) made the Histadrut 'triumphant' with regard to its 
exclusionary policies toward the Arabs. Depressed economic conditions 
coupled with high rate of unemployment among the Jewish population 
during this initial period, seem to have played a decisive role in the 
struggle over the status of Arab labor between the Histadrut and Jewish 
employers tipping the balance in favor of the Histadrut. The next 
section will examine the labor market conditions during this period. 
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Labor Market Conditions and Arab Labor 
(1948-1959) 
The economic conditions immediately following the establishment of 
the state, coupled with a massive influx of immigration, made employment 
opportunities extremely limited. Between 1948 and 1964 the Jewish 
population of Israel tripled (Table 1.1) and the increase in the Jewish 
labor force was similar (Table 2.5). The Jewish population grew from 
about 649,000 in 1948 to about 2,239,000 at the end of 1964. Most of 
this increase (67 percent) was due to immigration. In fact by the end of 
1951 (only three years after the establishment of the state), the Jewish 
population more than doubled, reaching 1,404,000 with 88 percent of the 
increase due to immigration. 17 
Between 1948 and 1951, the period during which the highest 
immigration influx occured (see Table 1.1), the economy was dominated by 
the need to furnish basic provisions for the large and continuing influx 
of immigrants. According to Pack, consumer demands for all manufactured 
goods were rapidly increasing but no commensurate increase in domestic 
supply was forthcoming. 18 Pack also argues that this lack of domestic 
supply was a result of "lack of capital with which to employ potential 
workers and the immigrants unfamiliarity with industrial occupations." 19 
Thus, a very high proportion of manufactured consumer goods was supplied 
17 Friedlander, D. and Goldscheider, C., The Population of Israel, 
Columbia University Press, N. Y. 1979, pp. 30-31, tables 2.1, 2.2. 
18 Pack, H., Structured Change and Economic Policy in Israel, New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, p. 73. 
19 Ibid., p. 74. 
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through imports. Such economic conditions and activities were reflected 
in a high rate of unemployment as shown in table 1. 
As measured by several indices the economy began showing signs of 
expansion after 1954. 20 A good proportion of imported goods started to 
be manufactured locally under a policy of import substitution. By 1958 
imports constituted only 25. 8 percent of the total supply of 
manufactured goods (domestic plus foreign) compared to 46 percent in 
1951. 21 
Not only did the ratio of import relative to domestic production 
decline, but the proportion of exported domestic products rose 
considerably. In terms of manufactured goods the proportion rose from 
5.2 percent in 1951 to 14.5 percent in 1958 and to 23.6 percent in 1964. 
Export of agricultural output rose from 9.2 percent in 1951 to 18.3 
percent in 1964. 22 
The gross domestic product also showed a dramatic increase during the 
period 1950-1965. In 1950 the gross domestic product was 1,160,000 IL 
(Israeli Lira) compared to 1,884,000 IL in 1954, 2,719,000 IL in 1958, 
and 5,245,000 IL in 1965, all calculated on the basis of 1955 prices. 
The compounded rates of growth for these years was about 10 percent 
annually. 2 3 
20 Ibid., p. 75. 
21 Ibid., p. 74. 
22 Ibid., p. 65, table 3.6. 
23 Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1968, pp. 140-41. In Pack, 1971, 
p. 29, table 2.8. 
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The data also show inter and intra-sectoral variations in 
expansion. 24 This unevenness in development among the sectors was 
affected to a great extent by government decisions. In formulating its 
policies the government took into consideration the sector's capacity to 
absorb the unemployed and anticipated growth in the labor force 
irrespective of productive efficiency. 25 Such policies should not be 
surprising coming from a government headed by Mapai claiming to be 
protector of labor's interests. The results of this policy of economic 
expansion were reflected in the decline of unemployment from almost 14 
percent in 1949 to 5.7 percent in 1958 and to 3.3 percent in 1964 (see 
Table 2.5). 
The actual decline in the unemployment rate would have been even 
greater had it not been for some distortion in the figures of the early 
years. Those figures do not include, for example, underemployment 
estimated to have been around 5 percent, 26 nor do they include those 
immigrants who were housed in temporary camps and were not required to 
register in labor exchanges. 27 These facts help magnify the extent to 
which the economy was able to absorb the numbers of job-seekers who, as 
a result of immigration, were continuously increasing both 
proportionally and in absolute. The exclusion of the Arabs enabled the 
Histadrut to secure many jobs for Jewish immigrants, a task which also 
24 for more detailes see Pack, tables 4.1, 4.2, pp. 74-77. 
25 Ibid., p. 14. 
26 Ibid., fn. 23, p. 13. 
27 Friedlander, D., The Population ..... , p. 14; Ben-Porath, The Arab 
Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, Universities Press, 1966, p. 48. 
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proved politically beneficial to Mapai. And, to be successful in its 
efforts the Histadrut continued to play the nationalistic tune in 
conjunction with the national security tune played by the military 
government. 
Other reasons can be pointed out to explain employers' acquiescence 
with these policies manifested in the absence of any vigorous campaigns 
for more access to Arab labor, although there was always a demand to 
abolish travel restrictions. For one thing the private sector was not 
well developed nor was the need for labor particularly great. 2) The 
travel restrictions were neither absolute nor unbendable legally and 
illegally, which meant employers were, at least partially, enjoying the 
henefits of cheap Arab labor. 3) Not all Jews, especially the newcomers, 
were automatically organized through the Histadrut. That meant there 
was, for a while at least, a pool of Jewish 'cheap' labor from which 
employers could fill their needs, and those Jews were indeed earning low 
incomes. As Pack notes: 
... during at least part of the 1950's, differences in pretax income 
were widening; as might be expected the immigration lowered the 
level of unskilled wages relative to skilled. 28 The intervention of 
the Histadrut, which reflected their strongly egalitarian 
philosophy, prevented actual differences in income from reaching 
levels that would have occured solely through market forces. 
Nevertheless, there were growing differences between incomes of 
veteran (pre 1948) residents and new immigrants. 29 
28 Uri Baharal, The Effect of Mass Immigration on Wages in Israel, 
Jerusalm: Falk Project, 1965. In Ibid., p. 188. 
2 9 Ibid. , p. 189. 
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As the economy expanded around the mid-fifties, and demand for labor 
increased with Arabs still excluded from the labor market, wages for 
Jewish labor began rising. Table 6.1 below shows a rate of increase in 
wages of about 10 percent compounded annually. Furthermore, the Table 
shows that these increases in wages correspond to decreases in the 
unemployment rate. 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
TABLE 6.1 
Nominal Wage Changes and Unemployment Rates 
(1956-1965) 
Wages 
(Percentage from 
Previous Year) 
11.0 
8.5 
11.4 
7.2 
6.3 
11.0 
13.0 
12.0 
12.0 
20.0 
Unemployment 
Percentage of Labor 
Force 
7.8 
6.9 
5.7 
5.5 
4.6 
3.6 
3.7 
3.6 
3.3 
3.6 
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Source: Abridged from Howard Pack, Structural Change and Economic Policy 
in l5rael, New Haven: Yale University Press, Table 7.10, p. 205. 
Other consequences of the expansion of the economy were the opening 
of new job opportunities in the industrial and construction sectors. 
Having gained experience with the passage of time and gained command of 
the language, the new immigrants set out to take advantage of the newly 
created opportunities. Since agricultural work was less rewarding (in 
terms of wages and benefits) than industrial employment, a shift from 
the former to the latter began to take place triggering a process of 
decline in the percent of Jewish men employed in agriculture. During 
the period 1958-1962, the greatest rate of decline in agricultural 
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employment occured among immigrants from Asia-Africa. (see Table 6.2). 
As a result there was a change in both the supply and the structure of 
demand for agricultural labor. 
Year 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
TABLE 6.2 
Employed Jewish Men in Agriculture: 
1958-1963 (percent of total Jewish employed men) 
All Jews 
16.5 
15 .3 
15 .3 
14.7 
13.0 
12.4 
Asia-Africa 
(new immigrants) 
29.0 
25 .8 
24.2 
22.2 
n.d. 
n.d. 
Source: Ben-Porath, The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, 
Universities Press, 1966, Table 2.12, p. 32. 
The mechanization of agriculture and the shift to specialization and 
industrial crops resulted in a decline in the demand for farm workers as 
a whole, while at the same time the demand for seasonal workers 
increased. Since Jewish workers were able to find more stable 
employment in industry the need for Arab workers to fill those seasonal 
positions intensified. Similar processes of mechanizatipn and 
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specialization were experienced by other branches of the economy. For 
example, the construction industry which experienced rapid expansion due 
to the increased need to house new immigrants, also chose the route of 
mechanization and specialization. Consequently, the demand for unskilled 
labor intensified. This demand was ultimately filled, at least 
partially, through the hiring of Arab labor. The figures in Table 6. 3 
show that the percent of Arab labor employed in construction between 
1958 and 1963 increased from 19.4 to 25.6. 
TABLE 6.3 
Non-Jewish Employed men, by Industry: 
1958-1963 (percent) 
Year Agriculture Manufacturing Construction Other Total 
1958 42.4 16.1 19.4 22.1 100.0 
1959 44.0 17.2 14.8 24.0 100.0 
1960 46.8 15.7 15 .4 22.1 100.0 
1961 44.0 16.7 18.0 21.3 100.0 
1962 45.1 14.3 20.l 20.5 100.0 
1963 38.0 17.7 25.6 21. 7 100.0 
Source: Ben-Porath, The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, 
Universities Press, 1966, Table 2.11, p. 31. 
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The expansion of the labor market coupled with the anticipation of a 
limited expansion in the Jewish labor force (due to decline in 
immigration) together with a shift in the structure of demand for 
workers in certain sectors and the rising cost of Jewish labor resulted 
in an increase in demand for Arab labor. It is at this time when the 
demand for the abolition of travel restictions began intensifying (see 
Chapter 5). However, the fact that Arab labor, prior to its admission 
to the Histadrut, operated more clandestinely meant that employers did 
not have to abide by the labor union's rules concerning wages and 
benefits paid to Arab labor who were unorganized and vulnerable to such 
exploitation due to their limited resources and employment alternatives. 
Paradoxically, this weakness of the Arab labor increased their 
competitive potential and 'threat' for Jewish labor who were members of 
the Histadrut. 3 0 This competitive potential of the Arab labor and the 
corresponding fears by the Histadrut were further intensified by a 
government dicision in 1958 to begin a process of relaxation on travel 
restrictions (see Chapter 5). The next section describes the 
Histadrut's response to these and other developments. 
The Opening of the Histadrut to Arab Membership 
In 1959 the Histadrut announced its decision to open its ranks to 
Arab membership. Such an event symbolized the end of an era for the Arab 
labor force. The argument that the decision by the Histadrut was a 
result of an attempt to bridge the gap between its 'working-class' 
3 0 See Chapter 1 and Bonacich argument concerning the relationship 
between the weakness of minority labor and its threatening potential 
against majority labor. 
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'socialist-internationalist' ideology and discrimination against the 
Arabs is untenable. In the first place those who advance such an 
argument present no data in support of their claim. Secondly, if indeed 
this shift in the policy of the Histadrut towards the Arabs can be 
attributed to its egalitarian philosophy, then one would assume that 
some precipitating event(s) must have occured to elicit such a shift. 
Otherwise, how else can one explain the fact that for over 39 years the 
Histadrut was able to reconcile the differences between this presumed 
philosophy and its discrimination against Arab labor? 
The fact that one can search in vain for such event(s) which, 
suddenly, made the gap between a 39 year old ideology (1920-1959) and 
practice unbearable and in need of abridgement weakens this argument 
considerably. What brought about this decision by the Histadrut, I 
propose, was: a) the expansion of the Israeli economy and its need for 
unskilled labor which could not be met by Jewish labor; and b) the 
Histadrut 's desire to regulate the entry of the Arab labor force 
limiting its competitive potential through, among other things and in an 
awkward way, raising Arab wages so that Arab labor becomes less 
attractive to Jewish employers. 
The increasing demand for Arab labor, the result of increased demand 
for labor which could no longer be fulfilled by Jewish labor, was 
perhaps the most important factor percipitating a change in attitude of 
the Histadrut. As noted, the Histadrut was controlled by Mapai, which 
also controlled the government. Since Mapai was competing with other 
political parties for Jewish constituency, a continued control. over 
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business's access to Arab labor was neither in the best interest of the 
country or Mapai. Especially, that the near full employement among 
Jewish labor weakened in part the argument of the Histadrut against 
employing Arab labor. 
Furthermore, the mounting pressure on the government to abolish 
travel restrictions, indeed the whole military government system (see 
chapter 5), made the relaxation on travel restrictions, which were first 
introduced in 1958, a non-reversable process. This action increased the 
availability of Arab workers to Jewish employers. As non-union members 
the Arabs were not in a good bargaining position, accepting whatever 
wages and benefits they were offered. These developments placed the 
Arabs in a position of undercutting the Histadrut's efforts to secure 
more jobs and better work conditions for its Jewish members. Thus, with 
the relaxation of restriction orders the policy of exclusion by the 
Histadrut was no longer practical or enforcable. It was replaced by a 
policy of caste-like, restricting the Arab workers' mobility vertically 
into subordinate positions as well as horizontally limiting their access 
to certain job-categories. This new policy was also a policy of 
containment. 
The passage of the Employment Service Law in 1959, furthermore, made 
exclusion not only impractical but even illegal. It set up the 
Employment Service to which Histadrut labor exchanges were transferred. 
The law also required both workers and employers to resort to labor 
exchanges and prohibited discrimination on grounds of, inter alia, 
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religion, nationality or race. 31 The law's anti-discrimination measures 
against the Arabs, however, were limited. The loopholes provided by 
section 42(b) of the law left the Arab workers vulnerable to arbitrary 
measures by the labor exchange officers. This section states that "It 
shall not be considered discrimination if the character or nature of the 
task or considerations of state security prevents or prevent a person's 
being sent to or engage in some particular work." 32 
This clause seems to have provided the legal basis for disguised 
discrimination against the Arabs who alone, as a group, were considered 
high security risks. Furthermore, the law stipulates that labor 
exchanges had to be established everywhere, and the Employment Service 
regulations recognized the link between the worker and the exchange in 
his place of residence and gave priority and protection to local 
workers. Since the bulk of the Arab population lived in segregated all-
Arab towns and villages (see Table 2.3) it was possible through this 
clause to restrict the Arab workers' entry to Jewish settlements 
whenever such an action was desired. 
Hence, while the provisions of the law to control and expand labor 
exchanges somewhat legitimized the entry of much needed Arab workers to 
Jewish settlements and enterprizes, the clauses of security and localism 
provided the legal framework for the closure of certain job categories 
and positions in the face of Arabs. Since both clauses amount to a 
measure of protectionism for the Jewish workers it is likely (although I 
31 Laws of the State of Israel, 1959, vol. 13, p. 34. 
32 Ibid. p. 34. 
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have no data to support this), that the two clauses of security and 
localism were the result of a compromise negotiated by representatives 
of business and the Histadrut representing the workers. 
Nevertheless, the enact ion of the Employment Service law and the 
relaxation of travel restrictions, two not unrelated events, resulted in 
an increase in the participation of Arabs in the labor force. As can be 
seen from Table 6.4, between 1958 and 1963 the most dramatic increases 
occured in the lower (14-17) and upper (55+) age-categories. While the 
participation of the former increased from 41. 5 to 60. 6 percent the 
latter increased from 32.4 to 45.5 percent with the other age-categories 
showing only modest increases. 
The significance of these increases, particularly in the two extreme 
age-categories, lies in the fact that in times of high unemployment 
these age-categories are expendable and usually show a higher than 
average rate of unemployment (the former on the basis of lack of 
experience while the latter on the basis of weakened physical ability). 
It is when a labor shortage is experienced that those two age groups are 
recruited to the labor force. Furthermore, such recruitment could very 
well indicate a rising demand for certain, unskilled labor especially in 
the areas of agriculture and services, as the case is shown to have 
been. 
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TABLE 6.4 
Labor Force Participation of Non-Jewish Men 
by Age: 1958-1963 
Year 14-17 18-34 35-54 55+ 
1958 41.5 90.1 88.6 32.4 
1959 49.2 92.0 86.8 36.9 
1960 49.7 92.9 86.9 39.9 
1961 58.4 93.9 90.0 40.3 
1962 60.7 94.4 91.4 41.1 
1963 60.6 94.8 93.6 45.5 
Source: Ben-Porath, y., The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, 
Universities Press, 1966, Table 1.10, p. 17. 
The change in policy toward the Arab workers by the Histadrut, 
therefore, seems to have been an expression of accommodation to these 
emerging economic as well as structural realities which in the long run 
proved to be in the interest of its Jewish constituency. As is evident 
from occupational data the overall effect of the entry of Arabs on 
Jewish labor has been the upward displacement of Jews particularly 
Orientals. These dynamics seem to have been maintained beyond the 
initial period of the Arabs' entry to the labor market. The recent 
study by Epstein and Semyonov analyzing data on Arab and Jewish labor 
between the years 1969 and 1982 concludes that the higher the status of 
an occupation the more likely was the in-mobility of Jews relative to 
Arabs (both citizens and noncitizens). This led the authors to conclude 
that "although Israeli Arabs enjoyed some upward mobility, .the gap 
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between them and Jews grew wider". 3 3 That the change in policy was 
undertaken by the Histadrut as a strategy designed to combat Arab 
labor's competitiveness, and not as a result of a genuine change in its 
outlook toward Arab labor or indeed a desire to integrate Arabs, is 
further evidenced by the fact that although Arabs were accepted as 
members in 1959 it was only in 1965 that they were permitted to 
participate in the election to the Histadrut convention. In fact, until 
then (1965) the Histadrut continued to have as its official name as the 
General Federation of Jewish (emphasis added) Workers of the Land of 
Israel. 
Furthermore, one can ahw argue that a genuine change in outlook on 
the basis of egalitarian philosophy would have produced equality or at 
least equality of opportunities. While in theory Arab and Jewish members 
of the Histadrut are equal 34 in practice it has not been the case. The 
Arabs are still being dealt with through a special department (the Arab 
Department). This suggests that the Histadrut is still in favor of, and 
accordingly continues to maintain, separation between Arabs and Jews. A 
quick look at the Histadrut institutions and economic activities reveals 
that Arabs are still locked out of these institutions. According to 
Lustick, "Of the thousands of Histadrut-owned firms and factories, not 
one was located in an Arab village in 1977 .... , 35 there were, in 1975, 
only 5 Arabs on the 168-member Histadrut Executive (Vaad Hapoal) and no 
33 Lewin-Epstein, N., and Semyonov, M., 1986, p. 350. 
34 Even this statement can be contested in light of the fact that the 
Histadrut still maintains a separate Arab Department. 
35 To my knowledge this statement remains accurate even today. 
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Arab members of the 18-member Central Committee of the Histadrut. Nor 
were there any Arabs among the over 600 managers and directors-general 
of Hivrat Ovdim industries. 113 6 This means not only that Arab input or 
influence on the decision making process in the Histadrut is almost 
nonexistent but more importantly, this suggests a continuation of 
limited upward mobility for Arabs. 
Jewish Labor Protected 
I have shown, so far, that while expropriation of Arab land resulted 
in an increase in the proportion of Arab labor, the system of military 
government in conjuction with Histadrut pressures limited the access of 
this labor to the general labor market. Furthermore, I have argued that 
the expansion of the economy accompanied by an increase in labor demand 
which could not be fulfilled by Jewish labor forced structural changes 
(the eventual abolition of the system of the military government) as 
well as changes in the dynamics employed by representative of labor, the 
Histadrut (from exclusion to caste-like). 
The discussion so far seems to indicate that leaders of both the 
government and the Histadrut attempted, with great eagerness, to protect 
Jewish labor and its interests. This eagerness may have been motivated 
by nationalistic, i.e., Zionist and anti-Arab, feelings as well as 
determination on the part of those leaders to create and maintain a 
Jewish working class in accordance with the original Zionist ideology 
and aspirations. 37 
36 Lustick, 1980, pp. 96-7. 
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I propose, however, that part of the reason that Jewish labor needed 
such protective measures lies in the competitive potential of Arab 
labor. And one of the most important factors which made Arab labor 
attractive and increased their competitive potential against Jewish 
workers is wage differentials. It must be emphasized at this juncture, 
however, that while the initial differnces in wages are partly rooted in 
the unequal development of the two sectors prior to the establishment of 
the state, mostly reflected in differences in living conditions, style 
of life and other matters (see Chapter 1), the continuation of wage 
differentials between Arabs and Jews are partially an artifcat of 
restrictions, land confiscation, the Histadrut' s practices and other 
policies which continue to reproduce these conditions. 
The next two sections will document Arab-Jewish differentiation in 
terms of hierarchical location and wages. Although systematic data with 
regard to differences in wages do not seem to be available it is 
possible, nevertheless, with the help of sporadic data and background 
variables to shed some light on this aspect of Jewish-Arab relations. 
In general, differences in wages can be manifested in two ways: a) 
differential in sectoral and hierarchical positioning, or b) differences 
in wages for similar work within the same or similar sectors. 
3 7 The coincidence between the government views and those of the 
Histadrut may have been in part due to the fact that most leaders of the 
government fulfilled important posts in the Histadrut prior to the 
establishment of the state. And, until 1977, when the Labor Alignment 
lost the elections to the likod, both the government and the Hi_stadrut 
were controlled by Mapai. (see further details on biographies of some 
of the leaders in chapter .... ) 
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Sectoral and Hierarchical Positioning of the Arabs 
While differences in wages and benefits on the basis of job 
differentiation and positioning are accepted norms in any stratification 
system, it is the concentration of a certain category of people (whether 
this category is based on race, religion or ethnicity) which raises 
questions. In the case of the Arabs in Israel, since the establishment 
of the state they have been primarily concentrated in those sectors of 
the economy which demand few skills and in which remuneration and work 
conditions are among the lowest. Table 6.5 below shows a rough 
distribution of the Arab labor force between 1954 and 1963 by sector. 
TABLE 6.5 
Non-Jewish Employed Men by Occupation: 1954-1963 (percent) 
Year Profess. & Traders Farmers Transport Manufac- Service Total 
Administ. workers turing & Workers 
workers Construct. 
1954 6.0 6.5 53.7 2.3 27.2 4.3 100.0 
1955 7.2 7.7 48.0 4.3 28.8 4.3 100.0 
1956 7.1 7.3 50.7 3.7 26.5 4.7 100.0 
1957 5.4 5.4 46.0 2.8 35.5 4.9 100.0 
1958 5.4 7.0 40.7 4.1 37.5 5.3 100.0 
1959 5.6 6.8 43.2 3.8 34.0 6.6 100.0 
1960 6.0 6.6 45.5 4.4 31.3 6.2 100.0 
1961 5.1 5.3 42.9 3.9 36.0 6.8 100.0 
1962 5.2 5.8 44.0 5.1 34.6 5.3 100.0 
1963 5.7 5.0 38.0 5.0 43.8 6.3 100.0 
Source: Ben-Porath, y., The Arab 
-- --
Labor Force 
--- ---
in Israel, Jerusalem, 
Universities Press, 1966, Table 2.8, p. 29. 
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The most striking piece of information presented in Table 6.5 is the 
high concentration of Arabs in agriculture and construction. A more 
careful examination of the Table would reveal that the annual decline in 
the proportion of agricultural workers was absorbed almost entirely by 
the construction branch. The decline in agricultural workers was shown 
in chapter 4 to have been, partially, a result of Arab land confiscation 
policies. The difficulty in separating self-employed Arabs in 
agriculture from Arab wage laborers (on Arab and Jewish farms) makes it 
also difficult to assess the exact implications of land confiscation on 
the transformation of Arab labor. As noted earlier, however, during the 
late 1950's some of the Arab labor was channeled to agricultural labor 
in order to fill the vacancy created by occupational shifts of Jewish 
labor from agriculture to industry. 
Part of this Arab labor which was channelled to agriculture may have 
also been employed in agriculture in the Arab sector, either as self-
employed land owners or as wage laborers. Had it not been for this fact 
the rate of decline in Arab agricultural workers may have been even 
greater. 
It is of sociological significance, therefore, to point out that 
while occupationally some of the Arabs engaged in agricultural work did 
not experience a shift, their status was, nevertheless, transformed from 
independent to dependent workers; from self-employed land-owners into 
hired agricultural workers. The figures in the Table do not reflect this 
reality. Those Arabs did not only experience a decline in their 
occupational status but by going to agriculture they also over-crowded 
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this sector which is partially responsible for the depressed wages it 
offers in comparison with other employment sectors. 38 
TABLE 6.6 
Non-Jewish Employed Persons as Percent of All Employed 
persons, by Industry: 1961-1963 
Both Sexes Men 
1961 1963 1961 1963 
Agriculture 22.1 22.0 23.3 23.2 
Manufacturing 4.9 5.4 5.8 6.3 
Construction 13.5 18.0 13.8 18.3 
Other Industies 3.4 3.6 4.5 4. 7 
All Industries 7.9 8.1 9.2 9.7 
Source: Ben-Porath, y., The Arab Labor Force in Israel, Jerusalem, 
Universities Press, 1966, Table 2.3, p. 25. 
Table 6. 6 shows that in comparison with the Jewish population the 
Arab labor force have been over represented in agriculture and 
construction and under-represented in those job-categories which have 
high pay and good job conditions. While the Arabs accounted for about 11 
percent of the total population during the specified period 3 9 they 
accounted for 22 percent of all agricultural labor. Similarly, in 
38 See Chapter 1 for an expanded discussion on the effect of 
crowdedness on the reproduction of split labor market. 
39 Friedlander, The Population ... , TABLE 2.1, p. 30. 
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construction the Arabs accounted for about 18 percent in 1963. 
Between 1950 and 1973 the proportion of Arab workers in the 
construction sector rose from 6 to 25.5 percent. 40 This proportion would 
have been even greater had it not been for Palestinian workers from the 
occupied West-Bank and Gaza who were also channeled, in part, into the 
construction industry. A survey of this industry, which was conducted in 
1975 in Haifa, shows the proportion of the Israeli Arabs in construction 
to be 42.9 percent compared to 36.5 percent of the Jews and 20.5 percent 
of the Arabs from the West Bank. 41 
Although census data provide an indication of the occupational 
positioning of the Arabs it is very difficult to infer the sociological 
significance of the employer/employee status. In his 1969 study of Um 
el-Fahm, an Arab village of about 11,000 people at the time (in 1986 the 
village's population was reported to have reached 22,000 and its 
municipal status was upgraded to city), Garaisy reported that 92 percent 
of his sample of 116 villagers working in Jewish settlements occupied 
subordinate positions. Only 8 percent were in supervisory roles, and 
95. 8 percent of the respondents had Jewish supervisors while for 4. 5 
percent the supervisors were Arabs. 42 
40 Yachiel Harari, The Arabs in Israel: Facts and Figures, no. 4, 
Givat Haviva, Center for Arab and Afro-Asian Studies, 1974, p. 20. 
Cited in Zureik, The Palestinians in Israel, 1979, p. 124. 
41 Y. Waschitz, "Commuters and Enterpreneurs", New Outlook, vol. 18, 
1975, pp. 45-46. 
4 2 S. Garaisy, "Arab Village Youth in Jewish Urban Centers: A Study 
of Youth from Um El-Fahm Working in Tel-Aviv Metropolitan Area", 
unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Brandeis University, 1971. Cited in 
Zureik, 1979, p. 125. 
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Hence, the concentration of Arabs in those sectors (see Table 6.6), 
despite the fact that they offer low wages and no mobility chances can 
only be a result of the closure of other possibilities. Lack of 
interest by the Histadrut in integrating Arab workers in other branches 
of the economy makes it particularly responsible for this state of 
affairs. It is possible that by not integrating the Arabs the Histadrut 
attempted to prevent over-crowdedness in those other branches of the 
economy thereby protecting the highly desirable occupations and 
positions for its Jewish constituency. As the following quote 
demonstrates, Arabs were not only pushed to menial jobs but even when 
they became organized within the Histadrut they continued to work for 
lower wages and were considered to work harder than their Jewish 
counterparts (more on this later). Writing in 1962, Zeev Schiff of 
Haaretz notes: 
Even when he is an organized worker registered with the Histadrut, 
the Arab does not entertain great illusions, he comes primarily to 
work. . . Another reason for the Jewish employer's preference for 
Arab worker is that his wages are generally lower. 43 
Arab-Jewish Wage Differentials 
Throughout the post-state period Arab labor was said to have been 
willing to accept lower wages than Jewish labor, becoming, therefore, 
cheaper than Jewish labor to employ. One of the main reasons for the 
'cheapness' of labor, according to Bonacich, is the lack of resources 
available to this labor. I have shown elsewhere (see chapter 4) that as 
a result of the 1948 war over half of the Arabs who remained in Israel 
43 Haaretz, October 19, 1962. 
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lost their land or a major portion of it. Furthermore, I have shown 
that through systematic expropriation of land many Arabs lost part or 
all of their property. Thus, whether intended or not, the establishment 
of the state coupled with certain governmental policies resulted in a 
loss of much of the resources over which Arabs had control. 
The same argument could be made with respect to political resources. 
Although Arabs were never disenfranchised, their political activities 
were confined within the existing Zionist parties. They were never 
allowed to form their own political party or develop into a pressure 
group. The few attempts to organize politically and enter elections to 
the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) in the late 1950's and early 1960's 
were immediately suppressed and the leaders for the most part were 
banished, detained or put under house arrest. 44 
With little economic and political resources, and a lack of union 
protection, the Arabs proved to be an easy target for exploitation. One 
of the hardest to prove and most disguised form of exploitation, 
however, is the existence of wage differentials between Jews and Arabs 
doing the same or comparable work. However, the best available data 
suggest that between 1949 and 1952 Arab wages were roughly 35 to 70 
percent of the Jewish wages for similar work. The smallest gap was 
between Jewish and Arab skilled workers. 45 However, one should bear in 
44 For a detailed account of these attempts, most notably the Al-Ard 
(the Land) movement and the treatment its leaders received by the 
Israeli authorities as well as the press such as continuous harrassment, 
banishment, and house confinement, see Lustick, 1980; Jiryis, 1976; 
Landau, 1968. 
45 Ben-Porath, 1966, p. 70. 
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mind that the latter category (skilled labor) encompasses a very small 
proportion of the Arab labor force. As late as 1960 it was estimated 
that Arabs working in agriculture earned half as much as Jews working in 
similar jobs. 46 It is important to note that during that period almost 
half of the Arab labor force was employed in agriculture (see Table 
6. 5). And the ratio of Arab to Jewish workers working in "Jewish 
agriculture" was estimated in 1975 by a study for the Ministry of 
Agriculture to be 6:10. 47 That is to say, almost 38 percent of the total 
labor engaged in agricultural work were Arabs. This is far greater than 
the 13 percent which represent the proportion of the Arabs in the 
population. 
Few studies have attempted to compare the average incomes of working 
Arabs and Jews. While family income cannot be taken as a direct measure 
of wages it, nevertheless, sheds light on some of its aspects. Ian 
Lustick shows that in 1975/1976 the average per capita income among 
Arabs living in urban areas was 572 IL (Israeli Lira), while per capita 
Jewish income in these same areas was 1,687 IL, 48 almost three-times 
that of the Arabs. Keep in mind that the great majority of the Arabs 
live in what are classified as rural areas (see Table 2.3) and have 
incomes that are, in general, much lower than urban employees. With 
regard to this fact, Lustick comments that "Judging from a comparison of 
46 S. Zarhi and A. Achiezra, 
Minority in Israel, no. 1, Givat 
Studies, 1966, p. 12. 
47 Waschitz, 1975, p. 48. 
48 Ian Lustick, 1980, p. 7. 
The Economic Conditions of the Arab 
- -- ---Haviva, Center for Arab and Afro-Asian 
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living conditions in these villages with those prevailing in the towns, 
there is every reason to think that had the large villages been included 
in the survey, the gap between Jewish and Arab incomes would be shown to 
be considerably wider." 49 
A survey sponsored by the Histadrut in thirty Arab villages revealed 
the average income per Arab family in 1969 to have been 3,910 IL, 50 This 
is compared to an average income of Jewish families of 10,500 IL for the 
same year. 51 In 1971 yet another study of income inequality showed the 
average income of Jewish families to have been 12,900 IL compared to 
8,600 IL average income of Arab families. 52 While one can only speculate 
on the discrepancies between the differe:'lt estimates, the fact remains 
that they all report large gaps in the average incomes between Jewish 
and Arab families. 53 
49 Ibid., fn. 27, p. 276. 
50 Gutman E., Klaf H., and Levi S., The Histadrut and its Activities 
in the Arab Sector: Research on the Status, Opinions and Behavior of 
Arab Villagers in Israel. Jerusalem, Israel Institute for Applied 
Social Research, 1971, (Hebrew), p. 20. Cited in Lustick, 1980, p. 7. 
51 Lustick, 1980, Table 1, p. 7; Zureik, 1979, Table 5.9, p. 126. 
5 2 Remba Oded, "Income Inequality in Israel: Ethnic Aspects," in 
Michael Curtis and Mordechai Chertoff (eds.), Israel: Social Structure 
and Change, New Brunswick, N. J. Transaction Books, 1973, p. 207. 
53 Since the different estimates do not relate to the same years the 
discrepancies between them may be partly due to inflation which, in 
Israel affects the level of wages in absolute as well as in relative 
terms. An agreement which was signed and has been in effect since 1952 
with periodic revisions between the government, the Industrialists Union 
and the Histadrut stipulates that part of their wages employees should 
receive cost-of-living allowance which is sensitive to inflation. For 
more details on the way these calculations are made and their effect on 
the level of inflation, see Pack, 1971, pp. 201-205. 
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Two conclusions can be drawn from what has been said. First, the 
relative occupational distribution of Jews and Arabs since the 
establishment of the state has been unfavorable to the Arabs. Data on 
employment show that as late as 1975, 19.2 percent of the Arabs compared 
with 51.1 percent of the Jews held white-collar (scientific, 
professional, managerial, clerical and business) jobs. 54 The grouping 
together of these occupational categories, however, gives a false 
impression concerning the extent of Arab involvement in these top jobs 
since most Arab white-collar workers are employed by the Ministry of 
Education as school teachers in the Arab sector. 
In a survey taken in 1963 of high school graduates, for example, it 
was reported that of the 457 respondents 98 were unemployed. Of those 
who were employed, 39.6 percent worked as school teachers, 21.2 percent 
as clerks, 8. 0 percent as laborers and 31. 2 percent were continuing 
their education in Israel and abroad. 5 5 That is to say, of those 
employed in white collar occupations 65 percent were school teachers. 
Furthermore, in another study which was sponsored by the government, it 
was reported that 47.3 percent of those Arab university graduates who 
received their degrees between 1961 and 1971 and were employed in white 
collar occupations worked as teachers. 56 
54 For these comparisons and others, see also S. Smooha, Israel: 
Pluralism and Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, 
pp. 138-41. 
55 Attalah Mansour, "Arab Intellectuals Not Integrated," New Outlook, 
7, no. 3, June 1964, p. 28. 
56 Eli Rechess, ~ Survey of Israeli-Arab Graduates from Inst~tutions 
of Higher Learning in Isreal, (1961-1971), Cited in Lustick, 1980, p. 
21. 
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Other categories of employment show that for the same year (1975), 
the nonskilled workers among the Arabs amounted to 13.0 percent compared 
with 5.2 percent among the Jews; 40.3 percent of the Arab employees were 
concentrated in the low-status blue-collar branches of agriculture and 
construction compared with only 11.8 percent of Jews. 
The second conclusion to be drawn is that while admission of Arabs to 
the labor union has contributed somewhat to a rise in their wages, no 
equalization effect either occupationally or in terms of hierarchical 
positioning, which reflect wages and incomes, were allowed to take 
place. Arabs are still paid less than Jews for doing the same work. 
Similarly, while differences in per capita incomes bet•.-1een Arab and 
Jewish families have narrowed they are still wide. It is reported that 
in 1973 the per capita income of an average Arab family reached 56 
percent of an average income of a Jewish family. This is compared to 35 
percent reported in 1956-7. 5 7 These figures are consistent with the 
figures reported by Zarhi and Acheizra which show that in 1963 the 
average income of an Arab earner is 45 percent of that of a Jewish 
earner. 58 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is expected that Arab 
family incomes will continue to increase but only up to a point. Since 
incomes reflect both wages and occupational and hierarchical locations, 
and since Arabs are not expected to reach or even come close to reaching 
parity with respect to either their occupational distribution or 
57 Smooha, 1978, p. 140. 
58 S. Zarhi and A. Acheizra, 1966, p.12. 
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hierarchical positioning, it follows that parity in incomes with the 
Jewish families should not be expected. 
Summary 
On the basis of the foregoing it is possible to highlight several 
observations. First, the Histadrut has been antagonistic toward Arab 
labor and its policies have affected their wages and occupational and 
hierarchical locations. During the first eleven years of statehood 
(1948-59) Arab labor was kept out of the Histadrut which practiced a 
policy of total exclusion of Arab labor. This lack of union protection 
increased the vulnerability of Arab labor to exploitation. 
Second, even the opening up of the Histadrut to Arab membership seems 
to have been in line with its original ideology of serving Jewish labor. 
This step was taken by the Histadrut following a relaxation on travel 
restriction (itself a function of the pressure of expanding economy and 
increased demand for labor) which resulted in an increase in Arab 
labor's participation in the labor market. The latter placed Arabs in a 
more threatening position to Jewish labor because of their wage 
differentials. 
Clearly, then, equalization of wages and benefits for similar work 
was in the long-term interest of expensive, i.,e., Jewish labor, because 
it minimizes competition and undercutting allowing expensive labor to 
preserve whatever gains they had achieved. The ext ens ion of union 
protection to Arab labor has produced such equalization between Arab and 
Jewish labor to a great extent. The immediate results for the Arabs 
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have been a considerable improvement in their wages, incomes and status. 
Had Arab labor not been extended union protection, equalization of wages 
would still have happened as a result of freer entry of Arabs to the 
labor market and the resulting effect of crowdedness. However, such 
equalization would have occured under most unfa\r.orable conditions to 
Jewish labor, who would have been dragged down trying to compete with 
cheaper labor. 
The Histadrut opened itself to Arab membership only after the passage 
of the Employment Service Law (1959) which set forth the mechanisms of 
protectionsm and preservation for Jewish labor. The law not only 
provided a basis of justification for limiting the accessabilty to 
certain occupations and positions to Jews (by virtue of their security 
standings) but the freer entry of Arabs under these conditions has had 
the effect of upward displacement of Jewish labor. The lack of 
objections by the Histadrut to this differential treatment of its 
members coupled with the fact that the Histadrut itself still maintains 
a separate department for Arab labor leads me to conclude that the 
admission of Arabs to the Histadrut was merely a strategy designed to 
protect Jewish labor and not to integrate the Arabs. To use a different 
terminology, the status of the Arabs was transformed from exclusion to 
caste-like. This is to say that by extending union protection to Arab 
labor the Histadrut was not compromising the interests of its Jewish 
constituency. Far from it. The data presented show that the Arabs take 
jobs which, for the most part, are least desired by Jews. The more 
prestigious jobs are reserved, through protectionist policies, to Jewish 
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labor. Furthermore, while both Arabs and Jews were shown to have 
improved their occupational status and incomes, the rate of improvement 
among Jews has been far greater. Hence, while the gap in incomes 
between the two groups was very wide prior to the admission of Arabs to 
the Histadrut, the data presented in this chapter show that xoward the 
1980's this gap grew even wider. From this perspective, it could be 
argued that the Histadrut is still continuing in its long-standing 
tradition of protecting Jewish labor, and will continue to do so in the 
foreseable future. 
As to the business sector, while its access to Arab labor was limited 
during the initial period, employers benefited from the lack of union 
protection for the Arabs. Hence, whereas the business sector was active 
against the travel restrictions there was no such activity on behalf of 
status equalization of Arabs with Jewish labor. Needless to say that 
following the 1967 war and the occupation of the West-Bank and Gaza, 
business gained access to the biggest pool of non-unionized, disoriented 
and cheap labor yet. And, it is there where business has been 
successful in resisting Histadrut's attempts to get employers to pay 
higher wages and better benefits for the noncitizen Arab labor which 
would, inevitably, limit their competitive potential agianst the 
Histadrut's Jewish and citizen Arab constituency. 
Finally, it is of interest to note that as an employer the Histadrut 
should have been equally interested in cheap labor. After all, the 
Histadrut owns and manages many economic firms and projects. By the mid 
1960's the Histadrut had become one of the largest employers in the 
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country, second only to the government. It is reported that by 1968 the 
Histadrut owned, either fully or in part, 54 of the 205 top companies in 
Israel. 59 However, for the Histadrut to have preferred short economic 
gains, by allowing free entry of Arabs to a tight labor market, over 
long term interests would have been irrational politically and 
ideologically. First, the Histadrut was a 'national institution' and 
was competing for constituency among the Jewish population. Second, it 
was ideologically committed to the Zionist ideas and for a long time 
advocated the idea of 'Jewish labor'. Deviation from such ideas over-
night would not have been either feasible or politically clever. The 
third and most important factor perhaps, was the fact that the Histadrut 
was controlled by Mapai (the ruling party at the time) and so was the 
government. Leaders of the government and the Histadrut were related 
(either ideologically or personally) 60 which made the Histadrut more 
susceptible to influence by the leaders of Mapai and, perhaps, vice 
versa. Advocating policies which negatively effect Jewish labor, 
therefore, would have been contrary to party interests. 
59 See details in Uri Davis, Israel ... 1977, pp. 100-103. 
60 Ibid, p. 103. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this study an attempt was made to describe and analyse factors 
which hindered the full integration of the Arab minority in Israel into 
the economic, political and social life of the state. Since the 
establishment of the state the Arabs have been 'welcomed' to a 
subordinate minority status where they still remain after almost four 
decades of statehood. 
There is no doubt that the Palestinian-Jewish conflict which began 
long before Israel was established has played a major role in the 
treatment of the Arabs. The continued emphasis on the sectarian 
character of the state as a Jewish state through the adoption of Jewish 
symbols, history and laws which serve the interests of the Jewish 
people, provided the basis for the Arab-Jewish division within the 
state. By virtue of definition, such emphasis regards the Arabs as 
outsiders and justifies their treatment as nonequals. 
However, despite the continuation and even the intensification of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, certain liberalization of policies toward 
the Arabs have ensued. These can hardly be attributed to any effective 
struggle by the Arabs or to the goodwill of the Israeli authorities. 
The Arabs were never allowed to organize in an independent political 
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party nor could they have developed into an effective pressure group 
within the Israeli political system. The Arab minority which remained 
in Israel was basically rural and leaderless, a fact which was further 
exacerbated by intra-Arab cleavages along religious, parochial and 
geographic lines. These divisions, which had been maintained during the 
Ottoman rule and the British mandate, and reinforced by the Israelis, 
delayed the development of national spokesmen for the Arabs. 
On the other hand, it would be naive to argue that changes in 
policies come as a result of the goodwill of governments. Governments, 
and particularly elected governments, tend to be sensitive ·to the 
interests and pressures of their constituency. The Israeli government 
is no exception. By virtue of numerical superiority of Jews over the 
Arabs (87:13) and a sense of shared goals and interests, the Jews rather 
than the Arabs, are the ones considered the real constituency. Hence, 
policies toward the Arabs seem to be attuned to the service of the 
Jewish, rather than the Arab, population. 
Needless to say, the interests of the Jewish community do not always 
converge and even come in conflict at times. For example, the interests 
of the religious versus the non-religious, labor versus capital, 
Orientals versus Ashkenazim, and so on. Throughout this study I have 
maintianed that the status of the Arab minority in Israel has been 
sensitive to intra-Jewish conflicts, itself a function of Jewish inter-
ethnic differentiation between, mainly, Ashkenazim and Orientals. I 
have shown that as a consequence of this Jewish inter-ethnic 
differentiation differential attitudes toward the Arabs have been 
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institutionalized in the Jewish population. The correspondence between 
the attitudes of the two Jewish ethnic groups toward the Arabs and their 
respective conflicting benefits lend substantial support to this 
argument. 
I have argued that Orientals, by virtue of their differentiated 
position relative to Ashkenazim benefit the most from a rigid Arab-
Jewish division. Subsequently, I have shown that not only do Orientals 
express more hostile attitudes toward the Arabs than do Ashkenazim, but 
they also support policies which have the effect of keeping the Arabs in 
a subordinate position. On the other hand, it was argued that while 
Ashkenazim, in general, benefit from an Arab-Jewish division their 
benefits are greatest when such a division is less rigid and therefore 
may support or object to those policies in accordance with their 
perceived intersts. As an example, it was shown that while hardly any 
objection was raised over the expropriation of Arab land, the policies 
of restriction on the movement of Arabs drew harsh criticisms, and 
objections to such policies seem to have intensified in conjunction with 
economic expansion and decline in immigration rates. Similarly, Jewish 
voices were kept silent over the objection of the Histadrut to extend 
union protection to Arab labor which made them more vulnerable to 
exploitation. 
This selective advocacy of liberal approaches to the Arabs by certain 
segments of the Jewish population is a reflection of the interests of 
those segments. It was shown that whereas land expropriation resulted 
in the generation of Arab labor which had the potential of serving the 
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interests of the business community, the policy of travel restriction 
limited the access of this community to the cheap labor. Hence, self-
interest seems to be the motive which dictated the response of the 
business community toward those issues. 
On the other hand, labor was shown to be antagonistic to Arabs. 
Exclusion was advocated and practiced whenever it was politically and 
economically feasible. However, when exclusion could not be practiced 
it was replaced with a caste-like treatment. During the first eleven 
years of statehood (1948-59) the Histadrut, representing labor, refused 
membership to Arab labor and fought against their employment. But even 
when it admitted Arabs to its ranks the Histadrut sought to enhance the 
interests of its Jewish constituency rather than integrate the Arabs on 
an equal basis. Consequently, while the Arabs gained considerably in 
terms of wages, incomes and occupational status, the limitations on 
their upward mobility and occupational undertakings still persist and 
are the basis for continuously widening gap between Arabs and Jews. The 
fact that these limitations have been institutionalized and legitimized 
by the Employment Service Law (1959) suggests that any improvement in 
the occupational status of the Arabs will always lag behind that of 
Jews. 
If the attitudes of Orientals toward the Arabs are not a derivative 
of these dynamics, they nevertheless have been institutionalized 
through the labor market. It must be recalled that while Ashkenazim 
occupy the managerial and upper positions, the Orientals in general man 
the middle and lower rungs of the occupational hierarchy. Since these 
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are the only positions open to Arabs a competitive and confrontational 
relationships develop between them and Orientals. It was also shown 
that as a result of more integrational policies toward the Arabs, the 
middle-class Orientals stand to lose certain employment opportunities 
and that the Oriental community may have to share development funds with 
the Arabs. Hence, both lower and middle-class Orientals are more likely 
to adopt antagonistic attitudes toward any notion of liberalization 
toward the Arabs. 
Implications and Future Developments 
Th~ split labor market perspective predicts that in the absence of 
conditions which reproduce a split in the labor market certain 
equalization will occur. Among the most effective of the factors which 
continuously help reproduce a split in the labor market is the presence 
of a strong ideology. However, it has not been made clear by this 
perspective under what conditions, short of a complete disappearance of 
ideology, equalization can be acheived. 
As noted, throughout the statehood period ideology has been used to 
rationalize the maintenance of the Arab-Jewish division and the limited 
progress toward full integration of the Arabs into the life of the 
state. Without the use of ideology it would have been very difficult 
nationally and internationally, for example, to forcefully transfer over 
two-thirds of the land from Arab to Jewish hands, restrict the movement 
and limit the civil and political freedom and organization of the Arabs, 
and maintain the Arabs outside the labor market or in its lower rungs. 
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The ideology used by Jews to justify domination over the Arabs 
stresses the their 'inherent' right over the land of Palestine, 
emphasizing the fact that Israel was established for the purpose of 
'redeeming' the land and the Jewish people. Accordingly, the rights of 
Jews are superior to others. This ideology has not only not weakened 
but in fact has been recently gaining strength. It is in this fact that 
the grimmness of the findings of this study for the future of the Arab 
minority lies. Ideology in Israel has been institutionalized through 
such things as the national anthem, the Star of David, the Law of 
Return, and the continued operation of Jewish, but not Israeli agencies, 
nuch as the JNF and the Jewish Agency. Such institutionalization has 
made ineffective the efforts of some Jewish groups --such as Shelli, the 
Civil Rights Movement and Mapam-- who oppose the treatment of Arabs as 
second class citizens. The continuation of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict which provided the basis for ideological rationalization and 
whose outcome is very difficult to predict makes any conclusions 
regarding the future of the Arab minority in Israel at best tentative. 
On the other hand, since its establishment Israel has experienced a 
very high economic growth rate due, in no small measure, to 
contributions from the World Jewish community, reparation from West 
Germany and much financial and military support from other Western 
countries. This expansion, irrespective of its sources and causes, has 
also benefited the Arab minority in an indirect way through a continuous 
rise in demand for labor which precipitated a liberalization of policies 
toward the Arabs. Under more stringent conditions the Arabs would not 
have experienced such liberalization. 
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Hence, it should not be surprising to find that in times of slow 
economic growth and high unemployment, such as the one experienced since 
1983, hostility against the Arabs in general and Arab labor in 
particular reappear. Here, again, ideology is invoked and latent 
feelings of hostility are aroused. Arabs are blamed for high 
unemployment among Jews. As Meier Kahane (a member of Knesset since 
1984 and the head of a right wing party, Kach), addressing a gathering 
of Oriental Jews explains: "the greedy Jewish employer can hire two 
Arabs for the wages of one Jew." 1 The way to deal with this Jewish greed 
is to throw the Arabs out. As Kahane explains to his audience, "there 
is one solution. It is not partial solution. ARABS OUT (emphasis in 
original) .... That's the solution .... Don't ask me how ... Let me be a 
minister of defense for two months and not a single cockroach will be 
left here. I promise you a clean Eretz Israel". 2 
The significance of Kahane's ideas and statements is not that they 
demonstrate Kahane's racism, which has been established since the days 
when he headed the JDL (Jewish Defense League) in the United States. 
The significance of such statements lies, rather, in the growing support 
for such ideas among the Israeli public. While during the 1970's Kahane 
was considered marginal in Israeli society, in 1984 he won a seat in the 
Parliament, and as noted (see Chapter 2) in 1985 over 40 percent of 
young Israelis are reported to be sympathetic to Kahane and his ideas. 
A few public opinion polls report that in coming elections Kahane is 
1 New Outlook, July, 1985, p. 13. 
2 Ibid., p. 13. 
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expected to increase his parliamentary power substantially, and that his 
support among Orientals is gaining in strength. 3 
If the increase in support for Kahane and/or his ideas are indeed 
related to the economic conditions, then a further deterioration in the 
economic situation will have grave consequences for the Arabs. It is 
conceivable that as a result of high unemployment due either to a 
continued stagnation of the economy or a resumption of Jewish mass 
immigration (for example from Russia) or both, the process of 
incorporating the Arabs will not only be halted but even reversed, 
especially, if the ideology to support such a development continues to 
be operative. The fact that both conditions, i.e., continued economic 
weakness and mass immigration, are likely to happen (considering the 
world economic problems and the recent developments in the Israeli-
Russian relations) leads me to conclude that the final chapter on the 
Arab minority in Israel has yet to be written. 
3 Ibid., pp. 11-14. 
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